ECHR Memorandum for the Representation of the People Bill

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REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE BILL
ECHR MEMORANDUM FOR THE BILL AS INTRODUCED IN
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

1. Section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires the Minister in charge of a
Bill in either House of Parliament to make a statement before Second Reading
about the compatibility of the provisions of the Bill with the Convention rights
(as defined by section 1 of that Act).
2. Steve Reed, Secretary of State, has made the following statement: “In my view
the provisions of the Representation of the People Bill are compatible with the
Convention rights.”

Summary of the Bill
Part 1 – Reduction of voting age to 16
3. Part 1 makes the amendments needed to reduce the voting age from 18 to 16
at UK Parliamentary elections; local elections in England, local elections in
Northern Ireland, Police and Crime Commissioner elections in England and
Wales, City of London elections, and for recall petitions across the UK.
4. This Part and Schedule 1 also amend legislation relating to registration of
electors, including amendments to facilitate the registration of looked after
children if they are placed away from the area where they were formerly
resident, and the registration of those who are 14 or 15, who are entitled to
register early (but not vote) in advance of attaining the voting age (“attainers”).
It also makes amendments to enable children of those in service of the Crown,
who may be posted away from their place of residence in the UK, to be entitled
to register under a “service qualification” in the same way that a spouse or
partner of a person in service is currently able to register. Further amendments
in this part relate to how Electoral Registration Officers (“EROs”) take action to
make sure the register is up to date and ensure that people who failed to
respond to an invitation to register when they were under the age of 16 are not
subject to criminal penalties. Clauses 15 and 16 impose duties in relation to
raising awareness of the new franchise among looked after children and those
receiving aftercare.
5. Clauses 7 to 14 make provision which recognises that attainers are under 16
years old and consequently their personal data should be given special
protection. This includes a general restriction on the ERO about disclosing such
personal data, subject to the exceptions set out in that Part.
Part 2 – Registration of electors

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6. Clauses 17 to 19 and Schedule 2 make provision to allow for more automated
forms of registration, so that an ERO can register a person or alter their register
entry without that person needing to make an application. Notification of th at
individual is required under the provision. Clauses 20 to 25 make provision for
powers to pilot changes to electoral registration, including in relation to
automated forms of registration, to enable these measures to be properly tested
on a local level before being rolled out. Clause 36 makes amendments to the
regulation making powers in Schedule 2 to the Representation of the People
Act 1983 (“RPA 1983”) to ensure that EROs and, in Northern Ireland, the Chief
Electoral Officer, have access to the information they need.
7. Clauses 26 to 29 make provision in relation to canvass reform in Northern
Ireland, including powers to pilot changes to the canvass and to implement
changes to the legislation that underpins the current arrangements. This will
enable the canvass in Northern Ireland to be brought into line with the canvass
in the rest of the UK. Further provision is made in respect of previous
divergence between the process for registration in G reat Britain and Northern
Ireland to bring Northern Ireland more in line with the rest of the UK.
8. This Part also includes provision relating to the seniority of ERO s in England
and Wales (clause 31), and to extend the length of a person’s entitlement to be
anonymously registered (clause 32), introduces into primary legislation a clear
deadline for registering to vote before an election (currently provided for by a
combination of primary and secondary legislation) (clause 33) and makes other
provision about pre-election applications in Northern Ireland (clause 34). It also
makes provision for termination of a person’s entitlement to be registered
pursuant to a declaration of local connection if they cease to meet the criteria
under which they were registered (clause 30).
9. This Part also reverses the presumption that a person is included on the edited
(open) electoral register unless they opt out, so that instead they are only
included if they actively opt in (clause 37). Further, under 16s will not be able to
opt in to have their information included on the open register.
Part 3: Conduct of elections etc
10. Part 3 includes provision relating to conduct of elections. It makes provision as
to the seniority requirements of Returning Officers (“ROs”) at UK parliamentary
elections in Scotland and at local elections in England (clause 39). It requires
local authorities in England and Wales to provide the services of their officer to
support ROs in the conduct of UK parliamentary elections (clause 38) . It
includes provision regarding nomination processes and requirements at UK
parliamentary elections and at local elections in Northern Ireland (clauses 40 to
44). It amends voter identification requirements at UK parliamentary elections
to allow for the use of payment cards as acceptable identification for electors
and proxies voting in person at polling stations. It removes the requirement for

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elector’s details to be called out at UK parliamentary elections and local
elections in Northern Ireland (clause 46). It also makes a number of changes to
provisions about absent voting in Great Britain and Northern Ireland (clause 48
and Schedule 3).
11. This Part also gives the Secretary of State the power (clause 49) to require
information to be provided by specified officers (see clause 50) for the purpose
of helping people understand the election, referendum or recall petition process
(see clause 51). It also makes provision as to the effect of the demise of the
Crown on certain elections and referendums (clause 52 and Schedule 4), and
makes provision for the forms of prescribed documents used at elections and
referendums to be prescribed in secondary legislation instead of primary
legislation (where applicable) and more generally as to the procedure for such
secondary legislation (clause 53 and Schedule 5).
Part 4: Election etc. Campaigns and political expenditure
12. Part 4 includes measures relating to election campaigns, expenses and
conduct of candidates and their agents. It includes a measure to reduce, as far
as possible, the requirement for candidates to publish their home addresses
(clause 54). This Part provides that returns as to expenses and donation reports
that are required to be provided to the RO or, for recall petitions, the petition
officer, are also required to be delivered to the Elect oral Commission (clause
56 and Schedule 7) and makes the Electoral Commission responsible for
making determinations about whether late invoices can be paid (clause 55 and
Schedule 6).
13. This Part makes provision to require registered political parties and other
regulated donees to undertake a risk assessment prior to accepting donations
of a value above a certain threshold (clause 58 and Schedule 8). In addition,
those below the voting age will not be permissible donors (clause 59). This Part
also makes provision about requirements around donations by companies and
LLPs (clause 60).

14. A further political finance measure in this Part clarifies that, in relation to
forfeiture of donations because the donor was not registered on an electoral
register (and therefore not a permissible donor), it is irrelevant that the donor
was eligible to be so registered (clause 61). Further provision is made to amend
the legislation governing political contributions made by unincorporated
associations, including lowering the threshold at which such contributions and
gifts made to those unincorporated assoc iations must be reported (clause 62
and Schedule 9).
15. This Part also extends the scope of the UK digital imprint regime to require
groups of third party campaigners not registered with the EC to include an
imprint on certain digital material; sets out additional information to be included
in imprints on campaign related print and digital material; amends the procedure

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for statutory guidance in relation to non-substantive revisions, and expands the
EC’s enforcement powers to include all imprint material (clauses 63 and 64).
Part 5 – Enforcement and the Electoral Commission
16. Part 5 of the Bill makes provision about the Electoral Commission’s role in
enforcing political finance offences. Clause 65 and Schedule 10 decriminalise
certain offences under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act
2000, giving the Electoral Commission sole responsibility for the enforcement
of offences which are considered to be “administrative” in nature. These
offences are those which do not involve fraud, dishonesty or obstruction. The
enforcement of all offences involving fraud, dishonesty or obstruction remain
the sole responsibility of the police, together with the Crown Prosecution
Service, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, and the Public
Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland. To facilitate consistent regulation
across all election types, clause 68 empowers the Secretary of State to make
provision in regulations that could be made by the Welsh Ministers or Scottish
Ministers, with their prior consent.
17. Clause 66 and Schedule 11 provides for the Electoral Commission to be given
shared responsibility, with the police and prosecution services across the UK,
for offences committed in relation to donations to and expenditure by
candidates, and for offences in relation to political parties, third parties and
other bodies . Clause 67 lifts the restriction which stops the Electoral
Commission from imposing a civil penalty that is higher than the maximum fine
applicable to the offence, in order for the Electoral Commission’s powers to
represent a more significant deterrent to offences committed.
18. This Part also includes powers for the Electoral Commission to disclose
information to a specified list of regulators and enforcement bodies to
streamline regulatory processes and increase cross -regulatory co- operation
(clause 69). The Bill includes a specific list of persons to whom the Electoral
Commission can disclose information, and by regulations, subject to the
affirmative procedure, the Secretary of State can add an entry, remove an entry
for a body or office that no longer exists or make changes needed as a result
of a function or name change.
Part 6 – Hostility towards candidates etc.: disqualification orders and sentencing
19. Part 6 introduces measures to address issues around intimidation. Clause 70
widens the scope of the existing disqualification order that must be imposed as
part of sentencing post -conviction for violent or intimidatory offences listed in
Schedule 9 to the Elections Act 2022 (“EA 2022”) where there is hostility to
electoral staff (currently this is limited to candidates and campaigners and
associated groups). This Part also includes the introduction of an aggravating
factor to be applied in sentencing (clauses 71 and 72).

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20. Clause 73 provides for existing Scottish disqualification orders, introduced by
the Scottish Elections (Representation and Reform) Act 2025, which only
applied to devolved Scottish offices, to also cause a person being disqualified
from being elected to or holding other elected offices, and clause 74 makes
further amendments.
Part 7 – General Provision
21. Part 7 contains general provision about the Bill as a whole, including powers to
make commencement regulations, and to make transitional, savings and
consequential provision.
Human rights issues
22. The Bill is considered to engage Article 1 Protocol 1 (“A1P1”), Article 3 Protocol
1 (“A3P1”) and Articles 7 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(the “Convention”). This Memorandum deals only with those parts of the Bill
which raise Convention issues. The remaining provisions of the Bill are
considered not to engage Convention rights, or, if they do, to do so in a way in
which it is clear that there is no interference.
Prisoner voting rights of 16- and 17-year-old prisoners and those detained under
mental health provisions in criminal justice legislation or provisions of mental
health legislation relating to criminal justice
23. A3P1 to the Convention provides: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to
hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions
which will ensure free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of
the legislature”. It is explained as an obligation on States, but the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) has developed to clarify that
A3P1 creates rights for individuals relating to both voting and standing as a
candidate, in elections to which it applies. The latter includes elections to the
House of Commons, as a legislature, and is therefore engaged by these
provisions which are making ch anges to voting at Parliamentary elections , or
recall petitions relating to membership of the House of Commons.
24. A3P1 has been held not to apply to local government elections or to
referendums, so changes to the franchise for local elections, which also
determine the franchise for local referendums, or police and crime
commissioner elections do not engage A3P1. A question may arise as to
whether elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly engage A3P1 as there has
not been a definitive case at the Court on this question, however it is considered
likely that the Court would find that the Assembly is a legislature, and the same
considerations will apply in respect of those elections as set out in paragraphs
25 to 59 below.
25. A wide margin of appreciation is afforded as to the type of electoral
arrangements a contracting State puts in place, Davydov v Russia (2018) 67

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E.H.R.R. 25, paragraphs 271 to 277. In particular, at paragraph 272 the Court
observed that: “ Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in
imposing conditions on the right to vote and to stand for election, it is for the
Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of [A3P1] have
been complied with; it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the
rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive
them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim;
and that the means employed are not disproportionate or arbitrary.”
26. Unlike other qualified rights, A3P1 does not list the legitimate aims that an
impingement can pursue. It has been accepted by the Court that a restriction
on prisoners voting can in principle be in pursuit of a legitimate aim. This
measure is considered to be in pursuit of the aims of “preventing crime by
sanctioning the conduct of convicted prisoners” and “enhancing civic
responsibility and respect for the rule of law” ( Hirst v. the United Kingdom
(no. 2) ([GC], no. 74025/01, ECHR 2005 -IX, §§ 74-75, and Scoppola v. Italy
(no. 3) ([GC], no. 126/05, 22 May 2012, § 92; most recently, Hora v the United
Kingdom, no. 1048/20, 23/09/2025, § 111). Additionally, in relation to mental
health where a person i s so unwell as to merit deprivation of their liberty, or
where they are considered to lack capacity such that they are subject to
guardianship, the Court has concluded that restriction of voting rights can
pursue the legitimate aim of ensuring that only citizens capable of assessing
the consequences of their decisions and of making conscious and judicious
decisions should participate in public affairs (Alajos Kiss v. Hungary , no.
38832/06, 20 May 2010; also Strøbye and Rosenlind v. Denmark, nos.
25802/18 and 27338/18, 2 February 2021). In each case, the proportionality of
the measure in achieving that aim is closely scrutinised by the Court.
27. In relation to the disenfranchisement of forensic mental health patients, the aim
being pursued includes not just the aims in relation to prisoners in penal
institutions and other similar institutions for children, but also this additional aim.
Hirst v UK (No. 2) and prisoner voting
28. Section 3 and 3A RPA 1983 prohibit all prisoners held in a penal institution or
in a mental hospital from voting in UK parliamentary and local elections, other
than local elections in Scotland. The Court held in Hirst v UK (No 2) [2005]
ECHR 681, that section 3 RPA 1983 was in breach of A3P1 because of the
automatic and blanket nature of that restriction . Subsequently, the UK
government announced a number of administrative measures which led to:
a. eligible prisoners released on temporary licence (RoTL) being able to
vote;
b. prisoners released on home detention curfew (HDC) being able to vote;
and

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c. a change to the warrant of committal to ensure prisoners were notified
of their disenfranchisement at the time of sentencing.
29. As a result of those measures, the Committee of Ministers, which is responsible
under Article 46(2) of the Convention for ensuring compliance with rulings of
the Court , closed the case. I n accordance with the Committee of Ministers’
decision, i t is the UK government’s position that the current restriction on
prisoners being able to vote is compliant with the Convention.
30. The expansion of the franchise to 16- and 17-year-olds will, as a consequence
of the combined effect of the operation of the existing restriction in sections 3
and 3A RPA 1983 and the amendments in clause 2 of the Bill, result in convicted
and detained prisoners aged 16 and 17 also being unable to vote. This
therefore engages A3P1.
31. The voting ban under section 3A RPA 1983, which is not being amended by this
Bill, will likewise apply to a new cohort of people ( 16- and 17-year-olds) who
are enfranchised by clause 1. Thus, a new cohort of people, if detained under
one of the relevant orders or directions could be disenfranchised by the existing
legislation. A3P1 is therefore engaged by the combin ed effect of clause 1 and
existing section 3A RPA 1983. As with adults, 16- and 17-year-olds on remand
(43% of the children in custody in the year ending March 2024 1), or released
on temporary licence or home detention curfew, will be able to vote.
Hora v UK and prisoner voting
32. The Court recently handed down a judgment in the case of Hora v UK. This
was the first case concerning prisoner voting rights in the UK to come before
the Court since the Committee of Ministers accepted the administrative
measures introduced by the government and closed the Hirst series of cases.
In Hora, the Court considered a number of factors including developments in
the Court’s approach to this area since Hirst and the circumstances of the
applicant in Hora and concluded that there was no violation of A3P1 in relation
to the applicant.
33. The claimant in Hora was serving an indeterminate sentence for very serious
offending and the court held that, as it was extremely unlikely that any
alternative legislative regime would have allowed him to retain the right to vote,
there was no violation of his rights under A3P1.
34. Consequently, it is the government’s view that the Court has been clear that the
disenfranchisement of offenders , and likewise forensic patients, is not to be
considered in the abstract but must be limited to consideration of the specific
facts that apply to an individual applicant.

1 Chapter 6 of Youth Justice Statistics 2023 to 2024, published 30 January 2025, available here: Youth Justice
Statistics: 2023 to 2024 - GOV.UK

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Youth offending
35. In relation to youth justice, there are a number of factors which indicate that
offenders under 18 who are detained in custody following a conviction are likely
to be serious offenders in respect of whom no violation would be found
regarding their disenfranchisement.
36. These factors include:
a. the key principle present in the youth justice system of each legal
jurisdiction in the UK that custody should be considered as a last resort
when sentencing a young person;
b. in England and Wales, that the most common custodial option for young
people, Detention and Training Orders, is unavailable when the
appropriate sentence would be less than four months;
c. a higher likelihood that an out of court disposal will be considered as an
alternative to prosecution; and
d. enhanced consideration of a young person’ s particular circumstances
and vulnerabilities including mandatory pre-sentence reports.
37. Since the judgment in Hora, it is not clear where the Court would draw the line
in establishing what convictions are serious enough to warrant incarceration but
not serious enough to warrant disenfranc hisement. However, given the
particular attention paid to the individual circumstances of the offender, and the
reduced likelihood of less serious offenders receiving a custodial sentence, it is
unlikely that a 16- or 17-year old would be convicted of an offence which was
serious enough to warrant immediate custody, but not seriousness enough to
make disenfranchisement a proportionate consequence. Therefore, the Bill is
considered to be compatible with A3P1 as the bar on prisoner voting achieved
by this Bill in conjunction with the existing legislation is a proportionate means
of achieving a legitimate aim.
38. The government’s view is therefore that the ban on prisoner voting in respect
of offenders aged 16 and 17 sentenced to penal institutions and those
detained in other types of secure accommodation (included in the ban by
virtue of clause 2(2)) is compatible with the Convention.
Mental health detention in a criminal justice context
39. As a result of the Representation of the People Act 2000, the ban on civil mental
health patients voting was lifted, as was the bar on remanded prisoners voting.
This means there is no longer a general ban on voting for those detained under
mental health legislation, nor is there a ban on voting by those who lack mental
capacity for any other reason. A person detained in a mental institution for civil
reasons, and those who are detained on remand, are permitted to vote at

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elections. The ban in section 3A RPA 1983 is therefore limited to the specific
case of those who are detained for mental health and criminal justice reasons.
40. The restriction on voting rights of those who are detained under mental health
legislation in association with their crim inal conduct, is considered to be a
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim for a number of reasons.
41. Some of the orders listed in section 3A RPA 1983 apply to those who are
detained in hospital instead of in a prison or youth justice facility, but where they
have committed an offence for which a custodial sentence would be
appropriate. Others involve prisoners who are transferred to hospital during
their custodial sentence. A small cohort of those disenfranchised are those who
have not been convicted but who have been subject to a finding of fact (that
they committed the act that constituted the offence, but that they lacked the
requisite intention).
42. The vast majority of those who are disenfranchised are disenfranchised as a
result of an order that is imposed post-sentencing. Given the factors described
above in relation to youth justice, and the higher custodial threshold, it is likely
that a child would only be sentenced where their conduct is sufficiently serious
as to make their disenfranchisement proportionate.
43. There is the possibility that a small number of people may be detained under
orders imposed by the criminal courts where they have been so unwell that they
have not been fit to even be tried, although the court s have been clear that
detention under this section “must not be used as a routine and easy way of
avoiding a potentially troublesome trial ... [it] must be inappropriate to bring him
before the court at all ”. (R (Kenneally) v Crown Court at Snaresbrook, R
(Kenneally) v Rampton Hospital Authority [2002] QB 1169 (at paragraph 32)).
44. Additionally, the provisions themselves require the criminal court in question to
be convinced not just on medical evidence, but “considering any depositions or
other documents required to be sent to the proper officer of the court, that it is
proper to make such an order”. In Kenneally it was made clear by the Court of
Appeal that this is a high bar:
“34. It is clear from the duty imposed in section 51(6)(b) to consider “the
depositions” that the court is entitled to have regard to the evidence in the case
in deciding whether to make an order. In the absence of a conviction or a plea
of guilty, that too is a difficult task because it is impossible to know whether that
evidence would have been accepted. It cannot in my view have been intended
to put the court in that position, save in exceptional circumstances.
35. To pass sentence, even a sentence one of the objects of which is to assist
the defendant, without first convicting him is a drastic step, one that should be
taken only in exceptional circumstances.”

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45. Therefore, a hospital order under section 51(5) MHA 1983 (and the equivalent
provisions in Scottish and Northern Ireland legislation) can only be made in
respect of a person who is within the criminal justice system, within the
jurisdiction of a senior criminal court (Crown Court in England and Wales), and
at a time where a person’s mental health is even more extremely debilitated
that in the cases of those who are found unfit to plead. In this context, it is highly
unlikely that a person in such a condition could be said to be capable of
assessing the consequences of their decisions and making conscious and
judicious decisions, and therefore this is cons idered to be a proportionate
means of pursuing this aim, as well as prevention of crime and enhancement
of civic responsibility. Such an order may only be imposed in the context of a
criminal trial, after serious judicial consideration of whether it is proper to make
such an order, notwithstanding the absence of a hearing to determine any
finding of fact.
46. It is considered, therefore, that disenfranchisement of 16- and 17-year-olds who
are detained under criminal justice provisions of mental health legislation is a
proportionate means of pursuing the legitimate aims described above. The
government therefore considers that clause 1 , taken together with the current
restriction in section 3A RPA 1983, is also compatible with the Convention.
A3P1: the right to stand for election
Part 6
47. The clauses in this Part of the Bill:
a. Extend the scope of existing disqualification order provisions in Part 5
EA 2022 to ensure that those who commit certain violent or intimidatory
offences that are motivated by hostility towards electoral administrators,
are also banned from office (clause 70);
b. Ensure that the Scottish disqualification order established under Part 2
of the Scottish Elections (Representation and Reform) Act 2025 also
disqualifies people from being elected to or holding elected office
elsewhere in the UK (clause 73).
48. A3P1 is explained as an obligation on States, but the Court ’s case law has
developed to clarify that this creates rights relating to both voting and standing
as a candidate, at elections to the legislature. The provisions relating to
disqualification from office holding are considered to engage A3P1 in relation
to the “passive” element, the right to stand for election. The Court has
recognised that Contracting States’ margin of appreciation is wider in respect
of the ‘passive’ right to stand for election in comparison to the ‘active’ right to
vote (Yumak v Turkey (2009) 48 EHRR 61).
49. The provisions in Part 6 of the Bill do not introduce a new concept of a
disqualification order, but merely expand existing legislation, Part 5 EA 2022.

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These also provide for the cross -application of disqualification orders from
existing devolved Scottish legislation so that they disqualify a person from
standing as a candidate for, or holding elected office, across the UK outside of
Scotland, including devolved Welsh elections.
50. Part 5 EA 2022 provided in relation to certain offences involving violent or
intimidatory conduct (listed in Schedule 9 to that Act), where the offence was
motivated by hostility towards certain groups involved in the electoral process,
for a court to impose a disqualification order. The disqualification order prohibits
a person from standing for, or holding, a number of elected offices, including
membership of the House of Commons, Senedd Cymru, Northern Ireland
Assembly, and local government offices. Likewise the Scottish disqualification
order, which was introduced as a bar to holding Scottish offices for those
convicted of crimes of hostility towards electoral officials in Scotland , is cross-
applied by this Bill to additionally disqualify offenders from the same offices as
would an order made under EA 2022.
51. This therefore engages with and interferes with the right to stand for election
to the legislature.
52. The extension of the Part 5 EA 2022 disqualification order to cover intimidation
of electoral staff and other people associated in the delivery of elections and for
the cross-application of equivalent Scottish disqualification orders, pursues a
legitimate aim, namely to reduce the intimidation faced by those key
participants in elections and political debate by creating a deterrent for those
who seek to carry out that intimidation, thereby encouraging more people to
contribute to public life. Recent research from the Electoral Commission shows
a significant number of candidates in the 2024 elections – 43% of responding
candidates in England at the May 2024 local elections
2; 55% of responding
candidates at the 2024 General Election - experienced some kind of abuse or
intimidation. Likewise, a survey carried out by the Speaker’s Conference on the
security of MPs, candidates and elections also found that 52% of MPs felt
unsafe and 49% experienced anxiety or depression due to threats3.
53. There are clearly legitimate aims in ensuring that offenders who seek to
intimidate those involved in the electoral process are not then subsequently (for
a five year period) able to stand for electoral office after acting in a way that is
harmful to the electoral process ; and a further legitimate aim of protect ing
candidates when exercising their rights to stand. These measures are to
safeguard the free exercise of the vote, and the right of other individuals to
stand for election without fear of intimidation.

2 Report on the 2024 UK Parliamentary general election and the May 2024 elections. Key findings from
the FCA’s Financial Lives May 2022 survey. ↩
3 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5901/cmselect/cmspeak/570/report.html

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54. The government's view is that the measures introduced by these clauses on
intimidation are proportionate to this legitimate aim and are not arbitrary. A
disqualification order can only be imposed after criminal conviction, and only
where it is made out that the offence was motivated by hostility towards
candidates, electoral staff, or others involved in the democratic process .
Further, there is discretion retained by the criminal court by which an offender
is sentenced not to impose a disqualification order where that court considers
it unjust to do so based upon any particular circumstances regarding the
offence or the offender.
Clauses 41 and 42: requirement for prospective candidates at certain elections to
provide a copy of acceptable idenitification in order to be successfully nominated as
a candidate
55. Candidates will be required to provide a copy of prescribed identification
documentation under amendments made by clauses 41 and 42 in order to be
successfully nominated. This may arguably interfere with the right to stand for
election.
56. The justification for this new requirement is to ensure that only those seriously
wishing to participate in the electoral process are able to do so, and to ensure
that prospective candidates are who they claim to be. At the Speaker’s
Conference on the security of candidates, MPs and elections on 2 April 2025,
questions were raised about whether prospective candidates should prove their
identity and whether ROs should further vet the information provided by
prospective candidates and agents. Discussion of the issue has been further
prompted by a YouTuber who arranged for ten people, including himself, to
stand under his name at various constituencies at last year’s General Election.
The Speaker’s conference recommended that ID checks be introduced for all
prospective candidates.
57. This requirement therefore pursues a legitimate aim of protecting the A3P1
rights of voters and other candidates by ensuring that all candidates are who
they say they are and to reduce as far as possible the ability for mischief to be
caused by those who are not actually seeking election . This is also important
to ensure that electors know for whom they are voting when casting their vote
for a candidate.
58. It is also considered that the measures introduced by these clauses on
candidate ID are proportionate to this legitimate aim and are not arbitrary. The
power to prescribe acceptable identification for these purposes can be
exercised so as to ensure that there is a broad range of identification types that
can be used by prospective candidates.
59. The government’s view, therefore, is that any interference is a proportionate
means of achieving the legitimate aim of ensuring that the electorate are able

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to be confident that a person standing for election is who they purport to be.
This measure is considered to be compliant with the Convention.
Article 7 of the Convention
Clauses 71 and 72 – new statutory aggravating factor
60. Clauses 71 and 72 create a statutory aggravating factor that applies when
sentencing criminal offences involving hostility to those involved in the
democratic process. The offences to which the new statutory aggravating factor
applies and the required element of hostility are the same as those that would
lead to a disqualification order under Part 5 EA 2022. There are separate
provisions to provide the aggravating factor in legal jurisdictions throughout the
UK: England and Wales, the armed forces, Northern Ireland and Scotland (the
latter being a restatement of an existing Scottish provision).
61. These clauses may engage Article 7 because the provision will apply to
sentencing of offences after commencement that may have been committed
before commencement. The maximum penalty for the offences that may be
imposed before and after commencement is unaffected. In accordance with the
principles in Coeme and Others v Belgium (2000) and R v Uttley [2004] UKHL
38, this does not constitute a “heavier penalty... than the one that was applicable
at the time”. For these reasons, the Government is satisfied that this measure
is compatible with Article 7.
Article 10 and A1P1
Part 5 – campaigning measures
62. The measures in Part 5 of the Bill may engage Article 10 in relation to the ability
of individuals to make their opinion known by donating to political parties and
other organisations , and A1P1 in relation to donors’ and unincorporated
associations’ rights to dispose of their property (a “traditional and fundamental
aspect of the right of property” Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, §§ 63- 64). New and
existing provisions relating to forfeiture and requirements to return donations
will engage A1P1 in relation to the rights of the candidate or other regulated
campaigner who may be ordered to forfeit or required to return donations
received from impermissible donors. Some companies and LLPs that are
currently permissible donors may become impermissible due to the tightening
of the rules as to what constitutes a company with a UK connection.
63. A number of measures are introduced to tighten the rules on political donations.
These are: requirements on parties to carry out a risk assessment and to return
a donation where a risk assessment has not been undertaken on donations
over a specified threshold (clause 58); the lowering of the reporting threshold
for unincorporated associations to report political contributions (clause 62) and
to carry out permissibility checks on connected gifts they receive, and rules on
which companies and LLPs are able to be permissible donors (based on who

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controls those companies/LLPs and the amount of revenue they generate)
(clause 60). Further, the ban on attainers (under 16s) being permissible donors
is also intended to ensure that this group cannot be exploited to funnel
otherwise impermissible money into the political system (clause 59), and to
protect their rights to privacy (otherwise the “know your donor” requirements
would necessitate significant , otherwise private information being given to
political parties about such attainers).
64. These measures may be argued to interfere with the right of freedom of
expression (Article 10) or property rights (A1P1) of those who wish to donate
money or make other donations to show support to candidates, parties, or in
favour of a particular outcome at elections, referendums or recall petitions. The
rules already require that the person wishing to donate has a genuine
connection with the UK, and these clauses reinforce this principle.
65. To the extent that these measures interfere with Article 10 or A1P1, this is in the
general interest and necessary in a democratic society in order to ensure that
parties must take responsibility for ensuring they know where donations come
from, that unincorporated associations cannot be used as a vehicle for
donations to facilitate foreign interference in election campaigns, and that only
those donors with a genuine connection to the UK and a legitimate interest in
elections in the UK can contribute financially to parties and candidates. This is
in pursuit of the legitimate aim of protecting the A3P1 rights of voters against
large donations from abroad creating an uneven playing field in a way that
distorts the ability to ascertain the genuine opinion of the people at an election.
Further, a permissible donor is able to donate below specified thresholds
without their information being reported.
66. The Court recognised in the case of Bowman v UK 141/1996/760/961 (at
paragraphs 42 and 43):
“Free elections and freedom of expression, particularly freedom of political
debate, together form the bedrock of any democratic system (see the Mathieu-
Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, p.
22, § 47, and the Lingens v. Austria judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103,
p. 26, §§ 41–42).
“[…] Nonetheless, in certain circumstances the two rights may come into
conflict and it may be considered necessary, in the period preceding or during
an election, to place certain restrictions, of a type which would not usually be
acceptable, on freedom of expression, in order to secure the “free expression
of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”. The Court
recognises that, in striking the balance between these two rights, the
Contracting States have a margin of appreciation, as they do generally with
regard to the organisation of their electoral systems (see the above-mentioned
Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt judgment, pp. 23 and 24, §§ 52 and 54)”.

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67. While not focusing on donations, the Court in its recent judgment in Bradshaw
and others v the United Kingdom (at paragraphs 118 and 119) noted:
“The State is therefore under an obligation to adopt positive measures to
organise elections “under conditions which will ensure the free expression of
the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see Communist Party
of Russia and Others , cited above, § 107; see also Yumak and Sadak , cited
above, § 106).
“[...] in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to
maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at
identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage.”
68. A further argument for why those without a genuine UK connection should be
restricted in their involvement in elections in the UK was set out in the Fifth
Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life:
“The political parties are involved in the democratic process taking place within
the United Kingdom. In particular, the parties have to submit their proposed
policies to the electorate by manifestos and the governing party is chosen by
popular vote. The political parties should, therefore, be confined to seeking
financial support from those entitled to vote for them, subject to reasonable
extensions to include UK registered companies and UK organisations and
trusts. Put in its simplest form the argument is : what happens here is the
concern of those who live and work here and the political parties should not be
entitled to fill their coffers with donations from abroad, made by persons and
corporations who have no genuine stake in the country.”
69. These measures are not intended to prevent genuine free expression by
individuals or legal persons, or their rights to dispose of their property but this
must be balanced against the A3P1 rights of others. It is considered that these
measures, to the extent that they interfere with Article 10 or A1P1 are necessary
to protect the rights of others to be able to freely express their opinion in the
choice of the legislature, and in the case of the attainer measure (clause 59),
to protect their Article 8 rights, and are a proportionate means of achieving that
aim.
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
12 February 2026