Courts and Tribunals Bill — Written evidence submitted by the Centre for Policy Research for Men and Boys (CTB15)

Written evidence submitted by the Centre for Policy Research for Men and Boys (CTB15)
Clause 17 of the Courts and Tribunals Bill
Repeal of Presumption of Parental Involvement in the Children Act 1989
Introduction
1. This submission addresses Clause 17, which would repeal the presumption of parental
involvement contained in section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989. That presumption
currently provides that, unless the contrary is shown, the involvement of each parent in
the life of the child will further the child’s welfare. We support the amendment put
forward by Both Parents Matter which has been submitted to the Public Bill Committee.
2. The stated aim of repeal is to strengthen child safety, especially in cases involving
domestic abuse and other forms of family harm. Child safety must remain paramount. No
principle of parental involvement should ever override child welfare, nor should contact
be maintained where it exposes a child or parent to abuse, coercion or intimidation. The
question, however, is not whether courts must be able to prevent unsafe contact. They
already can and should. The real question is whether repealing the existing presumption
improves child welfare, or whether it risks creating a new imbalance by weakening the
legal and cultural recognition that, where safe, children generally benefit from
meaningful relationships with both parents.
This submission argues that if Clause 17 is to be approved, a subsequent modest clause
should then replace it called the Parental Responsibility Test as put forward by Both
Parents Matter (Paragraph 5 below). Otherwise, the government risks the implication by
default, that it believes the involvement of both parents in the lives of the children, where
there is no risk and/or harm, is NOT in the interests of children.
3. The present law already enables courts to withhold, restrict , or supervise contact where
welfare demands it. If there are failures in the family justice system, those failures are
more plausibly failures of implementation, evidence -gathering, judicial practice, risk
assessment, delay, and resourcing than failures ca used by the statutory presumption
itself.
4. The proposed repeal , with replacement or amendment risks sending a wider
institutional signal that the active involvement of both parents is no longer ordinarily
considered beneficial to children. In practice, that signal is likely to fall most heavily on
fathers, given the reality that fathers are less often the resident parent after separation

and often report having to prove, rather than being presumed to have, value in their
child’s life. The likely effect is not greater neutrality , but a stronger default away from
paternal involvement, even in cases where fathers are safe, willing, and capable carers.
5. Rather than repealing the presumption of involvement, Parliament should adopt a more
precise and child-centred framework: a Parental Relationship Test that directs courts to
consider:
• The quality and sustainability of the child’s relationship with each parent
• The nature of the relationship between the parents insofar as it affects the child
• Each parent’s willingness and capacity to support the child’s relationship with the
other parent, where safe
6. This approach would better align legal decision-making with child welfare, contemporary
evidence on child development, and the need to distinguish safe parental involvement
from harmful or coercive contact.
The existing legal principle is not the core problem
7. The current statutory position does not create an absolute right to contact. It creates a
rebuttable presumption that parental involvement furthers a child’s welfare unless the
contrary is shown. This sits within the broader architecture of the Children Ac t 1989,
under which the child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration. In other words,
the law already permits courts to restrict or refuse involvement where there is evidence
that a parent’s participation would place the child at risk.
8. That matters because the case for repeal appears to assume that the presumption itself
drives unsafe outcomes. Yet even the government’s own framing recognises that the
issue arises in cases where courts or associated agencies are said to have failed prope rly
to assess allegations, manage risk, or respond to harm. If that is the problem, then
removing the presumption does not necessarily solve it. It may simply move the point of
failure elsewhere.
9. Where courts have failed to identify abuse, coercive control, or other serious welfare
concerns, those failures must be addressed directly. The answer lies in better evidence,
clearer guidance, stronger training, earlier fact -finding, faster decisions, and more
consistent application of the welfare principle. Repeal, by contrast, risks becoming a
symbolic response to operational weaknesses.

10. There is also a conceptual danger in shifting from a flawed implementation problem to a
legislative remedy that may be overbroad. If a legal principle is capable of safe and
appropriate application, and already contains an exception where welfare requires it,
then the burden rests on those proposing repeal to show that the principle itself is the
source of harm. That burden has not been convincingly met.
Why parental involvement matters to children
11. Any legislative change in this area must begin from the child’s perspective. The relevant
question is not what adults want, but what children need to thrive. On that question, a
large and growing body of research supports the conclusion that, where relationships are
safe, stable, and supportive, children benefit from the active involvement of both parents.
12. This is particularly important in the present context because public discussion often slips
into an outdated assumption that mothers are primary parents, and fathers are optional
or supplementary. That assumption is no longer tenable. Fathers are not merely helpers
to mothers. They are parents in their own right, capable of care, nurture, teaching,
protection, play, emotional support , and long -term developmental influence. This is
backed by public opinion as research by King’s College London for International Women’s
Day 2026i showed 78% of UK men and women believe childcare is the equal responsibility
of mothers and fathers (14% said it was the mother’s responsibility, 3% the father’s).
13. Research cited in a forthcoming CPRMB discussion paper points to three broad
propositions which are based on the work of Dr Anna Machin , a world-leading academic
on evolutionary anthropology.
14. First, fathers are biologically and psychologically oriented toward s parenting. Studies
have shown changes in hormones, stress reactivity, and brain structure during the
transition to fatherhood, especially where fathers are actively involved in caring for their
children. These findings matter not because biology determine s family law, but because
they undermine the stereotype that fathers are naturally distant, peripheral, or less
equipped for caregiving.
15. Second, children form meaningful attachment relationships with fathers. These
attachments are not lesser versions of maternal bonds. They may differ in form and
expression, but they are developmentally significant. Positive father -child attachment is
associated with security, confidence, resilience , and better emotional outcomes over
time.

16. Third, fathers often make distinctive contributions to child development. The evidence
suggests positive father involvement can support social competence, behavioural
regulation, educational engagement, and mental health. For boys, fathers can model
constructive forms of masculinity, encourage learning behaviour, and reduce risks of
antisocial conduct. For girls, positive father involvement has been associated with better
educational outcomes, self-esteem, and relational wellbeing. More broadly, children who
maintain secure, supportive relationships with fathers tend to do better across a range of
indicators.
17. These findings do not mean every father is beneficial, nor that mother and father roles
are fixed, essentialised or incapable of overlap. They mean the law should not casually
diminish the importance of paternal involvement when it is safe and beneficial. A system
that makes it harder for children to sustain those relationships should be required to show
clear necessity.
The harm of unnecessary father loss
18. Debates on contact often focus, rightly, on the harm that can flow from abusive parental
behaviour. But there is another form of harm that also deserves recognition: the
avoidable loss of a loving and safe parent from a child’s life.
19. Where a child loses meaningful contact with a safe father, the effects may be long -term.
The child may lose a source of emotional support, practical guidance, identity formation,
social learning, and stability. In adolescence, this may mean less resilience, lower
confidence, weaker educational engagement, or less support in negotiating peer pressure
and emotional stress. In later life, it can affect relationships, self -esteem, and a sense of
family continuity.
20. The point is not that father absence always causes poor outcomes, nor that all two-parent
arrangements are better than all alternatives. Many children flourish in single -parent,
blended, adoptive, kinship or same -sex parent families. The point is narrower and more
practical; where a safe and committed father exists, the law should not create additional
unnecessary barriers to that relationship.
21. Clause 17 risks doing exactly that unless there is a replacement recognising the
importance of both parents, whil e at the same time remedies the practical challenges
that the current presumption clauses in the Children’s Act have exposed. The likely
practical effect is to weaken the starting recognition that continued involvement by each
parent is ordinarily good for children. In a system where one parent is usually resident

and the other is often seeking to maintain or rebuild contact, the removal of that starting
point will not operate in a vacuum. It will alter expectations, negotiation dynamics,
professional attitudes, and litigation strategy.
22. In real terms, the parent most likely to be disadvantaged is the father. That is not because
the statute names fathers, but because family court realities and wider social assumptions
mean fathers disproportionately occupy the position of non -resident pare nt. Repeal
therefore risks entrenching a de facto maternal default even while claiming gender
neutrality.
The role of domestic abuse and the need for safety
23. Any submission on this issue must state clearly that the welfare and safety of children and
adult victims of abuse are paramount. No parent, regardless of sex, should benefit from
a presumption that shields them from scrutiny where there is evidence of vio lence,
coercive control, intimidation, stalking, economic abuse or child -related manipulation.
The system must be able to identify risk quickly and act decisively.
24. But recognising that imperative does not automatically justify repealing the presumption
of involvement. The key issue is whether the current law already allows courts to deny or
restrict contact where abuse is present. It does. If abusive contact is being ordered or
preserved inappropriately, then the concern lies with the quality of risk assessment, the
speed and fairness of investigation, and the consistency with which courts and agencies
apply the law.
Concerns about the evidential basis for repeal
25. A serious legislative change should be founded on balanced and sufficiently wide-ranging
evidence. A major concern is whether the evidence base has adequately captured the
experiences of fathers, male victims of abuse, children affected by maternal abuse, and
cases involving alienating or contact-undermining behaviours. If a policy is likely to affect
all separated families, its evidential basis should be correspondingly inclusive.
Risks of unintended consequences
26. Legislative signals matter. Repealing the presumption of parental involvement would not
simply alter a technical provision , i t would reshape the normative framework within
which judges, magistrates, Cafcass officers, social workers, lawyers, and separating
parents understand the law.

27. Three unintended consequences are foreseeable.
28. First, the repeal may increase conflict rather than reduce it. Where one parent believes
the law no longer recognises the importance of the child’s relationship with the other,
incentives to facilitate contact may weaken.
29. Second, repeal may entrench existing asymmetries. The resident parent will often remain
the practical gatekeeper of the child’s relationship with the other parent. Removing the
statutory recognition that involvement by both parents usually furthers welfare , risks
making that gatekeeping role harder to challenge even where resistance to contact is not
justified by safety concerns.
30. Third, the repeal may reduce confidence in family justice among fathers , mothers and
among children who value those relationships.
A better alternative: the Parental Relationship Test
31. If Parliament wishes to improve the law, a better approach would be to replace broad
repeal with a more focused and explicitly child -centred test. This submission therefore
recommends a Parental Relationship Test for use in private law children cases.
32. The court should be required to consider:
1. The quality and sustainability of the child’s relationship with each parent
This directs attention to the child’s actual lived bond with each parent, rather than
abstract assumptions. It allows the court to ask how secure, beneficial, and
developmentally important the relationship is, and whether it can be sustained safely
over time. It supports continuity where a relationship is positive but does not compel
contact where the relationship is harmful, negligible, or unsafe.
2. The nature of the relationship between the parents insofar as it affects the child
Children are affected not only by direct treatment from each parent, but by the climate
of conflict, coercion, fear, or cooperation between parents. This ensures court s take
seriously patterns of domestic abuse, manipulation, entrenched hostility, or instability
that may affect welfare. Equally, it can recognise where parents, despite separation, are
capable of functional co-parenting that supports the child.
3. Each parent’s willingness and capacity to support the child’s relationship with the
other parent where safe

This is essential. A child’s welfare is rarely served by a parent who, without good reason,
undermines the child’s bond with the other parent. By contrast, a parent who can support
the child’s relationship with the other, while keeping the child safe, demo nstrates a
commitment to the child’s interests above adult grievance. This also allows courts to
distinguish between legitimate protective action and unjustified obstruction.
This test would offer a better framework than outright repeal because it is concrete, child-
focused, and balanced. It does not privilege contact over safety. Nor does it assume all
relationships are equal. It asks the right questions in the right order.
What reform should focus on instead
33. Whether or not Clause 17 proceeds, there are several reforms more likely to improve
child welfare outcomes than repeal.
34. First, there should be better and faster fact -finding where abuse is alleged. Long delays
harm children and parents alike. Unsafe contact may continue too long, but equally safe
contact may be suspended for extended periods without resolution. Speed matter s to
justice and to child development.
35. Second, there should be improved training for judges, magistrates, legal representatives,
Cafcass officers and social workers on domestic abuse, coercive control, post -separation
abuse, alienating behaviours, and the developmental importance of both parent s where
safe. Training should avoid ideological simplification and equip professionals to assess
evidence fairly.
36. Third, there should be better data collection and independent research on family court
outcomes, including post-order experiences of children and parents. The system currently
generates insufficient transparent evidence on what arrangements are made, how
allegations are resolved, what forms of abuse are alleged, and what the long -term
consequences are. Policy should be built on stronger foundations than currently exist.
37. Fourth, there should be greater recognition of fathers as carers from the outset of family
life. Some of the tensions that later emerge in family court reflect earlier institutional
habits in maternity, health and social care systems that still treat fathers as peripheral.
38. Fifth, there should be clearer guidance distinguishing involvement from contact volume.
Some of the confusion around the current law comes from a public misunderstanding that
parental involvement means equal time. It does not. Involvement can take many for ms.

The law should continue to recognise that children may benefit from a meaningful
parental relationship without requiring identical divisions of time in every case.
The importance of avoiding a false choice
39. Public debate on this issue is often framed as a choice between protecting children from
abuse and supporting children to have both parents in their lives. That is a false choice.
40. A good family justice system must do both. It must protect children and adult victims from
abusive parents. It must also protect children from the avoidable loss of safe, loving, and
important parental relationships. Repealing the presumption of parental involvement
risks implying that these aims are in tension. In fact, they should be integrated.
41. The right legal framework should say, in effect: children usually benefit from the
involvement of both parents, but only insofar as that involvement is safe and genuinely
serves welfare. That principle is neither naïve nor ideological. It reflects both com mon
sense and a large body of developmental evidence.
42. Clause 17 moves away from that balance. It removes a principle that is capable of being
applied safely and replaces it with uncertainty, in a system already marked by delay,
inconsistency, and contested assumptions about mothers and fathers. It will not benefit
children, but cause confusion and further litigation.
Conclusion
43. Clause 17 should be amended or replaced. The repeal of the presumption of parental
involvement, without replacement, is not the most effective or proportionate response
to concerns about child safety in private law proceedings. The existing law already allows
courts to restrict or refuse parental involvement where a child’s welfare is at risk. If that
law has sometimes been poorly applied, the answer lies in better implementation, not in
abandoning the principle that, where safe, children benefit from the involvement of both
parents.
44. There is now strong evidence that fathers matter to children’s development in distinctive
and important ways. Safe father involvement supports children’s emotional wellbeing,
resilience, social functioning, and long -term life chances. A legal change that weakens
recognition of that role risks harming children, especially in a system where fathers
already tend to occupy the weaker post-separation position.

45. This submission therefore urges Parliament not to proceed with simple repeal . Instead,
the law should retain the centrality of child welfare while adopting a more precise
framework for judicial decision-making.
46. There should be a Parental Relationship Test that requires the court to consider:
• The quality and sustainability of the child’s relationship with each parent
• The nature of the relationship between the parents insofar as it affects the child
• Each parent’s willingness and capacity to support the child’s relationship with the
other parent where safe
47. This would provide a more balanced, practical, and child -centred basis for decision -
making. It would preserve the principle that children should not lose a parent without
good reason, while ensuring safety, evidence and welfare remain paramount.
23 March 2026

i King’s College London (2026), International Women’s Day 2026: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/assets/news/iwd-2026-
global-charts-final.pdf