Courts and Tribunals Bill — Written evidence submitted by JUSTICE (CTB28)

1

Courts and Tribunals Bill
Committee Stage, House of Commons
April 2026
Introduction
1.
JUSTICE is a
cross
-
party
law reform and human rights organisation
working to create a
fair justice system within everyone’s reach.
2.
This briefing addres
se
s the Courts and Tribunals
Bill
2026
(the “
Bill
”) in advance of
Committee Stage
in the House of Commons.
The Bill is introduced
as
one part of
the
Government’s
response to
the outstanding caseload in the Crown Court
which c
ontinues
to grow and currently stands at almost 80,000 cases.
The Bill follows
Sir Brian Leveson
’s
Independent Review of the Criminal Courts
(the “
Review
”)
.
Sir Brian Leveson
recommended
getting rid of jury trials for cases with a likely sentence of three years or
less and replacing them with trial by a judge and two magistrates
.
The Review also
recommended
introducing judge
-
only trials for certain serious and complex cases, for
example, complex fraud.
1
3.
The
Bill
goes further than
the
Review’s
recommendation
s
and
would have the following
effect
:
(a)
Removal of
the right of defendants to elect
for Crown Court trial in triable by
either way cases.
(b)
Replacing the automatic right to appeal to the Crown Court from the
magistrates’ court
in criminal proceedings with a permission stage
-
and
replacing the full re
-
hearing in the Crown Court with a hearing on issues
only
for
which leave to appeal has been granted.
(c)
Introducing powers to extend the magistrates’ court sentencing powers
from
the current 12 months, to either 18 or 24 months by way of secondary legislation
.
(d)
Restricting jury trials by i
ntroducing
judge only trials
for
:
(i)
triable either
-
way cases likely to receive a custodial sentence of three
years or less by judge alone.
(ii)
technical and lengthy fraud and financial cases
.
4.
The Bill would also
introduce
other measures including amending the
statutory thresholds
governing the admissibility of evidence, amendments to the Children Act 1989 in respect

1
Sir Brian Leveson,
Independent Review of the Criminal Courts: Part I
, Ministry of Justice, July 2025

2

to the presumption of parental involvement, reform
s to
the
leadership of
Tribunals, and
changes in respect to magistrates’ expenses.
5.
JUSTICE
is concerned by
several
of the
proposed reforms to the criminal courts and
strongly opposes the proposal to restrict jury trials.
JUSTICE has provided
a
comprehensive briefing on the case against restricting jury trials, which can be found
here
.
6.
Sir Brian Leveson
’s
Independent Review of the Criminal Courts
made 180
recommendations to increase capacity and reduce demand in the criminal justice system.
M
any
of these recommendations
, incl
uding addressing prison transport delays,
i
mprovi
ng cas
e management
a
nd the
listing framework
, increasing sitti
ng
days
a
nd
bolstering the criminal legal work
for
ce
have widespread support and
can be implemented
at a
much faster rate than the measures within the Courts and Tribunals Bill.
A
nalysis of
government
figures has
found tha
t sin
ce the
cap on the number o
f ju
dicial sittin
g
days in
crown
cou
rt
s
was lifted in October 202
5 the backlog has reduced in key regions of
England and Wales,
including in Lond
on.
2
The backlog at courts in Wales and the
northwest and southeast of England fell considerably since the sitting days were added
and in
Maids
tone crown court
the cas
e backlog had fallen by more than 5
% in the past
six months.
3
7.
Th
is makes the
Gov
ernment
’
s
decision to proceed with
restricting
jury t
rials
all the more
concerning
, p
articularly as
i
t has not
yet
provided a fu
ll response to Parts I and II of Sir
Bri
an
Leveson
’
s criminal courts review.
8.
We
urge MPs to support
the following amendments:
(a)
A
mendment
15
in the name of Jess Bro
wn
-
Fuller which
would make the
publication of the Government response to Part II of the Independent Review of
the Criminal Courts a precondition of Clause 1 to 7 of this Bill coming into force.
(b)
Amendment
35
in the name of D
r Kieran Mullan which prevents the provision
s in
sections 1 to 7 of the Bill from
coming into force until the Lord Chancellor has
provided funding for 130,000 sittings days in the Crown Court; HMCTS has
assessed that the Crown Court has used its allocation of sitting days; and the Lord
Chancellor has made a statement to the House that t
his has not reduced the
backlog.
(c)
Amendm
ent 36
in the name o
f Dr Kieran Mullan
which would ensure
that
clauses
1 to 7 of the Act
do
not come into force until the Lord Chancellor ha
s
reviewed how
to increase sitting hours in the Crown Court.
(d)
Amendment
59
in the name of D
r Kieran Mullan
which
would ensure that sections
1 to 7 of the Act could not be commenced until the
Lord Chancellor has used
alternative means to increase Crown Court sitting capacity.
(e)
Amendment NC27
(as well as amendment 60 consequentially)
in the name of Mr
Adnan Hussain
and
amendment NC11
(as well as amendment 16 consequentially)

2
The
Times,
‘
Data shows court backlogs falling, so why aren’t ministers talking about it?
’
(2026)
3
Ibid.

3

in the name o
f Jess Brown
-
Fuller
w
hich
would require the Government to pilot the
removal of the right to elect trial by jury before national implementation, and to
report to Parliament on its impact.
(f)
Amendment N
C24
in the nam
e of Dr Kieran Mullan
which would sunset
sections
1 to 7 of this Act so that they will no
longer be in force once the court backlog has
been resolved.
(g)
Amendment NC
13
in the name of
Jess Brown
-
Fuller which would
require the Lord
Chancellor to commission, lay, and respond to a report on the effect of the Bill on
public trust in the criminal justice system.
Magistrates’ Courts – right to elect and sentencing powers
R
emoving the right to elect
–
Claus
e
s
1
and 2
9.
Triable either
-
way offences are offences that can be heard in either the Magistrates’
Courts or the Crown Court.
Currently, for these offences, the defendant has the
right
to
elect for trial in the Crown Court
.
Clause
s
1
and 2
of the Bill will remove this right.
Instead,
it will be
up to
the Magistrates
’ Court
to decide whether to hear the case or send it to the
Crown Court.
Sentencing Powers
–
Clause
6
10.
Clause 6
of the Bill
would allow the Lord Chancellor to increase the maximum sentencing
powers of the Magistrates’ Court
by statutory instrument
from 12 months
4
to either 18
months or 24 months.
Concerns
11.
The Ministry of Justice projects that
,
taken together clauses 1
,
2 and
6 of the Bill will see
the Magistrates’ Courts retaining more either
-
way cases.
12.
However, the Institute for Government
highlights that
only around 30% of sentences of 6
-
12 months were handed down by Magistrates
since their sentencing powers increased
from six to 12 months in 2024
.
5
This indicates a lack of confidence among Magistrates
to
retain more serious cases.
If cases likely to receive 1
–
2
-
year sentences continue to be sent
to the Crown Cou
rt or if time is spent
sending
cases
to the Crown Court only for them to
be returned to the
Magistrates’ Court, the
MOJ’s expected
time savings are unlikely
to
materialise.
Challenges
facing
the Magistrates’ Courts
13.
W
hilst the
Magistrates
’
currently mak
e
all
ocation decisions,
for triable either
-
way
offences,
the
se dec
isions
do not determine the venue in practice as the
defendant
is then
able
to
ch
oose
whether their trial takes
place in the Crown
C
ourt o
r the
Magistrates
’

4
Increased from 6 months in
202
4
5
IFG, ‘
Beyond reasonable doubt?: Reviewing proposed reforms to jury trials’
(2026)

4

Court
.
R
emoving
defendant’s right to elect Crown Court trial risks placing critical
allocation decisions on
M
agistrates’
C
ourts at a time when they are structurally ill
-
equipped.
Magistrates’ Court
s are
designed for the trial of minor offences and
Magistrates
generally only sit
for
around 13 full days per
yea
r
.
Cases in the Magistrates’
Courts have also become less complex since 2019, with fewer triable
either
-
way or
indictable
-
only matters.
6
As a result, the system is not
set up
to absorb a greater volume
of more complex allocation decisions
.
14.
Further,
M
agistrate numbers have fallen dramatically
,
sitting at 46% below the number in
2010/11,
7
despite
a large
-
scale recruitment drive for both magistrates and legal advisers
.
8
A
significant proportion of the magistracy is
therefore
likely to be
relatively inexperienced
in dealing with
complex matters and making allocation decisions
.
This is particularly
concerning given the high rate of success in appealing Magistrate decisions (over 40% of
verdict appeals succeed, and 47% of sentence appeals upheld), indicating poor decision
making in the first place.
9

15.
Additionally, if the MOJ is correct that the Magistrates’ Courts will retain a greater number
of cases, we are concerned that the system will struggle to absorb the increased workload,
both in hearing more cases and in making more meaningful allocation dec
isions.
This
would also come at a time when the Magistrates’ Courts is facing its own growing
backlog,
10

and the number of trials conducted
11
has fallen sharply.

Reduced access to Legal Aid
16.
The
E
qualities
Statement for
the Bill acknowledges that “if more cases are dealt with in
the Magistrates’ Courts, it is likely that an increased proportion of these defendants may
be ineligible for legal aid when they would otherwise have been eligible if their case had
been heard at
the Crown Court
.
”
12
Th
is is because the
eligibility threshold for receiving
representation by a publicly funded lawyer in the Magistrates’ Courts is an annual income
of
below £22,325, significantly lower than the Crown Court threshold of £37,500. As a
result, individuals in full
-
time minimum
wage employment
will
no
t
qualify for legal aid at
the Magistrates’ Court
.
13

6
Performance Tracker 2025: Criminal courts | Institute for Government
7
Performance Tracker 2025: Criminal courts | Institute for Government
8
For example see:
Ministry of Justice,
Impact Assessment
which states
“The latest magistrates’ recruitment
campaign, launched in January” and
“Last year we onboarded 108 new trainee legal advisers, doubled specialist
allowances, and have committed to reviewing pay and progression alongside initiatives to strengthen career
development and retention.”
, p.26.
9
See: The Times ‘
Cutting right to appeal is profoundly dangerous, KCs tell David Lammy
’ (2025); CBA
‘Nutshell
-
Guide
-
to
-
the
-
Courts
-
and
-
Tribunals
-
Bill’
(2026)
10
Ibid.
11
(excluding guilty plea cases and cases decided without a hearing)
12
Ministry of Justice,
Equalities Statement
, p.12.
13
Emily Dugan,
Defendants ‘priced out of justice’ by cuts to jury trials
,
The Sunday Times
, 28 February 2026.

5

17.
An increase in unrepresented defendants
’
risks undermining fairness
.
Transform
J
ustice
reported
that unrepresented defendants
were observed to often
suffer
serious
disadvantages in court, for example,
lacking understanding of
the charges against them,
entering
inappropriate
pleas
,
struggling
with cross
-
examination and
ultimately receiving
harsher
sentences as they did not know how to mitigate
.
14
This is particularly concerning
given the proposed increase in Magistrates’ sentencing powers
, which
mean
that
defendants could face trial for offences carrying
a sentence of
up to two years’ without
any legal representation.
18.
Additionally
,
withou
t legal representation
individuals will have l
ittle choice but to
represent themselves
which
the
Institute
for Government
has highlighted is likely to
prolo
n
g hearings
and therefore erod
e anti
c
ipated efficiency
gains.
15
Further, whilst
defendants are banned from questioning victims in sexual,
child
abuse and
domestic
abuse cases, there remain a wi
de range of offences
, for example assault, where cross
-
e
xamination is
permitted
.
Pushin
g additional cases into the magistrates
’
court
,
where
free
le
gal support is
much harder to access for de
fendants
, risks leaving
victims exposed to
being cross
-
examined by
al
leged perpetrators.
16
Impact on minority and vulnerable groups
19.
T
he
E
qualities
Statement for
the Bill acknowledges that historic data for triable either
-
way offences shows that
Black defendants, older defendants, and female defendants
elect for trial at the Crown Court at higher rates than other groups
. For example,
in 2022
26% of Black defendants elected for trial in the Crown Court, compared to 19% Mixed
ethnicity, 17% Asian, 17% Other ethnicity, and 15% White defendants.
17
20.
The
E
qualities
Statement
states
that the reasons for these differences are unclear.
H
owever, it should be noted that
the current
Deputy Prime Minister
and Secretary of State
for Justice
, D
avid Lammy
,
conclude
d
, in his
review
into the treatment of, and outcomes
for Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals in the criminal justice system
,
that
many
individuals from ethnic minorities opted for trial in the Crown Court whenever possible as
they had more confidence in the fairness of juries than in the fairness of Magistrates’
Courts.
18
Given that
racial disproportionality exists in numerous
places
in the criminal
justice system
,
19
public trust in
the criminal justice system amongst ethnic minority
communities is particularly fragile
.
20
This makes the propos
als
particularly concerning,

14
Transform Justice, ‘
Justice Denied? The experience of unrepresented defendants in the criminal courts
’ (2016).
15
Instit
ute for Government,
‘
Beyond reasonable doubt?: Reviewing proposed reforms to jury trials
’
(2026)
16
Cutting jury trials risks more miscarriages of justice
17
Ministry of Justice,
Equalities Statement
, p.8.
18
David Lammy,
The Lammy Review
(2017),
p
.
27
.
19
Centre for Justice Innovation, ‘
Building Trust: How our courts can improve the criminal court experience for Black,
Asian and Minority Ethnic defendants
(
2019
)
; Crown Prosecution Service, ‘
Disproportionality Action Plan
’
November 2024 page 1; Ministry of Justice, ‘
Statistics on Ethnicity and the Criminal Justice System’
2024 (see
Main Points section)
20
Centre for Justice Innovation, ‘
Building Trust: How our courts can improve the criminal court experience for Black,
Asian and Minority Ethnic defendants
(2019)
.

6

as any reform that further reduces choice or confidence in the system risks deepening
existing disparities and
exacerbating distrust
from minoritised communities.
21.
The
E
qualities
Statement
for
the Bill
also acknowledges
that
s
ection
28 measures are not
available in the Magistrates’ Court
which allow witnesses or victims to pre
-
record their
cross
-
examination ahead of trial. This will affect
children, people with
certain
disabilities
and complainants of sexual offences
(
who
are
more likely to be women)
who would, in
the Crown Court, be
eligible for s
ection
28 measures
.
Whilst
the Government states that
the Magistrates’ Courts already manage these issues, it is concerning that there is a lack
of sufficient data on s28 cases and users to understand how many
vulnerable
witnesses
or victims would be affected by the increased
number
of cases in the Magistrates’
Courts.
21
Recommendation
s
Clause
s
1
and
2
22.
F
or
the
reasons
se
t
out above
we urge MPs to support
amendment
1
and
2
in the names
of
Jess Brown
-
Fuller
,
Siân
Berry
, Yasmin Qureshi
,
Karl Turner
and Cat Eccles
to leave out
Clause 1
and 2
of
the B
i
ll
.
Clause 6
23.
We urge MPs to support
amendment
6
in the names of
Jess Brown
-
Fuller
,
Siân
Berry
,
Yasmin Qureshi and Karl Turner
to leave out Clause
6
of
the B
i
ll
.
24.
I
n
the alternative
to leaving out
C
lause 6 of the
Bill
,
we urge MPs to support
t
he following
amendm
en
t
s:
(a)
Amendment
1
3
in the name of
Jess Brown
-
Fuller
which would
provide that the
Magistrates
’
sente
ncing powers are not increased beyond 12 months.
(b)
Amendment
53
in the name of Dr Kieran M
ullan which would
ensure
that
regulations to extend magistrates’ courts sentencing powers must be approved by
both houses of Parliament.
(c)
A
mendment
22
in th
e name of Jess Brown
-
Fulle
r which
would ensure that
where
defendant
s
face
more than 12 months
’
imprisonment,
they will receive Crown
Court level funding
rega
rdless of which court the case is heard in.

The right to appeal from the Magistrates’ Courts
Clause 7
and
Schedule 2
25.
Currently
,
a defendant has an automatic right of appeal from the Magistrates’ Court to
the Crown Court against either conviction or sentence. In either case the appeal is a re
-
hearing before a judge and two magistrates.

21
Ministry of Justice,
Equalities Statement
, p.
8.

7

26.
Clause 7
of the Bill introduces
Schedule 2
, which would remove this automatic right of
appeal. Instead, it introduces a requirement for an application for permission to appeal
based on written grounds. A Crown Court judge will decide whether to grant permission
and the appeal hearing would be hear
d by a single judge. Instead of a re
-
hearing, the
appeal w
ould only
be on the issues on which permission is granted.
If the
appeal
is
against conviction
,
the judge
must
allow the appeal if the conviction is unsafe. If so, the
judge may order a retrial in the Magistrates’ Court.
Concerns
27.
The
replacement
of the automatic right to appeal
Magistrates’ decisions with a multi
-
stage permission system is
complicated and highly
likely to be inefficient
. T
he Bill does
not consider the practicalities
involved
,
such as
defendant’s finding lawyers to assist
them in reviewing transcripts and preparing permission grounds of appeal
.
Victims and
defendants will face further delay if, following a successful appeal, the case is then sent
back to the Magistrates’ Court for
a rehearing, rather than the Crown Court making a
fresh decision there and then.
A
ddi
tionally
,
defendants
who have their
case sent for a
re
-
hearing
in
Magistrates’ Courts could also face issues with
not being able to gain
representation under Legal Aid due to the lower eligibility threshold.
22
Recommendation
s
28.
For the reasons set out a
bove, we urge MPs to support
amendment
s
7
and
9
in the names
of
Jess Brown
-
Fuller
,
Siân
Berry
, Yasmin Qureshi and Karl Turner
to leave out
Cla
use 7
and
S
chedule 2
of the
Bill.
29.
I
n the alternative to leavin
g out Clause 7
and Schedule 2
of the Bill
, we
urge MPs to
support the
following amendments:
(a)
Amendment
s
5
4
and
57
in
the
name of Dr Kieran Mullan
which
would
remove the
provi
sion that limits appeals to specific grounds and inst
ead
ensure that the Crown
Court allows
an
appeal
against conviction or se
ntence
if it
is
ma
de.
(b)
Amendment 37
in the name of Dr Kieran Mullan
which would prevent
the
restriction of right of appeal against magistrates court decisions unless the rate of
successful appeals from the magistrates courts has been below 10% in the
previous two years.
(c)
Amendment 66
(
as well as
64
and 65
consequentially)
in the names of Rachael
Maskell
, John Mc
Donnell and Yasmin Qureshi which ensures
a right to appeal
orally
and provides that grounds for appeal include procedure and fact, as well as
points of law.
Restriction of jury trials – triable either-way offences
Clause
3

22
The Criminal Bar Association,
The Nutshell Guide to the Courts and Tribunals Bill 2026
, p.13.

8

30.
Clause 3 of the Bill
would
re
move
the right to trial by jury
for either
-
way offences
where
the likely sentence is 3 years or less. These cases will be heard in the Crown Court
in a
tier
that the Government is calling the
Crown Court Bench Division
. Cases heard here
will be heard
by
a judge alone.
This could include
sexual offences, sexual abuse of
children
, stalking, fraud
offences
,
violence against the person offences and theft
offences.
Most of the postmasters wrongly convicted in the Horizon scandal received a
sentence under three years.
31.
The allocation decision will
be
taken
by a Crown Court judge at
a
pre
-
trial hearing
called
the
plea and trial preparation hearing
.
Both the
prosecution and defendant will be allowed
to make representations.
32.
The Bill also sets out circumstances in which the case may be reallocated
from judge
-
only trial to jury trial or vice
-
versa.
33.
There is no right to appeal
against
allocation or reallocation decisions
.
34.
A judge sitting alone in the
Crown Court Bench Division
can impose any sentence
available in the Crown Court,
including sentences longer than three years
.
Clause 5
35.
Clause 5 of the Bill provides that the court must provide a judgment stating the reasons
for a decision to convict or acquit the defendant at the time of
the verdict
or as soon as
reasonably practicable
thereafter.
Concerns
36.
JUSTICE
strongly oppose
s
the restriction
of
jury trials
for the following reasons.
Public trust and confidence
37.
For centuries, juries have
acted as a
constitutional
safeguard
,
anchoring public trust in
the system by
ensuring that individuals are judged by their peers rather than a single
authority.
Without juries, evidence passes from the police to the prosecution to a judge
alone, having only been considered by professionals in the criminal justice system.
23
38.
Public polling also shows that the British public views the
‘
right to a fair trial by jury
’
as a
fundamental protection, ranking it as a primary right t
hat t
hey believe should be
enshrined in la
w.
24

Research shows that most people would serve on a jury again
as they
believed that the system was fair.
25
It is particularly important that we do not remove the

23
DAT Green,
‘Why juries matter’
Prospect
,
4 December 2025
.
24
Professor Cheryl Thomas
KC (Hon) ‘
How the jury system really works
’
Counsel,
19 December 2025:
the
Rowntree
Foundation conducted research with the British public on what rights should be enshrined the last time a Bill of
Rights was proposed, “the right to a fair trial before a jury” came out top of the list. 89% of the British population
thought that th
is was a primary right that should be enshrined in law.
25
Ibid
.

9

most trusted part of the criminal justice system
at a time where public confidence in the
criminal justice system is fragile
.
26
39.
The impact assessment of the Bill states that public confidence is strengthened when
cases are dealt with efficiently.
27
However, it fails to recognise that there is no evidence
that restricting jury trials will improve efficiency (
see further
below), and it overlooks the
fact that juries are one of the most trusted elements of the criminal justice system
.
40.
In addition, the
three year
threshold is likely to lead to outcomes that are seen as unfair
to both those within the system and the public. It means that repeat offenders are more
likely to qualify for a jury trial because their previous convictions would push the likely
sentence ab
ove three years, while
first
-
time
offenders committing the same offence may
be denied a jury trial.
Restricting jury trials will not solve the backlog
41.
There is no empirical proof or existing pilot that demonstrates that removing juries will
make a material difference in reducing delays in the criminal courts, nor ease pressure
on prisons and probation. The Government itself estimates that the
Bill’s measures will
not impact the court backlog until 2028/2029 and th
at
prison demand is only predicted
to start to decline from 2034/35.
28
42.
Analysis by the Criminal Bar Association demonstrates that the proposals are based on
optimistic assumptions. The impact assessment assumes that the proposal will save
5000 Crown Court sitting days.
29
However,
this represents only around 3.5% of the
current Crown Court workload
, which means that victims who currently have to wait a
year for their tri
a
l might see their cases brought forward by a week.
30
Further,
the
assessment assumes that cases within scope
of the proposals
average 6.25 sitting days,
yet the Criminal Bar Association notes that
in practice they are typically closer to 3 sitting
day
s; the basis of the savings are therefore over
-
estimated by around double the realistic
figure.
31
43.
Detailed analysis
by the Institute for Government
-
and
based on the Government’s own
figures
-
shows that the predicted time savings from
judge
-
only
-
trials are marginal at
best
; predict
ing
only 1.5
-
2.5% of
C
rown
C
ourt time will be saved through
j
udge
-
only
trials.
32
44.
This figure uses the Government’s own assumption that hearing times will fall by 20% for
judge alone trials compared to jury trials. However, this figure is very likely an

26
Gallup, ‘
Britons' Trust in Courts and Police Declines
’ (December 2025): polling shows that in 2025 there was the
biggest annual drop in confidence in the judicial system on record. Only 57% expressed confidence in the judicial
system and courts, down 12 percentage points from 2024.
27
Ministry of Justice,
Impact Assessment
, p.27.
28
Ministry of Justice,
Impact Assessment
, p.
23
29
Ibid,
p.17.
30
The Criminal Bar Association,
The Nutshell Guide to the Courts and Tribunals Bill 2026
, p.
3.
31
Ibid
.
32
Institute for Government, ‘
Trial and error?: The impact of restricting jury trials on court demand’
22 January 2026

10

overestimate, and the Government acknowledges within the impact assessment that
there is uncertainty
in
this assumption.
33
Crucially, any potential time savings from not
having a jury must be offset by the time that it will take for judges to write reasoned
decisions, as required by the Bill.
The
allocation of cases is going to lengthen the plea
and trial preparation hearing
as will the process of reallocation.
This model also overlooks
that currently a judge can sit on two concurrent jury trials whilst one jury is in retirement,
which will not be possible with judge
-
alone trials.
Setting up a new court infrastructure
and adapting the Common Platform
34
would be challenging, particularly given existing
difficulties.
35
Further, restricting jury trials may be counterproductive given the
strong
opposition by the criminal legal profession, given
the existing shortage of criminal
lawyers
driving
productivity issues.
36
45.
Further, given there is no right to appeal allocation or reallocation decision to the Crown
Court Bench Division, there is likely to be an increase in the number of judicial reviews of
these decisions, which will increase pressure on the High Court. There
are also likely to
be an increase in appeals of Crown Court Bench Division decisions to the Court of
Appeal, in light of the written reasons the judges will have to provide
–
something that
juries are not required to do.
T
he proposal
therefore
risks creati
ng a parallel system that
simply displaces
the
criminal court backlog onto another court.
Focus on fixing the real causes of the backlog
46.
Delays in the criminal courts stem from a range of causes, including chronic
underfunding,
as highlighted by Sir Brian Leveson in
his Independent Review of Criminal
Courts
.
JUSTICE has highlighted that there are several avoidable inefficiencies which
arise before juries
are
sworn in. Unavailability of witnesses, poor case management,
prison transport delays and the prosecution or defence advocate failing to attend are
amongst the reasons for ineffective trials and key operational failures attributed to
inef
fective trials between 2019
-
2024.
37
47.
There are changes, such as improving court productivity, which could begin much more
quickly
.
These changes
do not carry the same risks
to
damaging public confidence in the
criminal justice system.
To that end, m
any of the recommendations made by Sir Brian
Leveson are welcomed, including,
increased use of out of court resolutions, increased
sitting days, improved efficiency in prisoner transport to court and measures to bolster
the criminal legal workforce.
38
Examples across England and Wales
, such as Liverpool

33
Ministry of Justice,
Impact Assessment
, p.
37
34
HMCTS Common Platform
35
A Guide to Criminal court statistics
: “There remains a proportion of cases being entered on legacy systems.”
36
IFG, ‘
Beyond reasonable doubt?: Reviewing proposed reforms to jury trials’
(2026)

37
JUSTICE
, ‘
Restricting the Right to a Jury Trial’
2026, page 9; Institute for Fiscal Studies, ‘
Productivity in the Crown
Court | Institute for Fiscal Studies
’ 2025
38
Sir Brian Leveson,
Independent Review of the Criminal Courts: Part I
and
Independent Review of the Criminal
Courts Part II
,
Ministry of Justice, July 2025 and

11

Crown Court
,
demonstrate that
investment, efficient case management and practical
court adaptations work
in managing the court backlog without curtailing jury trials.
39
48.
The Government has announced several
welcome
measures
that
do not
require
legislation
, including
increased
funding and
investment
,
including into the
physical court
estate
, the removal of the cap on sitting days,
and the
use of ‘blitz’ courts
.
40
These
measures c
an
be implemented immediately
without
major structural change
of
introducing a Crown Court Bench Division
-
a disruption which will divert resources from
other solutions, which will have a much bigger impact on reducing the backlog.
Impact on
marginalised communities
and
victims
49.
This Bill risks further failing victims and marginalised communities.
Racial
disproportionality is evident throughout the criminal justice system
41
however,
research
demonstrates
that
jury decision making is one of the few places
such disproportionality
does not
appear to exist
. The Lammy Review found that
juries
convicted
defendants from
racialised groups
at
very similar
rates
to
white defendants
, including in cases with all
-
white juries and across a variety of offence types.
42
This continues to be the case
today.
43
50.
In contrast, judges sentencing defendants in
the Crown Court
are more likely to give
defendants from ethnic minority backgrounds prison
sentences
tha
n
white British
defendants
.
They are also
more
likely to give d
efendants from certain ethnic minority
backgrounds
a longer
sentence for similar crimes.
44
We are
deeply
concerned that this
racial
disproportionality will
translate into conviction
decisions.
51.
Juries bring together 12 randomly selected citizens, with broader diversity and collective
deliberation compared to a single
judge. Diversity of
circuit judges who sit in the Crown
Court and would hear judge alone trials is
particularly
concerning
-
only
36% of circuit
judges are women and only 10% are from minority ethnic backgrounds.
45
Concerningly,
i
n
the report
‘
Racial
Bias and the Benc
h
’
9
5%
o
f the 350 pro
fessionals su
rveyed said that

39
J
USTICE
,
‘
Restricting the Right to a Jury Trial’
2026: page 8
-
9
40
Deputy Prime Minister Rt Hon David
Lammy
MP, ‘
We are calling time on the justice system of the past’
, 24 February
2026
41
Centre for Justice Innovation, ‘
Building
-
trust’
2019; Crown Prosecution Service, ‘
Disproportionality
-
Action
-
Plan’
November 2024 page 1; Ministry of Justice, ‘
Statistics on Ethnicity and the Criminal Justice System’
2024 (see
Main Points section)
42
The Lammy Review
. p 31
-
32
.
43
Professor Cheryl Thomas KC (Hon) ‘
How the jury system really works
’
Counsel,
19 December 2025.
44
Kitty Lymperopoulou
, ‘
Ethnic Inequalities in Sentencing: Evidence from the Crown Court in England and Wales
’
,
The British Journal of Criminology,
2024, 64,
p.119
7
-
8.
After adjusting for individual and case characteristics,
a
custodial sentence is 41 per cent more likely for Chinese defendants, and between 16 and 21 per cent more likely
for defendants from Asian groups, compared with white British defendants. Similarly, a custodial sentence is
between 9 and 19 per cent more li
kely for defendants in the black groups, and 22 per cent more likely for white
and black African defendants than white British defendants after adjusting for other characteristics
.
T
hose from Pakistani, Bangladeshi and black Caribbean groups who are shown to have worse sentencing
outcomes than the white British even after
controlling for individual, case and court characteristics
, receiving
between 4 and 11 per cent longer sentences than the white British
45
Ministry of Justice ‘
Diversity of the judiciary: Legal professions, new appointments and current post
-
holders,
2025

12

racial bias played some rol
e in the justice system
,
63% said i
t played
a significant role
and 29% said racial bias played a fundamental role.
46
Diversity is not only important for
decision making but is crucial for trust and legitimacy. Replacing jury trails with a single,
likely white male judge, risks
eroding already fragile trust in the justice system
,
particularly
among minority ethnic communities.
52.
The Deputy Prime Minister
himself
stated
that
when
“
a jury retires to make a decision, its
members must consider the evidence, discuss the case, and seek to persuade one
another if necessary.
This debate and deliberation acts as a filter for prejudice
–
to
persuade other jurors, people must justify their position. In the final decision,
power is
also never concentrated in the hands of one individual
.”
(emphasis added).
53.
The government has presented proposals to restrict jury trials
as a solution
to speed
up
justice for victims.
Victims deserve timely justice but this Bill will not deliver it. Instead
,
it
removes
an important safeguard, particularly for women and minoritised groups
and
will
result in rushed structural change which risks detracting from the real solutions to the
backlogs.
Or
ganisations such as Rights of Women
,
End Violence
Again
st Women
Coalition
and over 20 other
organisations representing victims of violence against women
and girls
stress
that preserving jury trials is essential to survivors’ access to justice; what
is needed instead
of curtailing jury trials
is greater investment in prevention and early
intervention.
47
54.
We also remain
concern
ed that practical issues
arise
from
j
udge
-
only trials,
which would
impact directly upon victims of sexual offences
.
In sexual offence cases, strict rules limit
the use of evidence about a complainant’s previous sexual history.
48
While
j
udges
currently rule on admissibility and juries never see excluded material, a
j
udge
-
only trial
wou
l
d require the judge to view such material and
then
to ‘put out of his or her mind’ any
of the material that is inadmissible before making a decision on guilt.
The impact
on
the judiciary
55.
We are concerned about the impact of these reforms on the judiciary, in terms of their
politicisation, demands on their workload, and recruitment. Judges would become
arbiters of fact as well as law in several sensitive and sometimes controversial cases.
T
his would risk exposing them to undue politicisation.
Juries
insulate
the judiciary from
public criticism.
As highlighted by
His Honour
Geoffrey Rivlin K
C
,
the former Resident
Judge at Southwark Crown Court and Honorary Recorder of Westminster
“judge
-
alone
trials are calculated to throw a harsh spotlight on individual judges; their jobs will become
much more difficult. It risks division in the public perception of justice, and, seriously, a
lack of confidence
–
first in the judiciary and then th
e system as a whole.”
49
This is in

46
Unive
rsity of Manchester;
Keir
Monteith KC,
Professor Eithne Quinn
,
Professor Andrea L. Dennis
,
Dr Remi Joseph
-
Salisbury
,
Erica Kane
,
Franklyn Addo
,
Professor Claire McGourlay
,
‘
Racial
Bias an
d
The Bench
’
2022
47
Rights o
f Women
‘
VAWG sector letter to Justice Secretary calls for re
-
think on jury trials
’
(March 2
026)
Rights of
Women,
Maintaining jury trials is critical to women survivors’ access to justice,
2 December 2025
48
Crown Prosecution Service,
‘
Limiting the use of complainants’ sexual history in sexual offence cases’
, ‘
Rape and
Sexual Offences
-
Chapter 11: The Sexual History of Complainants, Section 41 YJCEA 1999’
2021
49
HH Geoffrey Rivlin KC,
‘
Juries and Judges
-
The Right to Choose & Current Proposals
’
Red Lion Chambers,
11
December 2025

13

turn is likely to impact the retention and recruitment of judges
,
already
facing serious
difficulties.
50
Recommendation
s
Claus
e 3
56.
For the reasons set out a
bove, we urge MPs to
support
amendment
3
in
the names of
Jess Brown
-
Fuller
,
Siân
Berry
, Yasmin Qureshi
,
Karl Turner
and Cat Eccles
to leave out
Cla
use
3
of the B
i
ll.
57.
I
n the alternative to leavin
g out Clause
3
, we urge MP
s
to support the
f
ollowing
amendments
to the Clause
:
(a)
Ame
nd
ment
18
in the names of Jess Brown
-
Full
er and Yasmi
n Qureshi
which
entitles
a
defendant
to appeal against a judge
’
s decision to allocate a case to trial
by judge
-
alone.
(b)
Amendment 39
in the name of Dr Kieran
Millan which
would ensure that trials by
jury continue for indictable offences carrying a sentence of less than three years
in prison if the defendant can demonstrate that it would be in the interests of
natural justice.
(c)
Amendment
4
0
in the name of Dr Kie
ran Mullan
which
would allow a defendant
to appeal the decision to have a judge
-
only trial
on the basis that
it is in the
interests of natural justice for the trial to be with a jury.
(d)
Amendmen
t
42
in the
name of
Dr
Kieran Mullan which
prevents a judge sitting
alone from sentencing a defendant to more than three
years in prison, and requires
that if this is the likely sentence, the case must be remitted for trial by jury.
(e)
Amendment
44
in the name of
Dr Kieran Mullan
which would ensure that where
a decision for a ju
dge
-
only tria
l is being
con
sidered for reallocation following a
change
in circums
tances
, the judge must con
sider
fairness when considering the
rights and circumstances of the defendant
a
nd the interests of justice.
(f)
Amendment NC2
in the name of Charlotte Nichols and
25 oth
e
rs
,
which
would
establish specialist courts for sexual offences and domestic abuse cases, with
those cases heard by a specialist judge and a jury. It makes further provision
including for victim support, and to prioritise cases where a defendant is bailed
(g)
Amendment
NC8
in the name of Jess Brown
-
Fuller
which
requires the provision
of training for the judiciary focused on discrimination against ethnic minorities,
including racial bias and its impact on judicial decision
-
making.
(h)
Amendmen
t
NC7
which would
require the Lord Chancellor to lay before
Parliament a strategy for victim
-
led case management in relation to criminal court
proceedings
and
Amendment NC9
in the name of Jess Brown
-
Fuller
which
requires the provision of training for the judiciary focused on violence against
women and girls.

50
UCL, ‘
Judicial system facing looming crisis in recruiting and retaining judges’
, (February 2025)

14

Clause 5
58.
For the reasons set out a
bove, we urge MPs to support
amendment
5
in the names of
Jess Brown
-
Fuller
,
Siân
Berry
, Yasmin Qureshi and Karl Turner
to leave out
Cla
use
5
of
the B
i
ll.
59.
In the alternative to leaving out
C
lause 5, we u
rge M
Ps to
support
the
following
amendments:
(a)
Ame
ndment
58
in the name
of
Dr Kieran Mullan
which would stop
sections 3 to 5
coming into force until the Government had an evidence base for how long these
provisions might delay the issuing of judgments after convictions.

Restriction of jury trials – complex and lengthy cases
Clause 4
and
Schedule 1
60.
Clause 4
and Schedule 1
give
the
court the power to
order that a trial of
certain
cases
as
listed in the schedule,
be hea
r
d by a judge alone
where (a) the complexity and/or length
of the trial makes it appropriate to do so; (b) it is in the public interest; and (c) there are
no other reasons why it would be more appropriate for the trial to be conducted with a
jury.
61.
Currently the cases in the schedule are confined to fraud, money
laundering and
terrorism funding. However,
t
here is a power for the Secretary of State to amend the
schedule to include other offences.
Concerns
62.
The Government states that the aim of these provisions
is
to (a) reduce the time taken to
hear particularly lengthy and complex cases; and (b) remove the requirement for jurors
to sit on trials that can last many months. However, the
change is unnecessar
y, will not
impact the backlog in any meaningful way and
risks opening the door to the restriction
of jury trials in other cases.
63.
The Government’s own Impact Assessment
states the anticipated saving
from these
provisions is 200 Crown Court sittings days per year
.
51
This is a tiny fraction of
Crown
Court sitting days
–
around 0.18% of current capacity.
52
64.
His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC collected data from Southwark Crown Court
(the primary
v
enue for complex financial crime trials)
on the length of fraud cases
over the six years
2018
-
2024. The data show the vast majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months,

51
Ministry of Justice,
Impact Assessment
,
p. 17
52
Sitting days this year are
expected to be 113,000
(Rajeev Syal, ‘
David Lammy lifts cap on court siting days in effort
to cut backlog of cases
’
Guardian
, 24 February 2026)

15

with only
one or two cases per year lasting over three months and only two cases in total
that were over 6 months.
53
65.
As His Honour
G
eoffrey
Rivlin
KC has argued, jury trials impose discipline to
reduce the
length of fraud trials.
Without this incentive, judge alone trials may be
as long or even
longer than jury trials.
54
Further, in
complex fraud, money laundering and terrorism
funding cases, the length of time it will take the judge to write their reasoned judgement
is likely to be significant.
66.
Delays
,
collapses of
fraud cases
and miscarriages of justice
are not caused by juries
, as
demonstrated by the recent case of
R v Hayes
.
55
In this case
,
the convictions of Tom
Hayes and Carlo Palombo for LIBOR and EURIBOR manipulations were quashed
–
not
because of issues with the jury but because of judicial misdirection.
67.
The issues which juries decide in fraud trials are factual, not technical
:
in particular
,
whether the defendant was
dishonest. This is assessed by reference to the standards of
ordinary decent
people.
56
Twelve
‘ordinary’ jurors are much better placed to decide this
than a single judge alone.
68.
We are particularly concerned with the
unconstrained
powe
r provided to the Secretary
of State to add offences to the list of those which may be heard without a jury.
The
Government
has currently singled out fraud, money laundering and terrorism funding as
“particularly lengthy and complex cases”, however,
we are concerned at the ease at
which he will be able to add another class of long trials to the list
. Terrorism, murder, rape
and
drug trials
can last many months and be equally as complex as fraud cases
. This is
particularly the case for those involving multip
le defendants and/or contested expert
evidence
–
there is no reason why these would not be regarded by the Secretary of State
as equally
ripe for purported time savings and
‘bu
rdensome’ on jurors.
57
R
ecommendations
69.
For the reasons set out a
bove, we urge MPs to support
amendment
4
and
8
t
abl
ed by
Jess Brown
-
Fuller
to leave out
Clause 4
and Schedule 1 of the Bill.
70.
In the alternative to leaving out
C
lause
4 and S
chedule 1
,
we urge MPs to support
the
following amendments
:
(a)
A
mendment
51
in the name
of Dr Kieran Mullan which prevents
the Lord
Chancellor adding further offences to the list in Schedule 1 by regulations.

53
HH Geoffrey Rivlin KC, ‘
Juries and Judges
-
The Right to Choose & Current Proposals
’ Red Lion Chambers, 11
December 2025
.
54
Ibid
.
55
[2025] UKSC 29
.
56
Ivey v Genting Casinos UK Ltd (t/a Crockfords Club)
[2017] UKSC 67, [2018] AC 391
57
HH Geoffrey Rivlin KC, ‘
Juries and Judges
-
The Right to Choose & Current Proposals
’ Red Lion Chambers, 11
December 2025
.

16

(b)
Amendment
47
in the name of Dr Kieran Mullan
and
amendment
30 in the
name
s
of Yasmin Qu
reshi and John McDonnell
which would add a righ
t for defendants to
appeal against the decision for a j
udge
-
only trial for
lengt
hy and complex cases.
(c)
Amendment
50
in the name of Dr Kieran Mull
an which would
prevent the court
unilaterally overriding a reason to issue a revocation order so that a case allocated
for judge
-
only trial under this section could be tried by jury.
(d)
Amendment 61
in the
name of
Adnan Hussain which would
restrict the use of
judge
-
only trials to exceptional circumstances and require courts to give written
reasons decisions to allocate such trials.
Retrospective effect
71.
Clause
s
3(2)
-
(4)
and 4(6)
-
(8)
confirm
that
the provisions relating to
judge alone trials
will
apply
retrospectively
,
to any trials beginning on a day specified by the Lord Chancellor
which must be at least three months after Clause 3 is commenced.
Concerns
72.
The retrospective application of
the
provisions curtailing jury trials
is contrary to the rule
of law. The House of Lords Constitution Committee’s legislative standards state that
retrospective legislation is unacceptable other than in very exceptional circumstances
and must have the strongest possible justification.
58
Given that the curtailment of jury
trials is going to have only a marginal effect at best on the court backlog, we cannot see
how this retrospective application can be justified.
It is deeply unfair for defendants who
elected for trail in the Crown Court on the basis that it would mean a trial by jury, to
subsequently have their cases tried by a judge alone, under a process that did not even
exist at the time they made their electi
on.
Defendants
who opted for a
jury trial
may have
been
incarcerated on
remand wait
ing for their
Crown Court
jury trial
. Had they known
that this was never going to materialise they may well have opted for a magistrates trial
and
have already been released
.
73.
Th
e reallocation of cases already in the Crown Court caseload to the Bench Division
could result in challenges by way of
j
udicial
r
eview. This would also require additional
hearings and the preparation of representations for every affected case already in the
backlog, creating further delays and placing unnecessary burdens on both defendants
and the prosecution who are already under s
ignificant pressures.
Recomme
ndations
74.
Given the above co
ncerns, we urge
MPs to support
amendment
12
in the name of Jes
s
B
rown
-
Fuller
and
amendment
43
in
the name of Kieran Mullan
which
would prevent the
provisions on trial on indictment without a jury applying retrospectively to cases where
the defendant has elected trial by jury before these provisions become law.

58
https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/47701/documents/249210/default/
para 77 and 78.

17

75.
Additionally, we urge MPs to support
amendment
49
in the name of
Dr Kieran Mullen
which prevents the provisions in
Clause
4 coming into effect retrospectively.

For more information, please contact:

Leyya Kitmitto
,
Criminal Policy Lawyer,
JUSTICE
lkitmitto@justice.org.uk