Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill — Bill proceedings: Commons: All proceedings up to 24 February 2026

Committee StageTuesday 24 February 2026
Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and
Information Systems) Bill
(Committee Stage Decisions)
This document sets out the fate of each clause, schedule, amendment and new clause considered at
committee stage.
A glossary with key terms can be found at the end of this document.
First to Seventh Sittings
First and Second Sittings
Kanishka Narayan Agreed to
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 3
February) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 3 February;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 5 February;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 10 February;
(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 24 February;
(e) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 26 February;
(f) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 3 March;
(g) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 5 March;
2. the Committee shall hear oral evidence on Tuesday 3 February in accordance with
the following Table:
Witness Time
Royal United Services Institute; DLA Piper Until no later than 10.00 am

Witness Time
techUK; Nine23; ISC2 Until no later than 10.40 am
Cisco; Darktrace; NCC Group; Amazon Until no later than 11.25 am
Information Commissioner's Office; OFCOM;
OFGEM
Until no later than 2.40 pm
Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China Until no later than 3.00 pm
Professor John Child, Professor of Criminal
Law, University of Birmingham
Until no later than 3.20 pm
National Police Chiefs’ Council Until no later than 3.40 pm
The Worshipful Company of Information
Technologists
Until no later than 4.00 pm
NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Until no later than 4.20 pm
Fortinet; Palo Alto Networks Until no later than 4.50 pm
Department for Science, Innovation and
Technology
Until no later than 5.10 pm
3. proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the
following order: Clauses 1 to 22; Schedule 1; Clause 23; Schedule 2; Clauses 24 to
61; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
4. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion
at 5.00 pm on Thursday 5 March.
Kanishka Narayan Agreed to
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee
shall be reported to the House for publication.
Kanishka Narayan Agreed to
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee
shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.
The following Witnesses gave oral evidence:
Jen Ellis, Associate Fellow, Cyber and Tech, RUSI,
David Cook, Partner, DLA Piper,
Jill Broom, Head of Cyber Resilience, techUK,
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 2

Stuart McKean, CEO, Nine23,
Dr Sanjana Mehta, Senior Director for Advocacy, ISC2,
Matt Houlihan, Vice President for Government Affairs in Europe, CISCO UK and Ireland,
Ben Lyons, Senior Director of Policy and Public Affairs, Darktrace,
Chris Anley, Chief Scientist, NCC Group,
Dr Ian Levy CMG OBE, VP of Security, Amazon,
Ian Hulme, Interim Executive Director of Regulatory Supervision and Director of Regulatory
Assurance, Information Commissioner's Office,
Natalie Black CBE, Group Director for Infrastructure and Connectivity, OFCOM,
Stuart Okin, Director of Cyber Regulation and AI, OFGEM,
Chung Ching Kwong, Senior Analyst, Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China,
Professor John Child, Professor of Criminal Law, University of Birmingham and Co-founding
Director of the Criminal Law Reform Now Network,
Detective Chief Superintendent Andrew Gould, Programme Lead, NPCC Cyber Crime programme,
National Police Chiefs’ Council,
Richard Starnes, Chair, Information Security Panel for the Worshipful Company of Information
Technologists,
Brian Miller, Head of IT Security and Compliance, NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde,
Stewart Whyte, Data Protection Officer, NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde,
Chris Parker MBE, Director, Government Strategy, Fortinet,
Carla Baker, Senior Director, Government Affairs UK&I, Palo Alto Networks,
Kanishka Narayan MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Minister for AI and Online
Safety), Department for Science, Innovation and Technology,
Third and Fourth Sittings
Clauses 1 to 3 agreed to.
Agreed to_Gov_11 Kanishka Narayan
. Clause 4, page 3, line 5, column 3, leave out from beginning to “the” in line 6
3 COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026

Member's explanatory statement
This amendment and Amendment 12 would remove the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation
and Technology as a joint regulator for the data infrastructure subsector, leaving the Office of
Communications acting as the sole regulator for that subsector.
Agreed to_Gov_12 Kanishka Narayan
. Clause 4, page 3, line 7, leave out “(acting jointly)”
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 11.
Clause, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 5 and 6 agreed to.
Agreed to_Gov_13 Kanishka Narayan
. Clause 7, page 7, line 7, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“(b) a pool of computing resources is “scalable” if the resources are flexibly
allocated by the provider of the service, irrespective of the geographical
location of the resources, in order to handle fluctuations in demand;
(c) a pool of computing resources is “elastic” if the resources are provided
and released according to demand, in order to rapidly increase and
decrease available resources depending on workload;
(d) computing resources are “shareable” if—
(i) multiple users share a common access to the service, which is
provided from the same electronic equipment, and
(ii) processing is carried out separately for each user.”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would refine and make further provision about certain aspects of the definition
of “cloud computing service”.
Clause, as amended, agreed to.
Negatived on division_25 David Chadwick
Freddie van Mierlo
Victoria Collins
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 4

. Clause 8, page 7, line 31, at the end insert—
“(1A) In paragraph (1), after “risks” insert “, including risks arising from fraud,””
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would explicitly include fraud as one of the risks to the security of network and
information systems relevant digital service providers must identify and manage.
Not called_28 Tom Collins
. Clause 8, page 8, line 4, at end insert—
“(4) After paragraph (2) insert—
“(2A) When taking measures to manage risks under paragraph (1), a RDSP
must, in the design of the relevant digital service—
(a) eliminate unnecessary functions from system requirements;
(b) where risks cannot be managed by the elimination of functions,
replace or substitute features in the architecture of the system;
(c) where risks cannot be managed by the replacement or
substitution of features, implement active functional controls;
(d) where risks cannot be managed by the implementation of active
functional controls, instruct and implement operational and
procedural controls;
(e) as a matter of last resort, apply requirements, conditions of use
or instructions to service users.
(2B) For the purposes of paragraph (1), “risks” include those relating to the
availability, reliability, safety, integrity, maintainability and
confidentiality of the relevant services or systems.””
Clause agreed to.
Clause 9 agreed to.
Not called_10 Matt Western
Emily Thornberry
Sir Gavin Williamson
Mike Martin
Sarah Champion
Edward Morello
Liam Byrne
5 COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026

. Clause 10, page 9, line 29, at end insert—
“(2A) The measures taken by an RMSP under paragraph (1) must ensure that the
number of customers to whom the RMSP provides services does not exceed
the critical risk threshold.
(2B) In paragraph (2A), the “critical risk threshold” is the number of customers
within a sector or subsector where an incident affecting the provision of services
to those customers by the RMSP would result in disruption that is likely to have
a significant impact on the economy or the day-to-day functioning of society
in the whole or any part of the United Kingdom.
(2C) Paragraph (2D) applies where the number of customers to whom an RMSP
provides services exceeds the critical risk threshold by virtue of contracts entered
into before the coming into force of section 10 of the Cyber Security and
Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Act 2026.
(2D) The RMSP must take steps to reduce the number of customers to below the
critical risk threshold, including exercising any right to terminate a contract or
vary the terms of a contract.”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would place a duty on relevant managed service providers (“RMSPs”) to ensure
that they do not provide services to manage the technology systems for a number of customers that
exceeds a critical risk threshold, such that an incident affecting those services would be likely to
result in significant disruption in the United Kingdom. This would prevent an RMSP managing the
technology systems for a whole sector or subsector. Provision is also made for a situation where an
RMSP is in breach of the critical risk threshold because of contracts entered into before the enactment
of the Bill.
Clause agreed to.
Clauses 11 to 14 agreed to.
Withdrawn after debate_1 Iqbal Mohamed
. Clause 15, page 22, line 15, at end insert—
“(f) whether the incident involves failure modes not previously observed in the
relevant sector materially involving autonomous or adaptive systems based on
machine learning, including where the potential impact of such failure modes
was mitigated or prevented.”
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 6

Not called_2 Iqbal Mohamed
. Clause 15, page 22, line 25, at end insert—
“(ea) where the incident was associated with one or more autonomous or adaptive
systems based on machine learning, details of those systems and their
involvement in the incident;”
Fifth and Sixth Sittings
Not moved_3 Iqbal Mohamed
. Clause 15, page 23, leave out lines 13 to 21 and insert—
“(3) For the purposes of this regulation, an incident is a “data centre incident” if—
(a) the incident has affected or is affecting the operation or security of the
network and information systems relied on to provide the data centre
service provided by the OES, and
(b) the impact of the incident in the United Kingdom or any part of it has
been, is or is likely to be significant having regard to the factors listed
in paragraph (3A).
(3A) The factors referred to in paragraph (3)(b) are—
(a) the extent of any disruption which has occurred, is occurring or is likely
to occur in relation to the provision of the essential service provided by
the OES;
(b) the number of users which have been affected, are being affected or
are likely to be affected;
(c) the duration of the incident;
(d) the geographical area which has been affected, is being affected or is
likely to be affected by the incident;
(e) whether the confidentiality, authenticity, integrity or availability of
data relating to users of the essential service has been, is being or is
likely to be compromised;
(f) whether the incident involves failure modes not previously observed in
the relevant sector materially involving autonomous or adaptive systems
based on machine learning, including where the potential impact of
such failure modes was mitigated or prevented.”
Not called_4 Iqbal Mohamed
. Clause 15, page 23, line 32, at end insert—
“(ea) where the incident involved one or more autonomous or adaptive systems
based on machine learning, details of those systems and their involvement in
the incident;”
7 COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026

Not called_5 Iqbal Mohamed
. Clause 15, page 26, line 37, at end insert—
“(h) whether the incident involves failure modes not previously observed in
the relevant sector materially involving autonomous or adaptive systems
based on machine learning, including where the potential impact of
such failure modes was mitigated or prevented.”
Not called_6 Iqbal Mohamed
. Clause 15, page 27, line 7, at end insert—
“(ea) where the incident was associated with one or more autonomous or adaptive
systems based on machine learning, details of those systems and their
involvement in the incident;”
Not called_7 Iqbal Mohamed
. Clause 15, page 30, line 8, at end insert—
“(fa) whether the incident involves failure modes not previously observed in the
relevant sector materially involving autonomous or adaptive systems based on
machine learning, including where the potential impact of such failure modes
was mitigated or prevented;”
Not called_8 Iqbal Mohamed
. Clause 15, page 30, line 21, at end insert—
“(ea) where the incident was associated with one or more autonomous or adaptive
systems based on machine learning, details of those systems and their
involvement in the incident;”
Clause agreed to.
Clauses 16 and 17 agreed to.
Agreed to_Gov_14 Kanishka Narayan
. Clause 18, page 38, line 31, at end insert—
“(aa) otherwise in connection with—
(i) the security and resilience of network and information systems, or
(ii) any other matter relating to cyber security and resilience,”
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 8

Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would allow NIS enforcement authorities to share information with persons listed
in regulation 6(2) (inserted by clause 18), and such persons to share information with NIS enforcement
authorities, for purposes relating to the security and resilience of network and information systems
or cyber security and resilience.
Agreed to_Gov_15 Kanishka Narayan
. Clause 18, page 39, leave out line 21
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 14.
Agreed to_Gov_16 Kanishka Narayan
. Clause 18, page 39, leave out line 24
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 14.
Agreed to_Gov_17 Kanishka Narayan
. Clause 18, page 39, line 26, leave out from beginning to “, or” and insert “the provision and
availability of data centre services in the United Kingdom”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Amendments 15 and 16.
Agreed to_Gov_18 Kanishka Narayan
. Clause 18, page 39, line 34, leave out “anything mentioned in paragraph (5)(b)” and insert
“the provision and availability of data centre services in the United Kingdom”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Amendments 15 and 16.
Not called_9 Iqbal Mohamed
. Clause 18, page 40, line 10, at end insert—
“(8A) Where the CSIRT receives notification of an incident under regulation 11, 11A,
12A, or 14E that materially involves autonomous or adaptive systems based
on machine learning, the CSIRT must share relevant technical information with
the relevant body within 72 hours.
9 COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026

(8B) For the purposes of this regulation, a “relevant body” means the AI Security
Institute or any successor or replacement body designated by the Secretary of
State.”
Clause, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 19 to 22 agreed to.
Agreed to_Gov_19 Kanishka Narayan
. Schedule 1, page 86, line 33, at end insert—
“(ea) in sub-paragraph (da), after “14A;” insert “or”;”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would make a minor drafting correction.
Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 23 agreed to.
Agreed to_Gov_20 Kanishka Narayan
. Schedule 2, page 89, line 35, at end insert—
“(ia) omit the “and” at the end of the definition of “relevant
law-enforcement authority”;”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would make a minor drafting correction to regulation 1(2) of the Network and
Information Systems Regulations 2018.
Agreed to_Gov_21 Kanishka Narayan
. Schedule 2, page 89, line 37, at end insert—
“(iia) omit the “and” at the end of the definition of “representative”;”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would make a minor drafting correction to regulation 1(2) of the Network and
Information Systems Regulations 2018.
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 10

Agreed to_Gov_22 Kanishka Narayan
. Schedule 2, page 91, line 4, at end insert—
“11A Regulation 24 (service of documents) is amended as follows. (1)
(2) In paragraph (1)—
(a) in the words before sub-paragraph (a)—
(i) for “or notice” substitute “, notice or direction”;
(ii) after “served on” insert “or given to”;
(iii) after “served”, in the second place it occurs, insert “or given”;
(b) omit the “or” at the end of sub-paragraph (b);
(c) for sub-paragraph (c) substitute—
“(c) sending it by post to the person’s proper address or by
email to the person’s email address.”
(3) In each of paragraphs (2) and (3)—
(a) after “document” insert “, notice or direction”;
(b) after “served on” insert “or given to”.
(4) In paragraph (4), for “service” substitute “documents, notices and directions”.
(5) For paragraph (5) substitute—
“(5) For the purposes of this regulation, a person’s “proper address” is—
(a) in a case where the person is a body corporate with a registered
office in the United Kingdom, that office;
(b) in a case where paragraph (a) does not apply and the person is a
body corporate, partnership or unincorporated body with a principal
office in the United Kingdom, that office;
(c) in any other case, an address in the United Kingdom at which the
person serving or giving the document, notice or direction believes,
on reasonable grounds, that it will come to the attention of the
person on whom it is to be served or to whom it is to be given.
(5A) For the purposes of this regulation, a person’s email address is—
(a) an email address provided to a NIS enforcement authority as an
address for contacting that person,
(b) an email address published for the time being by that person as an
address for contacting that person, or
(c) if no email address has been so provided or published, an email
address by means of which the person serving or giving the
document, notice or direction believes, on reasonable grounds, that
it will come to the attention of that person.”
(6) After paragraph (5A) (inserted by sub-paragraph (5)) insert—
“(5B) A document, notice or direction sent to a person by email is, unless
the contrary is proved, to be treated as having been served or given at 9am
on the working day immediately following the day on which it was sent.
11 COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026

(5C) In paragraph (5B) “working day” means a day other than a Saturday,
a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday under the Banking
and Financial Dealings Act 1971 in any part of the United Kingdom.””
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would align regulation 24 of the NIS Regulations with the provisions about giving
of directions and notices in clause 57 of the Bill, as amended by Amendments 23 and 24.
Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 24 to 39 agreed to.
Withdrawn after debate_26 Freddie van Mierlo
David Chadwick
Victoria Collins
. Clause 40, page 63, line 7, leave out “5” and insert “3”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would increase the frequency of the reports that must be published under Clause
40, from every five years to every three years.
Clause agreed to.
Clauses 41 and 42 agreed to.
Withdrawn after debate_27 Freddie van Mierlo
David Chadwick
Victoria Collins
. Clause 43, page 66, line 11, at end insert—
“(fa) a requirement to remove, disable or modify hardware, software or
other facilities;”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would enable the Secretary of State to issue directions to remove, disable or modify
hardware, software or other facilities for national security purposes.
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 12

Clause agreed to.
Clauses 44 to 56 agreed to
Agreed to_Gov_23 Kanishka Narayan
. Clause 57, page 83, line 8, at end insert—
“(za) an email address provided to a regulatory authority as an address for
contacting that person,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that a direction or notice can be given to a person using an email
address which has been provided to a regulatory authority as a contact email address.
Agreed to_Gov_24 Kanishka Narayan
. Clause 57, page 83, line 11, leave out “there is no such published address” and insert “no
email address has been so provided or published”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Clause as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 58 to 61 agreed to.
Not called_NC1 Matt Western
Emily Thornberry
Sir Gavin Williamson
Mike Martin
Sarah Champion
Edward Morello
Liam Byrne
. To move the following Clause—
“Food supply chain to be regulated as an essential service
(1) The NIS Regulations are amended as follows.
(2) In the table in Schedule 1 (designated competent authorities), after the entry
relating to digital infrastructure insert—
13 COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026

The Secretary of State for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (United
Kingdom)
Food supply chain “Food supply
(3) In Schedule 2 (essential services and threshold requirements), after paragraph
10 insert—
“The food supply chain subsector
11 — (1) This paragraph describes the threshold requirements which apply to essential
services in the food supply chain subsector.
(2) For the essential service of the food supply chain in the United Kingdom the
threshold requirement is that the person is in the food supply chain and does
not qualify as small or a micro-entity (or is excluded) within the meaning of
Part 15 of the Companies Act 2006.
(3) after paragraph 10 insert—
(a) a “food supply chain” is a supply chain for providing individuals with
items of food or drink for personal consumption, where the items consist
of or include, or have been produced to any extent using—
(i) anything grown or otherwise produced in carrying on agriculture,
or
(ii) anything taken, grown or otherwise produced in carrying on
fishing or aquaculture;
(b) a person is “in” a food supply chain if that person is a producer or an
intermediary in a food supply chain.
(4) In paragraph (3)(b)—
(a) “producer” means a person who is carrying on agriculture, fishing or
aquaculture;
(b) “intermediary” means a person in the food supply chain between a
producer and the individuals referred to in paragraph (3)(a).
(5) In this paragraph—
“agriculture” includes any growing of plants, and any keeping of animals,
for the production of food or drink;
“aquaculture” means the breeding, rearing, growing or cultivation of—
any fish or other aquatic animal, (a)
(b) seaweed or any other aquatic plant, or
(c) any other aquatic organism;
“plants” include fungi.
(6) In regulation 8A of the NIS Regulations (nomination by an OES of a person to
act on its behalf in the United Kingdom), after paragraph 1(b) insert—
(c) provides an essential service of a kind referred to in paragraph 12 of
Schedule 2 (food supply chain sector) within the United Kingdom.”
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 14

Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would designate those in the food supply chain that rely on network and information
systems as “operators of essential services” within the meaning of the Network and Information
Systems Regulations 2018, thereby placing them under duties to manage risks to those systems and
to provide notification regarding any incidents that have an impact on the food supply chain.
Seventh Sitting
_NC2 Dr Ben Spencer
Bradley Thomas
Alison Griffiths
. To move the following Clause—
“Register of foreign powers for the purposes of Part 4
(1) For the purposes of informing action taken under Part 4 of this Act, the
Secretary of State must, by regulations, establish and maintain a register of
foreign powers that the Secretary of State believes present a risk to the United
Kingdom’s critical network and information systems within six months of the
passing of this Act.
(2) Foreign powers designated by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) must
include states –
(a) which have been confirmed by GCHQ as having—
(i) perpetrated, or attempted to perpetrate, a cyber-attack in the
UK in the preceding seven years,
(ii) targeted, or intended to target, that attack at the network or
information systems of one or more operators of an essential
service or critical suppliers, or
(iii) carried out, or intended to carry out, that attack through a state
department, agency or affiliate group,
(b) which GCHQ has warned pose a risk to the security or resilience of the
network or information systems of one or more operators of an essential
service or critical suppliers.
(3) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution
procedure.
(4) In this section, “foreign power" means–
(a) the sovereign or other head of a foreign state in their public capacity;
(b) a foreign government, or part of a foreign government;
(c) an agency or authority of a foreign government, or of part of a foreign
government;
(d) an authority responsible for administering the affairs of an area within
a foreign country or territory, or persons exercising the functions of
such an authority; or
15 COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026

(e) a political party which is a governing political party of a foreign
government. A political party is a governing political party of a foreign
government if persons holding political or official posts in the foreign
government or part of the foreign government—
(i) hold those posts as a result of, or in the course of, their
membership of the party, or
(ii) in exercising the functions of those posts, are subject to the
direction or control of, or significantly influenced by, the party.”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Government to maintain a register of state actors posing a threat
to UK cyber security for the purposes of exercising the Secretary of State’s powers under Part 4 of
the Act, which enable the giving of directions in the interests of national security.
Negatived on division_NC3 Dr Ben Spencer
Bradley Thomas
Alison Griffiths
. To move the following Clause—
“Register of foreign powers for the purposes of Part 4: review of nature of risk
(1) For each foreign power added to the register established under section [Register
of foreign powers for the purposes of Part 4], the Secretary of State must
review the extent and nature of the risk posed to the network and information
systems of operators of essential services and critical suppliers, including
whether the risk arises –
(a) from activities undertaken outside of the UK, or
(b) from foreign owned or controlled infrastructure or locations within the
UK.
(2) Within six months of the establishment of the register under section [Register
of foreign powers for the purposes of Part 4(1)], the Secretary of State must
lay before Parliament a report containing –
(a) the findings and conclusions of the review conducted under subsection
(1), and
(b) the Government’s plan for addressing the risks identified.
(3) If the Secretary of State considers that laying a report, or any portion of a
report, under subsection (2) would be contrary to the interests of national
security, the Secretary of State must make a statement to Parliament confirming
that –
(a) a review has been conducted under subsection (1), and
(b) that the report, or a portion of the report, cannot be laid before
Parliament for reasons of national security.”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Government to report on the risk to relevant network and
information systems posed by foreign powers appearing on the register established by NC2 considering
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 16

whether such risks arise from extra-territorial activities and infrastructure or premises owned or
controlled by foreign powers.
Negatived on division_NC4 Dr Ben Spencer
Bradley Thomas
Alison Griffiths
. To move the following Clause—
“Review of effect of information sharing and analysis centres
(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act,
conduct a review of the effect of information sharing and analysis centres on
the security and resilience of network and information systems in regulated
sectors.
(2) Following the conclusion of a review under subsection (1), the Secretary of
State must publish and lay before Parliament a report which –
(a) identifies advantages and challenges associated with the operation of
information sharing and analysis centres;
(b) identifies sectors in which the establishment of information sharing
and analysis centres is likely to be beneficial for the purposes of
increasing the security and resilience of systems; and
(c) where the establishment of further information sharing and analysis
centres is likely to be beneficial, sets out a plan for the establishment
of such centres.
(3) In this section –
“information sharing and analysis centres” means organisations –
(a) whose membership is primarily comprised of entities operating
within a regulated sector for the purposes of the NIS Regulations
and this Act,
(b) that are independent of the designated competent authority or
authorities for the relevant regulated sector, and
(c) whose aim is to increase cyber security among its membership
“regulated sectors” means sectors and subsectors under the regulatory
oversight of designated competent authorities as defined at section 3
and Schedule 1 of the NIS Regulations (as amended by this Act).”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to conduct a review of the effect of existing
information sharing and analysis centres, with a view to determining whether further such centres
should be established.
Negatived on division_NC5 Dr Ben Spencer
Bradley Thomas
Alison Griffiths
17 COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026

. To move the following Clause—
“Duty on Secretary of State to report on the meeting of existing
recommendations and implementation deadlines
(1) The Secretary of State must, at least once in every 12-month period, lay before
Parliament a report outlining the Government’s progress towards meeting –
(a) the recommendations made in the National Audit Office’s report on
Government Cyber Resilience of 29 January 2025, and
(b) the implementation milestones set out in the Government’s Cyber Action
Plan of 6 January 2026
so far as they relate to the security and resilience of network and information
systems.
(2) Any report under this section must, where a deadline or implementation date
has not been met in relation to the matters set out in subsection (1) above,
include –
(a) an explanation for the failure to meet the deadline or implementation
date;
(b) a revised deadline or implementation date and a plan for meeting the
new date.”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to report annually on the Government’s progress
towards taking actions relating to the security and resilience of network and information systems
arising from the NAO’s January 2025 report on the Government’s cyber resilience and from the
Government’s Cyber Action Plan.
Not moved_NC6 Dr Ben Spencer
Bradley Thomas
Alison Griffiths
. To move the following Clause—
“Inclusion of ransomware attacks in the NIS Regulations
In regulation 1(2) (interpretation) of the NIS Regulations—
(a) in the definition of “incident”, after “systems” insert “or a ransomware
attack which is targeted at the security of network and information
systems”;
(b) after the definition of “online search engine” insert—
“ransomware attack” means a cyber-attack involving a type of
malicious software that infects a victim's computer systems, can
prevent the victim from accessing systems or data, impairs the
use of systems or data or facilitate theft of data, and in relation
to which a ransom is demanded for access to be restored or for
data not to be published.”
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 18

Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would include ransomware attacks in the definition of “incident” in the NIS
Regulations.
Negatived on division_NC7 Dr Ben Spencer
Bradley Thomas
Alison Griffiths
. To move the following Clause—
“Impact of reporting requirements on relevant bodies
(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish
and lay before Parliament—
(a) a review of the impact, on relevant bodies, of—
(i) the requirements relating to the notification of incidents in Parts
3 and 4 of the NIS Regulations (as amended by this Act); and
(ii) any additional incident notification requirements made by
regulations under this Act; and
(b) proposals for the creation of a single cyber incident reporting channel
for relevant bodies.
(2) A review under this section must consider –
(a) the costs of requirements on relevant bodies; and
(b) interactions with other incident reporting regimes.
(3) In this section, “relevant bodies” means operators of essential services, critical
suppliers or digital service providers, as defined by the NIS Regulations.”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the impact of incident reporting
requirements on relevant bodies, and to set out proposals for a single incident reporting channel.
Not moved_NC8 David Chadwick
Freddie van Mierlo
Victoria Collins
. To move the following Clause—
“Local authorities to be regulated as essential services
(1) The NIS Regulations are amended as follows.
(2) In the table in Schedule 1 (designated competent authorities), after the entry
relating to the energy sector, insert—
The Secretary of State for Housing,
Communities and Local Government”
Local Government “Local
Government
19 COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026

(3) In Schedule 2 (essential services and threshold requirements), after paragraph
10 insert—
“The Local Government Sector
11 — (1) This paragraph describes the threshold requirements which apply to specified
kinds of essential services in the local government subsector.
(2) For the essential service of the maintenance of electoral registers, the threshold
requirement is that the entity is a local authority responsible for the
maintenance of an electoral register.
(3) For the essential service of the management of social care records, the threshold
requirement is that the entity is a local authority responsible for the
management of social care records.
(4) In this paragraph “local authority means” —
(a) in England, a county council, a district council, a London borough
council, the Common Council of the City of London or the Council of
the Isles of Scilly;
(b) in Wales, a county council or a county borough council;
(c) in Scotland, a council constituted under section 2 of the Local
Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994;
(d) in Northern Ireland, a district council constituted under section 1 of the
Local Government Act (Northern Ireland) 1972.””
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would bring local authorities within the scope of the NIS Regulations as operators
of essential services in relation to their functions managing electoral rolls and social care records.
This ensures that public sector bodies holding sensitive data such as electoral rolls and social care
records are subject to the same statutory protections as other critical infrastructure.
Not moved_NC9 David Chadwick
Freddie van Mierlo
Victoria Collins
. To move the following Clause—
“Critical manufacturing and retail sectors
(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act,
introduce regulations under section 24(3) to specify the following as essential
activities—
(a) the manufacture of critical transport equipment;
(b) the industrial production and processing of food products; and
(c) the retail sale of food and essential goods via large-scale distribution
chains.
(2) Regulations made under subsection (1) must designate appropriate regulatory
authorities for these sectors.”
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 20

Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to designate the manufacturing of critical
transport equipment and retail of food and essential goods (when part of a large-scale distribution
chain) as essential activities, bringing them within the scope of Part 3 of the Bill.
Negatived on division_NC10 David Chadwick
Freddie van Mierlo
Victoria Collins
. To move the following Clause—
“Consultation on resourcing of regulatory authorities and regulated persons
(1) The Secretary of State must, within one year of the passing of this Act, carry
out a consultation with regulatory authorities and regulated persons for the
purpose of assessing—
(a) whether regulatory authorities and regulated persons have resources
and capabilities adequate to fulfil their requirements under this Act;
and
(b) whether further government support is needed.
(2) The Secretary of State must publish a report setting out the findings of the
assessment carried out under subsection (1).”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to consult and report within one year on
whether regulatory authorities and regulated persons have sufficient resources and capabilities to
meet their statutory obligations, and whether additional government support is required.
Not moved_NC11 David Chadwick
Freddie van Mierlo
Victoria Collins
. To move the following Clause—
“Electoral infrastructure to be regulated as an essential service
(1) The NIS Regulations are amended as follows.
(2) In the table in Schedule 1 (designated competent authorities), after the entry
relating to digital infrastructure insert—
The Electoral Commission” Electoral infrastructure “Elections
21 COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026

(3) In Schedule 2 (essential services and threshold requirements), after paragraph
10 insert—
“The electoral infrastructure subsector
11 — (1) This paragraph describes the threshold requirements which apply to specified
kinds of essential services in the electoral infrastructure subsector.
(2) For the essential service of the administration of an election or the maintenance
of an electoral register in the United Kingdom, the threshold requirement is
that the service relies on network and information systems to—
(a) maintain a register of electors containing more than 50,000 entries;
(b) issue, receive, or process postal ballots for a parliamentary or local
government election; or
(c) count or aggregate votes cast in a parliamentary, mayoral or local
government election.
(3) In this paragraph—
“parliamentary election” means an election of a Member to serve in the
Parliament of the United Kingdom;
“network and information system” has the meaning given by section 24(1)
of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems)
Act 2026.
(4) In regulation 8A (nomination by an OES of a person to act on its behalf in the
United Kingdom), after paragraph 1(b) insert—
“(c) provides an essential service of a kind referred to in paragraph
11 of Schedule 2 (elections sector) within the United Kingdom.”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would designate the administration of elections and maintenance of voter registers
as an “essential service” within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.
Not moved_NC12 David Chadwick
Freddie van Mierlo
Victoria Collins
. To move the following Clause—
“Political parties to be regulated as an essential service
(1) The NIS Regulations are amended as follows.
(2) In the table in Schedule 1 (designated competent authorities), after the entry
relating to digital infrastructure insert—
The Secretary of State for Housing,
Communities and Local Government”
Political parties “Government
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 22

(3) In Schedule 2 (essential services and threshold requirements), after paragraph
10 insert—
“The political parties subsector
11 — (1) This paragraph describes the threshold requirements which apply to
specified kinds of essential services in the political parties subsector.
(2) For the essential service of the management and operation of a
registered political party in the United Kingdom, the threshold
requirement is that the political party is represented by at least two
Members of the House of Commons
(3) In this paragraph—
“registered political party” means a party registered under Part 2
of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.”””
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would designate political parties as providing essential services for the purposes of
cyber security.
Negatived on division_NC13 Freddie van Mierlo
David Chadwick
Victoria Collins
. To move the following Clause—
“Statement on risks posed to systems by foreign interference
(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish
a statement of the Government’s plans in relation to risks to the security and
resilience of network and information systems arising from foreign interference.
(2) Any statement under this section must—
(a) set out the Government’s intentions to assess, manage and mitigate
the risks posed, or which could potentially be posed, to the security and
resilience of network and information systems by foreign interference
in such systems;
(b) include risks associated with—
(i) hardware,
(ii) software,
(iii) supply chains,
(iv) procurement processes, and
(v) the use of, or reliance on, foreign technologies or systems;
(c) include a specific focus on government digital procurement processes.
(d) where risks are identified under (2)(b)(v), state whether the Government
intends to address these risks by encouraging or supporting the use of
domestic technologies or systems.”
23 COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026

Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Government to publish a statement of how it intends to address
and mitigate any risks to network and information systems posed by foreign interference.
Negatived on division_NC14 Freddie van Mierlo
David Chadwick
Victoria Collins
. To move the following Clause—
“Cyber security support service for SMEs
(1) The Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision for the
establishment and operation of a cyber security support service for relevant
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for the purposes of improving the
security and resilience of their network and information systems.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a relevant SME is one which is—
(a) an operator of an essential service,
(b) a relevant digital service provider,
(c) a relevant managed service provider, or
(d) a critical supplier
within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.
(3) A support service established under this section must provide—
(a) advice and technical assistance to SMEs following a cyber incident; and
(b) guidance on recovery and remediation.”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a cyber security support service for
relevant SMEs.
Negatived on division_NC15 Freddie van Mierlo
David Chadwick
Victoria Collins
. To move the following Clause—
“Review of high-risk bodies
(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish
and lay before Parliament a review of the national security risks posed to
relevant network and information systems by foreign state ownership or control
of relevant bodies.
(2) A review under this section must assess—
(a) the number of relevant bodies which are owned, in whole or in part,
by a foreign state or a foreign state-owned enterprise;
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 24

(b) the risk of such bodies being compelled to facilitate unauthorised access
to, or surveillance of, network and information systems in the United
Kingdom; and
(c) the adequacy of current powers under Part 4 (Directions for national
security purposes) to mitigate such risks posed to the security and
resilience of essential activities.
(3) In this section—
“relevant body” means—
(a) an operator of an essential service,
(b) a relevant digital service provider,
(c) a relevant managed service provider, or
(d) a critical supplier
within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.
“foreign state-owned enterprise” means a body corporate in which a
foreign state has a controlling interest;
“network and information systems” has the meaning given by section
24(1).”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Government to review the security risks posed by critical suppliers
and essential service providers linked to foreign states and evaluate whether current powers are
sufficient to address these threats.
Negatived on division_NC16 David Chadwick
Victoria Collins
Freddie van Mierlo
. To move the following Clause—
“Board oversight of security and resilience of network and information systems
(1) Where a relevant body is governed by a board or equivalent management
body, that body must exercise oversight of arrangements relating to the security
and resilience of the body’s network and information systems.
(2) In exercising oversight, the management body must—
(a) approve the approach taken by the body to the management of risks
to the security and resilience of the body’s network and information
systems; and
(b) satisfy itself, on a periodic basis, that appropriate and proportionate
measures are in place to manage those risks.
(3) The management body may be held accountable for failures by the body to
comply with duties relating to the security and resilience of its network and
information systems.
(4) Members of the management body must undertake training designed to enable
them to identify risks and assess appropriate risk-management practices.
25 COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026

(5) For the purposes of this section, a relevant body is one which is –
(a) an operator of an essential service,
(b) a relevant digital service provider,
(c) a relevant managed service provider, or
(d) a critical supplier
within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require active board oversight of, and accountability for, security and resilience
measures, where a relevant body is governed by a board or similar body.
Negatived on division_NC17 David Chadwick
Victoria Collins
Freddie van Mierlo
. To move the following Clause—
“Requirement for regular testing of network and information systems
(1) A relevant body must undertake regular testing of the security and resilience
of the network and information systems on which it relies in the provision of
its services.
(2) Testing undertaken in accordance with this section must –
(a) be proportionate, having regard to the size, nature and risk profile of
the business; and
(b) be conducted periodically, at intervals that are appropriate to the risks
identified by the body.
(3) A relevant body must document –
(a) the outcomes of testing undertaken in accordance with this section;
and
(b) any remedial actions required or taken in response to the testing.
(4) Information documented under subsection (3) must be provided to the relevant
regulatory authority upon request.
(5) For the purposes of this section, a relevant body is one which is –
(a) an operator of an essential service,
(b) a relevant digital service provider,
(c) a relevant managed service provider, or
(d) a critical supplier
within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require bodies to carry out proportionate, periodic testing of the security
and resilience of their network and information systems and provide the results to regulatory bodies
upon request.
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 26

Withdrawn after debate_NC18 Freddie van Mierlo
. To move the following Clause—
“Computer Misuse Act 1990: security and resilience of network and information
systems
(1) The Secretary of State must, within twelve months of the passing of this Act,
review whether amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 may be
conducive to ensuring, maintaining or improving the security and resilience
of network and information systems used or relied upon in connection with
the carrying on of essential activities.
(2) Following the conclusion of the review under subsection (1), the Secretary of
State must lay before Parliament a report which outlines–
(a) the potential amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 which
were considered as part of the review;
(b) the review’s conclusions as to whether the potential amendments
considered could be beneficial in ensuring, maintaining or improving
the security and resilience of relevant network and information systems;
and
(c) the Government’s intentions to make amendments to the Computer
Misuse Act 1990 or act on any other recommendations of the review.”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review, within 12 months, whether amending
the Computer Misuse Act 1990 could improve the resilience of network and information systems,
and to report the government’s intentions to Parliament.
Not moved_NC19 Dr Ben Spencer
. To move the following Clause—
“Vulnerability research: review of the merits of a statutory defence
(1) The Secretary of State must, within twelve months of the passing of this Act,
review the extent to which an amendment to section 1 of the Computer Misuse
Act, with the effect of introducing a statutory defence available to individuals
undertaking ethical vulnerability research, would improve the security of the
network and information systems of relevant bodies.
(2) A review under this section must consider whether a statutory defence would
enable relevant bodies to improve the resilience of their network and
information systems via enhanced vulnerability testing and research.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
(a) “ethical vulnerability research” means access, whether authorised or
otherwise, to computer material with the intention of identifying
vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, where—
27 COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026

(i) the research is aimed at enhancing the resilience of the network
and information system of a relevant body or relevant bodies,
and
(ii) the findings of the research are kept securely, shared only with
those responsible for the security or resilience of the network
and information system concerned, and shared solely for the
purpose of enhancing the security or resilience of the network
and information system concerned;
(b) “relevant bodies” means operators of essential services, critical suppliers,
digital service providers or managed service providers, as defined by
the NIS Regulations.”
Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Government to review whether the resilience of relevant
organisations could be enhanced by introducing a statutory defence to s1 of the Computer Misuse
Act, so that a person could be deemed not guilty if they engage in vulnerability research in the
public interest.
Bill, as amended, agreed to.
Glossary
Not called: debated in a group of amendments,
but not put to a decision.
Added: New Clause agreed without a vote and
added to the Bill.
Not moved: not debated or put to a decision. Agreed to: agreed without a vote.
Not selected: not chosen for debate by the
Chair.
Agreed to on division: agreed following a vote.
Negatived: rejected without a vote.
Question proposed: debate underway but not
concluded.
Negatived on division: rejected following a
vote.
Withdrawn after debate: moved and debated
but then withdrawn, so not put to a decision.
COMMITTEE STAGE Tuesday 24 February 2026 28