There is an obvious alignment between the workstreams covered under Pillar 2 and the Defence Industrial Strategy’s themes of innovation, resilience and prosperity; and it offers clear opportunities for defence-related growth. However, the UK’s approach to Pillar 2 has so far been disjointed and has failed to fully exploit those opportunities. (Conclusion, Paragraph 140) 53

AUKUS

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AUKUS

This is a House of Commons committee report, with recommendations to government. The Government has two months to respond.

Eighth Report of Session 2024–26

Author:

Defence Committee

Related inquiry:

AUKUS

Date PublishedTuesday 28 April 2026

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Contents

Summary

AUKUS, a trilateral defence and security partnership, was announced in 2021 by the leaders of the US, UK and Australia. Conceived with the overarching aim of preserving security and stability in the Indo-Pacific, AUKUS is made up of two distinct elements, or Pillars. Under Pillar 1, the UK and US will enable Australia to acquire a fleet of sovereign nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines (“SSNs”). This new submarine—the SSN-AUKUS—will also replace the UK’s existing Astute-class SSN fleet when it leaves service and is expected to be delivered to the Royal Navy from the late 2030s. Pillar 2 will see the trilateral partnership collaborate on the development of advanced technologies including hypersonics and AI.

AUKUS promises specific strategic advantages for the partner nationsimproved deterrence, closer relationships with allies, and accelerated technological advancement. Despite the profound geopolitical shifts which have taken place since AUKUS was announced in 2021, we find that its promise remains valid and the rationale underpinning the agreement still holds.

However, our inquiry has revealed shortcomings and failings in the delivery of AUKUS which threaten to prevent that promise becoming a reality. In the UK, political leadership—essential to secure the success of a programme of AUKUS’ length, cost, and complexity—has faded. We call on the Prime Minister to take a more visible role in promoting and driving forward AUKUS to counter the political drift that could see it derailed.

Public support will be needed to maintain the political capital to deliver AUKUS over several electoral cycles, but public awareness and understanding of the programme is limited. We call for the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to better engage Members of Parliament in the effort to communicate the benefits of AUKUS at constituency level.

The expansion of the UK’s SSN fleet will require significant and sustained funding to regenerate a depleted submarine industrial base. Timely investment in upgrading the BAE Systems shipyard at Barrow where SSN-AUKUS will be built will be crucial. This has already slipped: any further failures could lead to delay in delivering SSN-AUKUS with serious consequences both for UK national security and for credibility with AUKUS partners. Efforts to regenerate Barrow to attract and maintain the workforce required to deliver SSN-AUKUS must be properly funded.

The Government must work urgently with the US and Australia to address barriers to workforce movement across the trilateral. Failure to act now risks bottlenecks as work on SSN-AUKUS intensifies and could lead to key milestones being missed: we call for an “AUKUS visa” to be considered to address this issue.

Fulfilling the UK’s commitment under AUKUS to increase SSN visits to Australia has already placed severe pressure on an overstretched Royal Navy. Infrastructure upgrades at submarine maintenance facilities in Plymouth and on the Clyde must be completed at pace to relieve pressure on the existing fleet and prepare for SSN-AUKUS; wider investment in Plymouth to support the increased workforce requirement must also be prioritised.

For Australia, AUKUS is an unprecedented undertaking to be delivered to ambitious timescales. The UK will need to work closely with Australia at both industry and government level to share expertise and support Australia in meeting its own milestones.

With Australia expected to acquire 3–5 Virginia-class SSNs from the US prior to SSN-AUKUS entering service, low Virginia production rates in the US are a matter of concern. Although efforts are being made to address this, it has been identified as a potential risk to Pillar 1.

We welcome the far-reaching reforms providing exemptions to export control regimes between AUKUS partners. After a disappointingly slow start, the Government must now act to maximise the use of these exemptions by UK companies, particularly SMEs, and ensure that the relevant approvals are granted swiftly.

Cross-trilateral progress on advanced technology under Pillar 2 has been inadequate and it is rapidly losing credibility; priority programmes must be agreed and delivered at pace if this is to be reversed. Pillar 2 taps into existing UK strengths and offers clear opportunities to deliver defence-related prosperity, but Whitehall needs to take a more joined-up approach if its potential is to be maximised. Plans to expand Pillar 2 to include additional partner nations must, regrettably, be put on hold until tangible progress has been made at trilateral level.

Failure to meet our AUKUS commitments would have severe implications both for the UK’s defence and security, and for the UK’s standing with its trilateral partners. With progress in some areas having already fallen short, the Government must do more—and do it faster—if it is to avoid those consequences and deliver on the promise that this seminal partnership affords.

1
Background to our inquiry

1.
AUKUS, a trilateral defence and security partnership between the UK, US, and Australia, was announced by then UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, and US President Joe Biden in September 2021. It has been described as a “generational” pact which will see the UK and US help Australia to develop a sovereign nuclear-powered, conventionally-armed submarine capability, and increase collaboration between the three countries on advanced military technologies.
1

2.
As we approached five years since AUKUS was conceived, and with it having received only limited parliamentary scrutiny, we decided to inquire into the partnership, examining whether it was on track and how any challenges surrounding its delivery could be addressed.

3.
We launched our inquiry in April 2025 and held five oral evidence sessions between September and December 2025. We visited the US and Australia, the UK’s AUKUS partners, where we met with a wide range of interlocutors in the nations’ capitals and during site visits in Virginia, Adelaide and Perth. In the UK we visited Barrow-in-Furness, home to the UK’s only submarine building yard, and His Majesty’s Naval Bases at Plymouth and Clyde. We are grateful to all those who have provided written and oral evidence. We also wish to thank those who facilitated and hosted our visits, all of which greatly enhanced our understanding of AUKUS at both a national and international level, and have proved invaluable in informing our report.

4.
As a Select Committee of the House of Commons, our conclusions and recommendations are intended primarily for the UK Government. We are however keenly aware that the UK’s role within AUKUS cannot be seen in isolation, and it is our hope that this report will also prove relevant and useful to the UK’s trilateral partners.

2
Introduction

The AUKUS partnership

5.
AUKUS consists of two distinct elements, or “Pillars”.

6.
Pillar 1 will see Australia acquire a sovereign fleet of nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines (SSNs) with the support of the US and UK. This will be achieved via a phased approach. First, an increased tempo of US and UK SSN port visits and later rotational deployments will assist Australia in developing the expertise required to operate nuclear-powered submarines. Second, Australia will acquire between 3 and 5 Virginia-class SSNs from the US. Finally, the UK and Australia will build a new submarine class, the SSN-AUKUS, providing a sovereign-built capability for Australia and a successor to the Royal Navy’s current fleet of Astute-class SSNs. The Royal Navy is expected to take delivery of its first SSN-AUKUS in the late 2030s, with the Royal Australian Navy to follow in the early 2040s.

7.
Pillar 2 of AUKUS will see the trilateral collaborate on the development of advanced military technologies and deepen their defence co-operation. Initially covering four areas—cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and additional undersea capabilities—Pillar 2 has since expanded to include a total of eight workstreams and now also includes information sharing, innovation, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and electronic warfare.
2

8.
Announced in 2021 via a joint virtual press conference held by the three national leaders, the launch of AUKUS was high-profile and not without controversy. It involved the cancellation of a major contract between Australia and France for the supply of conventionally-powered submarines, which the then French Foreign Minister described as “a stab in the back”.
3
AUKUS remains a live political and social issue in Australia and we received evidence from its critics highlighting the costs of the programme, doubting its deliverability, expressing concern about the environmental and safety risks associated with nuclear waste, and questioning its implications for Australian sovereignty.
4

9.
The scale of the AUKUS undertaking cannot be underestimated. For Australia in particular, developing the required workforce and infrastructure will be an unprecedented endeavour. With the first SSN-AUKUS not expected to enter service for over a decade, timescales are lengthy and all three partners are likely to encounter significant challenges along the way: some have already emerged, as we identify in this report. Surmounting these challenges and delivering on the promise of AUKUS across both Pillars will require continued effort and political leadership at the very highest level for many years to come.

10.

conclusion
Our inquiry has underlined the importance of the AUKUS partnership, but has also laid bare the scale of the endeavour that will be required to successfully deliver it. For the UK, AUKUS presents challenges but also great opportunities. Meeting those challenges and seizing those opportunities will require sustained political will and strong leadership and direction from the very top of successive governments.

3
The geopolitical context

11.
From the outset, AUKUS has been framed around Indo-Pacific security. Announcing the agreement in 2021, Boris Johnson said that the UK would work “hand in glove” with the US and Australia to “preserve security and stability” in the region, whilst President Biden told reporters that “the future of each of our nations—and indeed the world—depends on a free and open Indo-Pacific”.
5

12.
AUKUS was implicitly acknowledged from its announcement to be a counter to an increasingly assertive China. The Council on Geostrategy told us that it was a response to “rising concern around the expanding influence and military might of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)”, noting that the PRC had “significantly increased” military investment in the maritime domain and was engaging in “assertive territorial claims in regional waters.”
6
Beijing reacted angrily to the announcement of the AUKUS agreement, describing it as “extremely irresponsible” and warning that it risked “severely damaging regional peace.”
7

13.
The Council on Geostrategy summarised the key strategic advantages of AUKUS for the three partners: an enhanced deterrent posture against the PRC; a bolstered alliance framework; and a stronger technological edge.
8
Within that context, AUKUS offers distinct advantages for each member of the trilateral. For Australia, geographically the closest to China, it promises a sovereign nuclear-powered submarine capability with greater stealth, endurance, and deterrent capability than its existing diesel-powered fleet. For the US, AUKUS will strengthen its allies and provide new SSN facilities in Western Australia, allowing enhanced force projection into the Indo-Pacific, whilst the development of a trilateral supply chain offers greater resilience for its submarine industrial base. And for the UK, collaboration with trilateral partners on the SSN-AUKUS and on Pillar 2 technologies offers an opportunity to revitalise the defence industrial base, build resilience across the supply chain, and enhance national military capabilities.
9
 The SSN-AUKUS, once delivered, will form the cornerstone of UK deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Geopolitical shifts

14.
Any assessment of AUKUS cannot be seen in isolation from the significant geopolitical shifts which have taken place in the 5 years since the partnership was announced. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and President Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy have called into question fundamental assumptions about the post-WW2 world order, and European defence priorities have shifted in response. The UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), whilst explicit in its support for AUKUS, heralded a “NATO-first” approach to defence and a focus on the UK’s contribution to Euro-Atlantic security.
10
Across Europe, the issue of readiness for war is higher on the political agenda than it has been since the end of the Cold War.

15.
Some of the evidence we received questioned how far these events had undermined the case for AUKUS and its chances of successful delivery. We heard that geopolitical and domestic developments presented “tangible challenges to the original AUKUS framework” and it was argued that the strategic priorities of the UK and Australia were no longer in alignment.
11

16.
Others, whilst acknowledging that AUKUS would need to adjust to the new geopolitical context, felt that the deteriorating global security situation in fact underlined the need for the partnership. RAND Europe wrote that “the core focus of a trilateral partnership built around trusted engagement with like-minded partners on shared and urgent strategic goals appears prescient” and argued that the changing geopolitical context also created a growing sense of urgency, “reinforcing the strategic importance of AUKUS.”
12

17.
Luke Pollard MP, Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry (“the Minister”), told us that the current threat picture faced by NATO and other partners including Australia meant that “the importance of making sure that AUKUS delivers is even more prominent than it was when the original initiative was launched all those years ago.” He emphasised that although the US and Australia were focused on the Indo-Pacific, the SSN-AUKUS would provide support for the UK in the Euro-Atlantic area.
13
Similarly, Sir Stephen Lovegrove, the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on AUKUS, said it was important to communicate that AUKUS “radically improves and enlarges our deterrent capability in our own backyard”.
14

18.

conclusion
Almost five years on from the announcement of the AUKUS partnership, the world is a very different place. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and shifting US priorities have placed increasing pressure on Western nations’ defence and security apparatus. The alliances that have underpinned global security for decades can no longer be taken for granted. There can be no doubt that these changes will present challenges for the partnership, as defence budgets come under increasing pressure and diplomacy enters a new era of unpredictability. They do not, however, undermine the fundamental rationale of AUKUS: bolstering security in the Indo-Pacific (and elsewhere); strengthening alliances between the US, UK and Australia; and seeking technological advantage through collaboration.

4
Governance and leadership

The UK AUKUS review

19.
In August 2024 the incoming Labour Government appointed Sir Stephen Lovegrove, a former National Security Adviser, as its AUKUS adviser and commissioned him to undertake a review of the programme.
15
The review’s terms of reference noted that Sir Stephen’s report would form a contribution to the SDR and would be provided to the Government in a form suitable for unclassified publication, with a classified version also to be produced.
16
The commitment to release a public version of the report “in due course” was reiterated in April 2025.
17
Evidence to our inquiry reflected the hope and expectation that the report’s findings would be made public.
18

20.
We were briefed privately by Sir Stephen, and he also provided public oral evidence to our inquiry where he set out some of the key findings of his review. We are grateful for his candour. Asked about plans to release a public version of his report, he told us that whilst he would be very happy to see one made available, it was “ultimately the Prime Minister’s document” and therefore a decision for No. 10.
19
We put the same question to the Minister and received a similar response and a commitment to follow up on our request for a public version to be released.
20
However—and despite having subsequently reiterated our request in writing to the Ministry of Defence (MOD)—no public version of the report has yet been forthcoming.
21

21.

conclusion
It is deeply disappointing that more than a year after Sir Stephen Lovegrove completed his review of AUKUS, the Government’s commitment to issue a public version of his findings has not been fulfilled. This reflects poorly on the Government and is damaging to stakeholder and public confidence. It is also symptomatic of wider issues around the lack of public engagement with AUKUS, which we examine in more detail later in this report.

22.

recommendation
We urge the Government to issue a public version of Sir Stephen Lovegrove’s report as soon as possible.

Leadership

23.
The scale and scope of AUKUS means that it requires sustained effort, resource and input from across Whitehall. Sophia Gaston, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Statecraft and National Security, King’s College London, told us that delivering on AUKUS was “a whole-of-government exercise” requiring “centralised oversight and an empowered and engaged political culture to drive institutional delivery.” She highlighted the breadth of “touchpoints” that AUKUS would encompass, including “education, infrastructure, housing, science and technology, defence, geopolitics, and, of course, the Treasury.”
22

24.
She argued that this whole-of-government effort had been impeded by a shift in AUKUS governance within Whitehall, with leadership having transferred from the Cabinet Office to Defence.
23
Sir Stephen Lovegrove told us that his review had also identified a loss of central leadership.
24
The MOD said that steps had been taken in response to his recommendations to improve accountability and deepen co-operation between the MOD and Cabinet Office. This would include regular Cabinet-level AUKUS Ministerial meetings which would be chaired by the Prime Minister or, in his absence, the Defence Secretary.
25

25.
Sir Stephen told us that he felt that these changes had been an improvement, but he observed that “big defence projects have a tendency to gravitate always back into defence,” cautioning against complacency and warning that a “constant effort” would be required to maintain a “national endeavour” approach to AUKUS within Whitehall.
26

26.
We heard that Prime Ministerial leadership would be critical to maintaining the political impetus to deliver AUKUS across Whitehall. Sophia Gaston emphasised that AUKUS was a political project which had been conceived through country leaders and pointed to drift—“a lack of political attention and will”—as the greatest threat to successful delivery of Pillar 1.
27
To counter this, she argued that proximity and empowerment from the Prime Minister would be crucial in providing the “very senior political authority” required, and she expressed some concern at the prospect of this leadership being diluted by AUKUS Ministerial meetings being chaired by the Defence Secretary in the PM’s absence.
28

27.
Sir Stephen Lovegrove also recognised the importance of senior political leadership, observing that AUKUS had been “initiated through very active leader-led collaboration” which needed to continue if momentum was to be maintained and the partnership’s potential fulfilled.
29
He told us that he had had “a couple of conversations” with the Prime Minister since his appointment and that he was “definitely engaged” in AUKUS.
30

28.

recommendation
The UK Prime Minister must take a more prominent role in driving the delivery of AUKUS. Many of the challenges we identify in this report arise from a lack of funding or prioritisation within Government rather than any underlying structural or technical issues. More visible Prime Ministerial endorsement for AUKUS will provide impetus and direction for Whitehall; without this leadership we are not confident that the cross-government coordination, prioritisation and pace required to deliver AUKUS will be achieved.

29.
In the five years since AUKUS was announced, there have been national elections and changes of governing party in each of the three partner nations. Each incoming Government has commissioned a review of the programme and there has been accompanying speculation about whether it retains ongoing political support across the trilateral, with the 2025 US review attracting particular media scrutiny.
31
Some of the evidence we received, which pre-dated the outcome of the US review, said that the shift in US foreign policy signalled by President Trump could see the US seek to renegotiate, amend or even pull out of AUKUS.
32

30.
With all three reviews now complete, if unpublished, the current leaders have since made clear their continued commitment to the programme. President Trump told reporters during a press conference with Prime Minister Albanese in October 2025 that AUKUS was “full steam ahead”.
33

31.
The joint public announcement of AUKUS by the three national leaders in September 2021 conveyed a powerful message about the importance which they each attached to it. National leaders came together publicly again in March 2023 to announce the Optimal Pathway—another clear statement of unity and intent which received widespread media coverage. With domestic reviews of the programme now complete in all three partner nations following changes of governing party, trade body Make UK Defence called for a fresh “clear, unified, public statement of support for both Pillars of AUKUS from the leaders of all three nations” which they said would provide momentum to capitalise on AUKUS’ potential.
34

32.

conclusion
As we approach five years since AUKUS was launched, following changes of Government and with domestic reviews of the programme recently completed in all three partner nations, a natural opportunity arises for national leaders to convene and make a powerful joint statement underlining their continued commitment to the programme, sending a clear public message both domestically and to adversaries.

Prime Minister’s Special Representative

33.
In April 2025 the Government announced a new appointment for Sir Stephen as the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on AUKUS. In this new role, Sir Stephen would “support the Defence Secretary and the National Security Adviser to drive the AUKUS programme forward” and would travel to both Washington and Canberra to brief the US and Australian Governments on the findings of his review.
35

34.
The creation of this new role, and Sir Stephen’s appointment to it, was “strongly welcomed” by Make UK Defence, while industry prime Babcock International said that it “provides the UK with a figurehead for driving the programme forward”.
36
It was also identified as a positive development by interlocutors during the Committee’s overseas visits, where we heard some support for the creation of a similar post in the US and Australia. Sir Stephen told us that he would welcome such a move.
37

35.
We did, however, hear concern about the limits of the post-holder’s influence. Sir Stephen told us that he did not have executive authority to direct the Whitehall machinery, although he had not yet had a request for information or action refused.
38
Defence on the Brink cautioned that only authority to affect policy, provided directly and openly from the Prime Minister, would give the post-holder “bureaucratic weight” within Whitehall and that without this the influence of the Special Representative would be limited.
39

36.
Sir Stephen’s initial appointment was for a year. He told us that he saw a “definite benefit” in having a central figure to cohere Whitehall and provide a public face for AUKUS.
40
The Minister told us that he saw clear value in the role but that any decision to extend it would be for the Prime Minister.
41

37.
We were surprised to hear that, given his broad remit, Sir Stephen did not currently have any staff dedicated solely to supporting him. He said he was “comfortable” with current levels of resource but that he was sure he would be able to find use for further staff resource were it offered.
42

38.

recommendation
The appointment of a Prime Minister’s Special Representative on AUKUS, initially for a year, has been a positive step welcomed by stakeholders in industry and across the trilateral. We recommend that the role be made permanent, providing consistency for stakeholders and sending an important signal across Whitehall and to our international partners about the UK’s commitment to AUKUS.

39.

recommendation
The Government should advocate for the US and Australia to follow the UK in appointing their own Special Representative (or an equivalent role). Consideration should also be given to establishing a joint secretariat to support them.

40.

recommendation
The remit of the Prime Minister’s Special Representative is broad, with both domestic and international focus across a wide range of capabilities. If its functions are to be exercised effectively, it must be adequately supported by the Civil Service. Alongside the extension of the role, the staffing of the office should be reviewed with a view to bolstering the resource available.

5
Engagement

41.
We heard that in the UK, AUKUS has suffered from a lack of meaningful public engagement—attributed in part to its origins as a top-secret project—and that Parliamentary and media understanding and awareness of AUKUS was also poor.
43
This was identified as a particular concern in light of the programme’s scale: we were told that its success would be reliant on public support.
44

42.
In part, the lack of awareness and debate around AUKUS reflects a broader lacuna in the national conversation around defence issues. This is an area which we examined in our recent report on the UK contribution to European Security, and we remain of the view that more needs to be done to directly engage with the public both on the role of defence in underwriting collective safety and prosperity, and the importance of funding it adequately.
45

43.
We explored the role that Members of Parliament could play in the AUKUS narrative, conscious that the wide range of advanced technologies included within Pillar 2 makes AUKUS relevant to areas outside traditional defence heartlands. Members can play an important role in raising local awareness of the employment opportunities and economic benefits that the AUKUS supply chain offers in constituencies across the UK. Our experience as constituency Members has been that obtaining information about this has not been straightforward and we have been frustrated by the MOD’s unwillingness to share information.

44.
We put to the Minister that this presented a missed opportunity to harness the storytelling role that could be played by local Members. He acknowledged that more could be done in this area and said he wanted to encourage a “much bolder and prouder” approach to communication within defence to improve public understanding around defence spending, including “the ability for us to tell that story on a local level, with constituency-level data”.
46

45.

conclusion
The need to engage more openly with the public in a national conversation on defence and security issues has been a recurring feature of the political discourse in recent years and one on which we have previously pressed the Government for action. A programme of AUKUS’ length and cost will rely on public support if it is to succeed.

46.

recommendation
Within an overarching dialogue about the role of defence in society, AUKUS offers an opportunity to demonstrate the more tangible benefits that a thriving defence industry can bring to local economies across the UK. Members of Parliament can play a key role in this messaging at constituency level, but our attempts to engage with the MOD to achieve this have so far been frustrated. In its response to this report, the MOD should set out how it will take a more proactive and open approach to working with Members, and to engaging with the media to achieve this shared goal.

6
Workforce and skills

47.
Within the UK, the MOD expects over 21,000 people to be working on SSN-AUKUS in UK shipyards and across the supply chain at its peak. They have forecast that the nuclear workforce (defence and civil) will need to increase by 40,000 by 2030 in order to support AUKUS and the wider demands on the Defence Nuclear Enterprise. They acknowledged that the AUKUS ambition could not be realised without the essential personnel and expertise needed to design, build, operate and maintain SSN-AUKUS, in both the UK and Australia.
47

48.
In August 2023 the Nuclear Skills Taskforce was established, bringing together Government, industry and academia to develop a strategic action plan for skills.
48
The National Nuclear Strategic Plan for Skills was subsequently published and set out some of the specific steps that would be taken to meet the workforce and skills demand.
49

49.
There was support for the work that was already underway and positivity about existing strengths. Harry Holt, Chief Executive Nuclear at Babcock International Group, told us that the work of the Nuclear Skills Taskforce (of which Babcock is a member) had been “very successful.”
50
Samira Braund, Defence Director at trade association ADS Group, described the skills academies run by industry primes as “amazing” and as “sector-leading, not just defence-leading.”
51
ADS said that AUKUS provides “an attractive offer for recruitment and development of UK skills” and noted that nuclear apprenticeships and graduate programmes remain oversubscribed.
52

50.
We heard, however, that workforce challenges remained. This included competition with other sectors for certain skillsets—Northrop Grumman gave software engineering as an example—and particular shortfalls in specific roles such as welding and electrical engineering, which Make UK Defence described as a “major hurdle”.
53

51.
Reflecting these challenges, there were calls for a more innovative and agile approach to recruitment. Make UK Defence argued for over-recruitment and/ or over-training by industry primes, saying that this could create a talent pool of potential employees which could filter down to mid-tier companies and SMEs. We heard that this initiative had already gained some traction but that a more formal and systematic approach would be welcomed.
54

52.
We also heard that the increasingly digital and data-driven nature of the defence industry provided opportunities to recruit in new locations. This could prove particularly relevant to Pillar 2. Andrew Kinniburgh, Director General of Make UK Defence, told us that:

We need to be less wedded to the big, old industrial sites. We do not have to have all the design and engineering on site there… We need… to follow the talent to some extent, and become more flexible in the way that we design and develop and bring virtual teams together as we are designing a submarine, a new aircraft or whatever it might be.
55
53.
An AUKUS-branded qualification or apprenticeship was suggested as potentially attractive to recruits, particularly if it offered the opportunity for secondments across the partnership.
56

54.

recommendation
Whilst the groundwork has been laid for growing the nuclear workforce, the scale of the recruitment needed to deliver AUKUS calls for more creative solutions. These should harness existing strengths, such as the world-leading skills academies run by UK defence primes, and use the unique recruitment opportunity presented by the trilateral partnership to tap into new sources of talent. The Government should encourage and incentivise recruitment from geographic locations and demographics without strong existing links to defence, using AUKUS as a vehicle to extend skilled employment and prosperity across the UK.

Workforce mobility

55.
We heard that part of the original rationale for AUKUS was to create an internationally more resilient workforce.
57
However, we received compelling evidence that at present there remain significant barriers to workforce mobility across the trilateral, with overly complex and bureaucratic security requirements hampering efforts to move employees between countries.

56.
Consultancy firm Mott MacDonald told us that moving personnel between their UK and Australian businesses was a “time-consuming and administratively burdensome” process undertaken on a case-by-case basis and entailing, at every stage, “an absolute reliance on individuals, and on their efficiency.” They described a “very significant cost in personal development and financial terms” for employees deployed from the UK to Australia who saw their security clearance lapse:

To lose their clearance and then be required to re-apply for it, is costly for the business; more crucially, it prevents that expert from being professionally useful on their return from supporting an AUKUS partner. This disincentivises companies and discourages staff from sharing their skills and knowledge in this way.
In the longer term, they argued that increased numbers of workers mobilising between the UK and Australia “will place an unsustainable bureaucratic load on the system and its individuals.”
58

57.
Alongside security clearances, we heard on our visits that other barriers to movement, such as spousal employment and tax liabilities, would also need to be addressed.

58.
Sophia Gaston told us that the absence of these “fundamental building blocks of co-operation” had “profoundly inhibited” the practical use of the ITAR reforms.
59
She called for an AUKUS “visa” or passport to be created, to enable “the mutual recognition of security clearances and classifications, as well as immigration pathways to support open movement for AUKUS projects between the three nations.”
60

59.
Sir Stephen Lovegrove described himself as “a big fan of the AUKUS visa”, and it also received support from our industry witnesses, who agreed that streamlining workforce transfers would become more important as AUKUS progressed and the volume of movements increased.
61

60.
Support for the idea did not, however, extend as far as the MOD. The Minister told us that the Government did “not yet see a need for an AUKUS visa”:

We will keep whether we need to transfer people under review, if there are barriers or a backlog that prevents the smooth transfer. We are not seeing that at the moment… If there is a need in terms of visas more broadly, that is something we will keep under review, but we do not see an immediate requirement for one today.
62

61.

conclusion
We are deeply concerned by the Government’s failure to recognise the impact of barriers to workforce movement across the trilateral. The ensuing inconvenience and cost may currently be manageable—although they are having a stifling effect on collaboration—but it is clear to us that existing arrangements will not be sustainable as work on AUKUS intensifies. With the programme already working to ambitious timelines, this problem must be addressed now to avoid future backlogs and delays, which could threaten the delivery of SSN-AUKUS in both the UK and Australia.

62.

recommendation
The Government must urgently remove barriers to workforce mobility across the AUKUS partners, beginning with security clearances. We recommend that the MOD, working with trilateral partners and in consultation with industry, set out within six months a clear plan to enable mutual recognition or continuity of security clearances for AUKUS-related work, and report to Parliament on progress. The introduction of an AUKUS visa should be considered as part of this work. Failure to address this now will constrain collaboration, slow delivery, and impose escalating costs as the programme intensifies.

63.
Whilst the smooth movement of people will be key to the success of AUKUS, it also poses potential risks for the UK which will need to be mitigated. Australia will need to create its own nuclear workforce and create new infrastructure in Adelaide and Perth. It expects delivering Pillar 1 to create 20,000 direct jobs over the next three decades.
63

64.
We encountered speculation that the UK’s submarine industrial base could suffer from a “skills drain” effect as a result.
64
Peter Anstiss, Chief Executive of Team Barrow, told us that he was “not unduly concerned” about the prospect, whilst Sir Stephen Lovegrove said that it was “something to keep an eye on” as the programme matures.
65
During our discussions with industry whilst in Australia it was suggested to us that the introduction of an AUKUS visa could exacerbate the problem.

65.

recommendation
The development of new SSN facilities in Adelaide and Perth could pose a risk to workforce retention at the UK’s equivalent facilities in Barrow-in-Furness and Plymouth. The MOD must closely monitor workforce flow as the design and build of SSN-AUKUS progresses, and should ensure that efforts to streamline workforce movements do not inadvertently create a detriment to the UK’s submarine industrial base. Efforts to regenerate Barrow and Plymouth will be key to mitigating this risk, as we address in more detail later in this report.

7
Pillar 1—The Optimal Pathway

66.
Following an 18-month scoping period, in March 2023 the three national leaders held a joint press conference in which they announced the “Optimal Pathway”, setting out details of the phased approach to Pillar 1:

Australian military and civilian personnel would be embedded within the US and Royal Navies, and US and UK submarine industrial bases, to advance their training;

the US and UK would increase SSN port visits to Australia from 2023 and 2026 respectively, and would establish a rotational SSN presence in Australia from as early as 2027;

Australia would acquire between 3-5 Virginia-class SSNs from the US from the early 2030s;

finally, the UK and Australia would build a new submarine class, the SSN-AUKUS. The Royal Navy would receive its first SSN-AUKUS in the late 2030s, with Australia delivering its first SSN-AUKUS in the early 2040s.
66

67.
In the SDR, the Government set out its intention to create a fleet of “up to 12” nuclear attack submarines (a significant increase on the 7-strong Astute fleet) and committed to continuous submarine production, with one submarine to be produced every 18 months.
67

Reinvigorating the submarine industrial base

68.
Delivering and sustaining a larger SSN fleet alongside the other demands on the submarine industrial base—notably maintaining the existing Astute and Vanguard fleets, and delivering the new Dreadnought-class nuclear deterrent—will require a significant uplift in industrial capacity. It comes after years of underinvestment which have had serious consequences for the resilience of the industrial base, as RAND Europe explained:

In the UK, the challenge lies in re-establishing a submarine industrial base with high capacity, resilience and tempo. These issues can largely stem from earlier decisions made at the end of the Cold War to delay investment in submarine programmes... This led to the atrophy of key industrial skills, infrastructure and supply chains and has had a long-term cascading effect on the overall health of the submarine industrial base. The rapid resurgence of demand associated with AUKUS has therefore placed further stress on an already heavily-taxed system.
68
69.
Significant Government investment has already been made in key industrial sites. This includes:

contracts totalling £4 billion signed with BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce and Babcock in October 2023 for the design, prototyping and purchase of main long lead components for SSN-AUKUS;

a further £3 billion invested into advanced manufacturing capabilities at BAE’s site in Barrow and the Rolls-Royce plant in Raynesway;

a £9 billion “Unity” contract with Rolls-Royce to produce nuclear reactors for the Royal Navy’s submarine fleet, including for the SSN-AUKUS; and

£2.4 billion in investment from the Australian Government to upgrade facilities and for design work on SSN-AUKUS.
69

70.
The scale of these investments reflects both the precarious state of the submarine industrial base and the size of the AUKUS endeavour. RAND Europe said that past problems were being “proactively tackled at pace” (whilst cautioning that they may take years to fully resolve).
70
However, we also heard that keeping up the tempo of investment as AUKUS progresses would be crucial and there were worrying signs that this had already slipped.

71.
Sir Stephen Lovegrove told us that decisions around investment had not always been timely, and that progress on infrastructure upgrades had not been as quick as it should have been.
71
He told us that the situation had since improved, with the pace of investment “picking up very markedly”, but he highlighted that that pace “will need to be maintained for the next 20 years at a minimum.”
72
He identified timely investment, particularly into Barrow, as the biggest risk and emphasised that “[w]e need to make absolutely certain that there is no excuse for delay.”
73

72.
During the Committee’s evidence session with industry representatives, the importance of maintaining the pace of delivery was underlined by all three prime contractors (Babcock, BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce).
74
In Australia we heard a commonly voiced refrain amongst interlocutors that “every day counts,” and a sense that the long timelines of the programme could not be allowed to distract from the need for pace at this early stage given the scale and complexity of the AUKUS undertaking.

73.
For the UK and NATO, the consequences of failure to deliver SSN-AUKUS to the Royal Navy were described by Dr Sidharth Kaushal, Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) as “quite dire and quite immediate”:

The first is that the ability of Russian attack submarines like the Yasen class to slip through the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and launch cruise missiles at the European homeland from unexpected vectors will increase exponentially in a context where American assets are reallocated to the Pacific, and the UK, as one of NATO’s two operators of nuclear attack submarines, faces a capacity shortfall. The second challenge is that European NATO’s independent deterrence, and particularly our own CASD [continuous at sea deterrent], will be at risk if Yasen-class submarines can break into the Atlantic in meaningful numbers.
75
74.
Vice Admiral Sir Chris Gardner, CEO of the Submarine Delivery Agency, said that they were “absolutely committed” to ensuring that there was capacity to deliver the increased drumbeat of production.
76

US production rates

75.
The UK is not alone in facing challenges in reinvigorating an ailing submarine industrial base. The US is also grappling with decades of underinvestment and a depleted workforce. Build rates for the Virginia-class submarine have consistently failed to meet procurement targets: build rates have stood at 1.2 boats a year since 2022 against the 2.33 that will be required to meet US Navy and AUKUS requirements.
77
As in the UK, significant investment has been made in the US to address the challenges and increase production, but our evidence reflected concerns about the implications for AUKUS of low US build rates: it was described as “a foundational problem” by the Council on Geostrategy and “an outstanding risk” by RAND Europe.
78

76.

conclusion
For the UK, delivering SSN-AUKUS will be a lengthy and complex undertaking requiring a sustained financial commitment from Government across several electoral cycles. It is deeply concerning that there are signs that the investment pipeline that underpins that commitment has already faltered. This cannot be allowed to happen again: the need for timely and appropriate levels of investment must be prioritised within Whitehall. Shortfalls or delays in funding risk a failure to deliver SSN-AUKUS on time, with potentially severe consequences for UK and wider Euro-Atlantic security, and our standing with our trilateral partners.

77.

recommendation
The Government must demonstrate that the industrial uplift required to deliver SSN-AUKUS is being funded and delivered at pace. We recommend that an annual assessment of planned versus delivered investment in submarine industrial capacity be conducted by the Prime Minister’s Special Representative, to be submitted to the Prime Minister and published in a form suitable for Parliamentary scrutiny. Any slippage should be explicitly justified. Given the long timelines involved, early delays will compound and materially threaten delivery.

8
Pillar 1—Build

SSN-AUKUSa partnership approach

78.
The final stage of Pillar 1 will see the UK and Australia build a new class of nuclear-powered, conventionally armed attack submarines: the SSN-AUKUS. The new submarine will be based on a UK design and will incorporate technologies from all three members of the trilateral. It will be built at two sites: the existing BAE Systems yard at Barrow-in-Furness, and a new facility to be constructed at Osborne Naval Shipyard in Adelaide. Rolls-Royce will provide the nuclear propulsion plants for both the UK and Australian submarines.
79

79.
Delivering SSN-AUKUS will undoubtedly stretch the UK’s defence industrial capacity, but the undertaking faced by Australia, which must create a new submarine yard at Osborne to tight timescales, is on a different scale. The MOD recognised the “enormity” of this challenge and the Australian Government likewise acknowledged the “complexity, scale and ambition” of acquiring an SSN capability.
80
The primes were generally positive about the working relationship with their Australian and US counterparts but Steve Timms, Managing Director of BAE Systems Submarines, highlighted challenges in securing alignment between partners:

It is mainly around the speed of decision making. Clearly, to finish programmes on time, we need to start on time. It is about getting the level of coherence and consensus in the early part of the programme, making the decisions that need to underpin that, and providing enough of a runway for the work ahead.
81

80.

recommendation
As Australia works against tight timescales to develop the infrastructure and workforce required to build its sovereign nuclear-powered submarine capability, it will need to take decisions which could have implications for the UK’s own build schedule at Barrow. The UK Government must co-ordinate closely with the Australian Government as it finalises its plans, ensuring that the UK has developed contingencies for all possible options.

Barrow-in-Furness

81.
The town of Barrow-in-Furness, situated on the North-West coast of England, plays a critical role in the UK’s defence and security as home to the BAE Systems shipyard which is the UK’s only submarine building facility.

Box 1Team Barrow

Team Barrow is a public-private partnership established in 2023 to oversee the town’s regeneration. The Barrow Delivery Board is chaired by The Rt Hon. The Lord Case, the former Cabinet Secretary. Other voting members of the Board represent BAE Systems, Westmorland and Furness Council, and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.

Team Barrow has two overarching objectives:

To enable and sustain the Defence Nuclear Enterprise in Barrow efficiently and securely;

To diversify and strengthen Barrow’s economy and increase productivity.

The Plan for Barrow sets out a range of specific aims which include

The building of thousands of high quality new homes;

An increase in employment levels amongst the working-age population;

An increase in population;

Improved educational outcomes;

Improved road and rail links;

Better healthcare provision.

SourceTeam Barrow - Delivering Barrow’s transformation - Barrow Rising

82.
The town’s prosperity has been closely linked to the shipyard’s output and productivity. We took evidence from Team Barrow, a public-private partnership tasked with regenerating the town. Their CEO, Peter Anstiss, told us that the town’s economy was “totally dependent on the shipyard” and that Barrow’s fortunes had “waxed and waned” in accordance with the yard’s output, with the cyclical procurement of small batches of submarines causing “great cycles of prosperity and lots of inequalities during the periods of feast and famine.”
82

83.
The post-Cold War slump in submarine building hit Barrow particularly hard. Large parts of the town now rank among the most deprived areas in the UK and health and wellbeing is a particular concern. Team Barrow highlighted some of the specific challenges they faced:

18.3% of the working-age population not in employment;

71.3% of adults overweight or obese;

poor mental health outcomes, with residents reporting the lowest sense of life satisfaction in the UK and high levels of anxiety;

alcohol and drug misuse rates significantly above national averages.

They told us that “[m]any of these socio-economic issues are deeply entrenched and will require sustained effort and significant resources to address.”
83

84.
Regenerating Barrow and making it an attractive place to live and work has been recognised as central to the success of AUKUS. The Minister set out the dependencies:

We have to improve the speed of production in Barrow. A new submarine needs to be emerging every 18 months. That can only happen if we get the skills situation right, and we can only get the skills situation right in Barrow if we build enough houses and deal with education, transport and some other challenges. That is what Team Barrow is designed to deliver.
84
85.
Steve Timms underlined the need to “revitalise Barrow-in-Furness as a place where people choose to work and live”, telling us that “[w]e cannot have a transient workforce for such a vital role for defence and security.”
85

86.
Despite the recognition of Barrow’s centrality to the AUKUS endeavour, there are concerning signs that regeneration efforts are not being progressed with the urgency required. Housing has been identified as a “major priority” for meeting workforce needs, but Team Barrow told us that it was not being addressed at the required pace, with a shortfall of new homes currently in the pipeline and issues with the quality of existing housing.
86

87.
The Government has committed £200 million in funding to Team Barrow over ten years via the Barrow Transformation Fund, but this sum will not be enough to deliver the changes required. Lord Case estimated the total investment requirement at £1 billion and said that alongside funding from private sources which Team Barrow was seeking to secure, further investment would be needed from the Department of Health and Department of Transport. He acknowledged competing demands for scarce public resources but warned of the consequences if the necessary investment in Barrow was not secured:

…if Barrow does not get it, we do not get our nuclear submarines, which are the cornerstone of this nation’s security. It is that simple really.
87
88.
Launching the Barrow Transformation Fund in March 2024, the then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak described the UK’s nuclear sector as a “critical national endeavour” which was vital for long-term security and prosperity.
88
However, our visit to Barrow revealed a clear disconnect between the importance attached to the town at a national level and the lived experience of local people. Concern was voiced that Team Barrow funding would be directed towards short-term interventions rather than addressing the fundamental and deep-rooted issues the town faced, particularly regarding education, where we were told that the Department for Education needed to urgently address funding shortfalls in local schools.

89.
Lord Case acknowledged that past failings had created scepticism:

I think belief and culture is the hardest thing that we are trying to tackle in Barrow… there have been a number of smaller interventions in Barrow going back over years. We get asked, “Why is it going to be different this time?”
89
90.
Although the regeneration is a long-term project, we were told on our visit to Barrow that making a visible and meaningful difference in the short-term would be crucial to obtaining local buy-in. The Minister agreed that progress needed to be real and tangible and that “[p]eople need to see the change”, both in Barrow and in other areas central to the delivery of AUKUS such as Plymouth and the Clyde. He accepted our encouragement to move faster on this.
90

91.

conclusion
There was a clear consensus in our evidence that the regeneration of the town of Barrow-in-Furness is essential to the delivery of AUKUS. The formation of Team Barrow and the investment committed to date to address this is welcome, but it does not go far enough. The scale of the challenge was laid bare in the evidence before us and was made apparent during our visit to the town.

92.

recommendation
With the successful delivery of SSN-AUKUS dependent on attracting and retaining a skilled workforce at BAE Systems’ site in Barrow, the Government must do more to ensure that the ambition laid out by Team Barrow is met. This will require additional funding from central Government to provide the investment in housing, healthcare, transport and education which the town urgently needs. Barrow’s unique role as the home of the UK’s submarine building capability means that failure to do so will jeopardise not only AUKUS, but also the nation’s defence and security. Put simply, the regeneration of Barrow is too big to fail.

93.

recommendation
Although the planned regeneration is in its early stages, Team Barrow must ensure that visible change is seen on the ground as soon as possible to reassure the local community that their role in the national endeavour has been recognised, and that meaningful change is underway.

9
Pillar 1—Sustainment

94.
Sustainment facilities for SSN-AUKUS will need to be in place from the day it enters service and throughout its decades-long lifespan. Harry Holt of Babcock observed that whilst there has “inevitably” been a lot of focus on the design and build stages of SSN-AUKUS, “[h]istory tells us that 75% of whole-life-cycle costs go in the operate and maintain phase.”
91
Babcock’s written evidence cautioned that the success of Pillar 1 would depend on sustainment elements including through-life infrastructure, workforce and supply chain, all of which hold “significant lead times and operational risk if deprioritised.”
92

95.
The consequences of failing to properly invest in sustainment have been demonstrated in recent years with well-publicised—if not officially confirmed—shortfalls in the Royal Navy’s submarine availability, as Defence on the Brink explained:

The Submarine Service has been badly affected over the past 18 months by maintenance and repair issues which have limited the availability of vessels. Some submarines have been waiting for maintenance for more than two years because of a shortage of facilities at HMNB Clyde and HMNB Devonport, as well as the prioritisation of the Vanguard-class submarines which provide the UK’s continuous at-sea deterrence. In the first half of 2024, none of the five Astute-class boats in service completed an operational deployment.
93
96.
It has been reported that patrol durations for the Vanguard-class have lengthened as a consequence, with concern expressed about the negative effect on crew welfare of spending increasingly longer periods at sea.
94

Increased UK SSN presence in Australia

97.
Under the Optimal Pathway, the UK has committed to increase the tempo of visits to Australia from its Astute-class submarines as a precursor to the establishment of a rotational UK and US SSN presence to be based out of HMAS Stirling near Perth (to be known as Submarine Rotational Force - West). The Australian Government described this element of the Optimal Pathway as “firmly in our shared defence and strategic interests,” saying it would strengthen the deterrent effect of AUKUS in the region whilst also enhancing Australia’s familiarity with UK systems, enhancing interoperability, and bolstering collective defence capability.
95

98.
We heard, however, that this commitment would add to the pressures on an already constrained Astute fleet. Dr Sidharth Kaushal observed that the fleet, “the smallest the UK has had in living memory”, would be stretched “to the limits of its capacity” in fulfilling the UK’s commitment to deploy an Astute to Australia. In practice, he said, this would mean that some functions and training would need to be dropped, giving the example of the “critical competency” of under-ice operations and explaining that:

The risk of stretching our SSN fleet is not just about the availability of hulls but, frankly, that we operate it to death—that we essentially drive out of the force certain competencies and the ability to train them.
96
99.
Similarly, Defence on the Brink cautioned that whilst the Astute deployment offered clear benefits in the context of AUKUS, it was not without risk and would allow the Royal Navy no breathing space if a submarine became unavailable. Nonetheless, they argued, “our allies will expect us to fulfil our promises.”
97

100.
The Minister denied that the commitment to increase Astute visits would leave the UK vulnerable. He said that it had been built into the Royal Navy’s planning assumptions and was “entirely realistic” and key to the delivery of AUKUS.
98
He highlighted the role it would play in building relevant knowledge in Australia and the “strategic advantage and importance” it held.
99

101.
Notwithstanding the Minister’s assurances, the risks outlined during our inquiry were later brought into sharp focus as we prepared this report. In February 2026 HMS Anson arrived in Australia for the first port visit from an Astute under the AUKUS Optimal Pathway. Just days later, war broke out in the Middle East and the Royal Navy’s readiness levels came under intense scrutiny.
100
Reported to be the only available Astute, HMS Anson was said to have cut short her planned month-long visit after just two weeks to relocate to the Middle East, in a move that was argued to cast doubt on the UK’s ability to fulfil its AUKUS commitments.
101

102.

conclusion
Delivering on the UK’s commitment to increase port visits and later rotate an Astute-class submarine out of Australia will be essential to maintaining credibility within AUKUS. We were glad to receive the Minister’s assurance that the UK remained on track to meet this obligation, and we welcomed the subsequent arrival of HMS Anson in Western Australia. However, it is clear that fulfilling this commitment has stretched the Astute fleet to—or even beyond—its limits.

Increasing sustainment capacity

103.
Major investment has been pledged to remedy these availability issues, with multi-billion-pound upgrades underway at the Royal Navy’s submarine bases at Devonport in Plymouth and on the Clyde, both of which we visited during the course of this inquiry.
102
The Government has committed £4.4 billion of investment into Devonport, and a £750 million contract was signed with Babcock in 2023 to construct new facilities for the Royal Navy’s attack submarines, including the SSN-AUKUS.
103

Team Plymouth

104.
The social and economic implications of an expanded nuclear enterprise at Devonport have created both opportunity and challenge for the city of Plymouth. September 2025 saw the creation of Team Plymouth, a public-private partnership between Babcock, the MOD and Plymouth City Council.
104
With Babcock alone requiring an additional 5,500 workers over the coming decade, Team Plymouth’s aims include addressing the skills and workforce gap, regenerating the city centre and building 10,000 new homes.
105

105.
Plymouth is one of five cities identified in the 2025 Defence Industrial Strategy as benefiting from a Defence Growth Deal, an initiative to combine defence and wider Government investment with the aim of boosting local economies, encouraging investment and ensuring long-term sustainability. The Government has pledged £250 million across the five cities to support this initiative.
106

106.
Harry Holt described the role of Team Plymouth as “symbiotic”:

It is about making sure that the city and the region are able to support the defence growth ambitions, and about ensuring that that defence growth maximises the prosperity and the economic development of the city and the region.
107
107.
Drawing on the experience of Team Barrow, Lord Case said that funding certainty would be key to the success of Defence Growth Deals and criticised the decision that they be led from the MOD, arguing that a core team needed to be responsible for delivery, including a dedicated CEO.
108

108.

recommendation
With submarine availability critically low, and against a backdrop of deepening concern about the readiness of the Royal Navy, the Government must deliver infrastructure improvements at HMNB Devonport and HMNB Clyde at pace to relieve pressure on the fleet. Failure to do so will risk the UK’s ability to meet its obligations under AUKUS whilst continuing to maintain security in the Euro-Atlantic.

109.

recommendation
Workforce growth at HMNB Devonport will be key to delivering the infrastructure required to improve submarine availability and prepare for SSN-AUKUS. Team Plymouth will play a central role in creating the local conditions to attract and maintain this larger workforce and will also be key to delivering the local defence dividend promised by the city’s Defence Growth Deal. The Government must provide timely and adequate funding for Team Plymouth to enable it to meet the workforce challenge and maximise defence-related growth.

Australian sustainment infrastructure

110.
The development of SSN sustainment infrastructure at Perth in Western Australia is a critical element of the Optimal Pathway. The existing naval base HMAS Stirling will see c.£4 billion of investment to deliver wharf upgrades and new SSN maintenance, logistics, and training facilities. A new Defence Precinct will be developed within the existing Australian Marine Complex (AMC) at Henderson, at an estimated cost of c.£12.5 billion, which will include facilities for depot-level maintenance of SSNs.
109
Developing the Defence Precinct with minimum disruption to existing commercial users of the AMC and creating replacement facilities for their use has been identified as important aspect of this work.
110

111.
With Australia set to acquire US Virginia-class SSNs in the early 2030s, it will need to have sustainment facilities in place well in advance of the delivery of the SSN-AUKUS, as Harry Holt observed.
111
The scale of the works required, and the urgency with which they will need to be progressed, were made clear to us when we visited Perth. Whilst we were left in no doubt as to the seriousness with which Australia is approaching this challenge, timescales are already very tight.

112.

recommendation
The UK must throw its full support behind Australia’s development of new infrastructure in Perth, particularly the new Defence Precinct at Henderson. Close working between the UK and Australia at government and industry level will enable the UK to share its experience in constructing and operating its own nuclear sustainment infrastructure, assisting Australia in expediting progress and allowing both countries to maximise the benefits to be gained by operating a common fleet.

10
Export controls

113.
The nature of the technologies covered by the AUKUS agreement means that many of them are subject to export controls and restrictions within the three partner nations. This was identified as a possible barrier to implementation of AUKUS from an early stage, with US ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) requirements a particular concern.
112

114.
In August 2024 it was announced that export controls and restrictions on technology sharing within the trilateral would be lifted in what the UK Government described as a “historic breakthrough in defence trade.” Although some limited exemptions remain, the Government estimated the reforms would cover up to £500 million in UK exports each year.
113

115.
The trade bodies welcomed these changes. ADS told us that the lifting of ITAR restrictions was “a massive win”, techUK that it was “undoubtedly a positive step,” and Make UK Defence described it as “a significant step forward.”
114

116.
However, alongside this praise there was also some criticism of the UK Government for what was seen as a slow start in capitalising on the opportunity presented by the reforms. Organisations wishing to make use of the exemptions must first join the AUKUS Authorised User Community (AUC). Giving evidence in October 2025, ADS told us that the UK had roughly 250 users compared to Australia’s 600, and that there had initially been “significant processing delays” in dealing with applications, although the situation had since improved.
115
Make UK Defence echoed these concerns about early delays, warning that the lack of pace would prevent timely investment from industry and limit the ability of businesses to fully participate in AUKUS.
116

117.
SMEs were recognised as facing particular challenges. Trevor Taylor, Director of the Defence, Industries & Society Programme at RUSI, observed that the process for joining the AUC was “not simple” and required organisations to meet US standards for security clearance, infrastructure protection and cyber systems. He said this would favour larger organisations which already had a defence footprint and would be harder to achieve for new, smaller firms trying to break into defence.
117

118.
Matthew Evans, Chief Operating Officer and Director of Markets at techUK, told us that whilst Australia took a heavily joined-up approach to trade, export and defence, the UK “still has some work to do” in this regard:

I am not sure how much the DBT [Department for Business and Trade] has necessarily been out there campaigning to say, “We have this AUKUS user community, which gives a lot of benefits. Please use it,” to its SME portfolio network. There is more that we can do to join up how the whole of government approaches AUKUS to make sure that we maximise the benefits that the ITAR reform brings.
118
119.
The MOD cited a recent urgent Government procurement from a US company which had taken just days, when in the past it would have required in the region of three to six months. They informed us that “the Government is committed to continuing to raise awareness of how to use the exemption so industry and academia can maximise the benefits.”
119

120.

conclusion
The lifting of export control restrictions under AUKUS is a significant achievement for the partnership. It has the potential to bring immense benefits across UK defence. However, that potential will only be realised if Government removes barriers to participation and raises awareness across industry, encouraging businesses—including those which may not consider themselves to be traditional defence suppliers—to make the most of the opportunity presented.

121.

recommendation
The Government should seek to identify those organisations which could benefit from membership of the Authorised User Community—especially SMEs—and proactively promote it to them, offering guidance and support where required. The new Defence Office for Small Business Growth should play a key role in this effort. The MOD must also work closely with the Department for Business and Trade to monitor applications and ensure that early delays to the granting of approvals are not repeated.

11
Pillar 2 delivery

Background and rationale

122.
Alongside the headline objective of providing Australia with a sovereign nuclear-powered submarine capability, the joint leaders statement announcing AUKUS in September 2021 also set out an intention to “significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities”. The statement identified four further areas for trilateral collaboration under AUKUS to “enhance our joint capabilities and interoperability”:

cyber capabilities;

artificial intelligence;

quantum technologies; and

additional undersea capabilities.
120

123.
This element of the AUKUS agreement has since been referred to as “Pillar 2”, and in April 2022 it was expanded to include four further areas:

hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities;

electronic warfare;

innovation; and

information-sharing.
121

Development of a Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) has also been identified as an element of AUKUS, although it remains unclear whether it is a formal workstream under Pillar 2.
122

124.
A brief from the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that whilst Pillar 1 was “historic”, Pillar 2 could be “revolutionary”:

Individually, each area of Pillar Two has game-winning potential in the strategic competition with China. Taken together, they could be game-
changing
, securing the future military and economic advantage of the AUKUS nations and recasting the nature of this competition for global influence.
123
125.
We heard from Dr Sidharth Kaushal that many Pillar 2 capabilities, including quantum technologies and hypersonics, would be “critical to ensuring the success of Pillar 1”, in what he described as a “golden thread” running through AUKUS.
124

Box 2Pillar 2 case study: marine autonomy

Falling under the workstream of undersea capabilities, marine autonomy—the development and use of vehicles with varying degrees of independence from human operators—was identified as one of the areas of Pillar 2 which has seen the most progress to date. The Maritime Big Play initiative has involved a series of experiments and exercises aimed at developing capability and improving interoperability between AUKUS partners, with the MOD and ADS both citing it as an example of positive industry engagement on Pillar 2.
125

Marine autonomy is an area where the UK already has considerable expertise, with Plymouth’s National Centre for Marine Autonomy launched in June 2025. It is also an area where opportunities abound for collaboration between AUKUS partners: defence firm Helsing acquired Australian marine autonomy specialist Blue Ocean in October 2025 and has opened a Resilience Factory in Plymouth where it plans to mass produce autonomous marine gliders.
126

Progress

126.
The rationale for Pillar 2 may be clear, but the evidence we received concluded overwhelmingly that it has so far failed to deliver on its promise. Whilst in Washington we were left in no doubt that time was running out for it to retain credibility.

127.
We heard that the heart of the problem lay in the fact that its aims and objectives were “exceptionally broad,” and its wide scope an impediment to delivery.
127
According to techUK, there was an urgent need to “review and rationalise” priorities within Pillar 2:

[t]he current list of technologies is hugely ambitious and simply not matched by the available resources… As one member argued, ‘despite broad agreement on what needs attention, the how, when, and who remain vague’.
128
128.
This conclusion was a recurring theme of the evidence we received and the conversations we held in both Washington and Australia. It has been recognised within the trilateral: we heard work had been undertaken to identify “signature” or “marquee” projects which could be progressed at pace and that four proposed projects had been agreed by the UK and Australia and sent on to the US.
129
The Minister told us that further progress was awaiting the outcome of the US AUKUS review.
130

129.
Air Marshal Tim Jones, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Force Development) told us that Pillar 2 had nonetheless achieved some success, citing contracts awarded to UK suppliers in connection with work on AI, maritime autonomy, hypersonics, and electronic warfare. He said that he was keen to now scale up those capabilities and get them “into the hands of the warfighter.”
131

130.
Evidence from industry revealed a high degree of frustration at the failure to clearly define the scope of Pillar 2, and consistent calls for more certainty to be provided. We heard that industry investment and efforts to attract private capital had been hampered, with techUK explaining that “the demand signal is too broad. You are looking at eight different areas. Where would you invest?”
132
RAND Europe noted that clear demand signals are particularly important for emerging and disruptive technologies.
133

131.
ADS called for dedicated funding mechanisms to be provided for Pillar 2 and advocated for these to be included within the long-delayed Defence Investment Plan.
134

132.

recommendation
With its aim of harnessing trilateral collaboration on advanced technologies, Pillar 2 has the potential to be transformative, but progress to date has been disappointing and inadequate. It now faces an uphill battle to restore credibility. In the short term, the Government must press for swift agreement within the trilateral on priority projects which provide tangible benefit to the warfighter and their subsequent delivery at pace. The Government must also provide clarity around funding mechanisms so that industry is provided with the investment confidence needed to produce those capabilities at scale.

Prosperity

133.
Frustration at the lack of progress on Pillar 2 was exacerbated for some by its potential to deliver prosperity. As Matthew Evans of techUK observed, “[w]e are a tech enabled, knowledge-based economy—more so, arguably, than Australia and the US. We should be trying to maximise the economic benefit from Pillar 2 as well as the capabilities that it can have.”
135

134.
Sophia Gaston agreed, telling us that this was “where the real opportunity for Britain lies”. She said that the UK’s prosperity and security were “completely entwined” and called for a more joined-up approach across Whitehall, describing it as “madness” that the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology had been only a “peripheral” actor in AUKUS, and arguing that the failure to integrate higher education had been “a real failing”.
136
Academics also highlighted the failure to involve higher education more systematically within Pillar 2.
137

135.
We note the clear parallels between the prosperity argument put forward by our witnesses and the 2025 Defence Industrial Strategy’s call for the Ministry of Defence to maximise its potential to drive economic growth.
138

Industry engagement

136.
Industry engagement on Pillar 2 is carried out primarily via the trilateral Advanced Capabilities Industry Forum (ACIF). ACIF is a high-level consultative body, meeting three to four times a year, on which UK industry is represented by nominated trade associations: ADS, techUK, Make UK and the Society of Maritime Industries.
139

137.
We received mixed evidence on the effectiveness of industry engagement. Make UK Defence said that the MOD had continued to engage regularly with the ACIF throughout a period of significant internal change within the Department; Matthew Evans of techUK went further and described MOD engagement as “exceptional”.
140

138.
We heard, however, that direct engagement with industry outside of the trade associations was limited.
141
This was particularly relevant to the experience of SMEs. SubSea Craft Ltd, a UK SME producing advanced uncrewed and autonomous marine capabilities, told us that engagement was “improving but remains uneven” and that dialogue had often concentrated on larger primes, whilst smaller firms (which they noted were often best placed to deliver rapid innovation) remained outside formal consultation.
142

139.
Make UK Defence said that the potential for SMEs to contribute to Pillar 2 had not yet been fully recognised and said that they had not yet met Sir Stephen Lovegrove, calling for more direct engagement with him and with seniors in the MOD.
143

140.

conclusion
There is an obvious alignment between the workstreams covered under Pillar 2 and the Defence Industrial Strategy’s themes of innovation, resilience and prosperity; and it offers clear opportunities for defence-related growth. However, the UK’s approach to Pillar 2 has so far been disjointed and has failed to fully exploit those opportunities.

141.

recommendation
The MOD must work closely with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, and the Department for Education, to drive a truly joined-up, whole-of-government approach to Pillar 2. The Government must also do more to involve SMEs directly in Pillar 2 activities, harnessing their agility and innovation to enhance capability development.

12
Expanding Pillar 2

142.
The inclusion of additional partners within Pillar 2 has been actively considered. In a joint leaders statement made in September 2024, the AUKUS partners said that opportunities to work with Japan on marine autonomy were already being explored and that consultations were underway with the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and Canada.
144

143.
We heard that there could be considerable strategic advantages to expanding the trilateral: burden-sharing of costs, stronger collective deterrence and capability amplification were all cited as potential benefits.
145
The MOD described the benefits of expansion as “compelling” and said that it would also underline the UK’s commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
146

144.
However, we also heard that bringing additional partners on board could present challenges. Data sharing, security clearances and alignment of technical standards were all cited as possible barriers to smooth collaboration, but there was also an underlying concern about the potential for additional stakeholders to cause a further dilution of focus and slowing of progress.
147
Given our conclusions about Pillar 2’s battle to regain credibility, this argument carried considerable weight with us and echoed concerns that were raised during our visit to Washington, where we heard a strong message that progress had to be made within the existing trilateral before expanding it further.

145.
The Minister made clear that whilst expanding Pillar 2 could bring “real opportunities,” it would only be considered where there was a clearly defined advantage to the existing members of the trilateral.
148

146.

conclusion
Expanding Pillar 2 to include additional partners offers potential opportunities, but it will add a further layer of complexity and negotiation to what is already proving to be a difficult task. Whilst remaining positive about a future expansion of Pillar 2, we reluctantly conclude that the focus for now must be on achieving tangible results within the existing trilateral: AUKUS must first deepen collaboration before widening it.

13
Conclusion

147.

conclusion
A programme of AUKUS’ scale and scope will not succeed if it is perceived within Whitehall as one of many defence programmes competing for scarce resources. Only strong and visible political leadership from the very top of Government can counter a drift into bureaucratic obscurity and ensure that AUKUS receives the funding and priority that the nation’s defence and security demands.

148.

conclusion
As we approach five years since the partnership came into being, with changes of Government in each partner nation and domestic reviews completed, now is the time to seize the opportunity AUKUS presents and demonstrate the UK’s firm commitment to making it a success. The recommendations in this report identify the steps that must be taken to address the challenges that have already emerged, and to inject a new impetus into the delivery of AUKUS. We call on the Government to adopt them without delay.

Conclusions and recommendations

Introduction

1.
Our inquiry has underlined the importance of the AUKUS partnership, but has also laid bare the scale of the endeavour that will be required to successfully deliver it. For the UK, AUKUS presents challenges but also great opportunities. Meeting those challenges and seizing those opportunities will require sustained political will and strong leadership and direction from the very top of successive governments. (Conclusion, Paragraph 10)

The geopolitical context

2.
Almost five years on from the announcement of the AUKUS partnership, the world is a very different place. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and shifting US priorities have placed increasing pressure on Western nations’ defence and security apparatus. The alliances that have underpinned global security for decades can no longer be taken for granted. There can be no doubt that these changes will present challenges for the partnership, as defence budgets come under increasing pressure and diplomacy enters a new era of unpredictability. They do not, however, undermine the fundamental rationale of AUKUS: bolstering security in the Indo-Pacific (and elsewhere); strengthening alliances between the US, UK and Australia; and seeking technological advantage through collaboration. (Conclusion, Paragraph 18)

Governance and leadership

3.
It is deeply disappointing that more than a year after Sir Stephen Lovegrove completed his review of AUKUS, the Government’s commitment to issue a public version of his findings has not been fulfilled. This reflects poorly on the Government and is damaging to stakeholder and public confidence. It is also symptomatic of wider issues around the lack of public engagement with AUKUS, which we examine in more detail later in this report. (Conclusion, Paragraph 21)

4.
We urge the Government to issue a public version of Sir Stephen Lovegrove’s report as soon as possible. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22)

5.
The UK Prime Minister must take a more prominent role in driving the delivery of AUKUS. Many of the challenges we identify in this report arise from a lack of funding or prioritisation within Government rather than any underlying structural or technical issues. More visible Prime Ministerial endorsement for AUKUS will provide impetus and direction for Whitehall; without this leadership we are not confident that the cross-government coordination, prioritisation and pace required to deliver AUKUS will be achieved. (Recommendation, Paragraph 28)

6.
As we approach five years since AUKUS was launched, following changes of Government and with domestic reviews of the programme recently completed in all three partner nations, a natural opportunity arises for national leaders to convene and make a powerful joint statement underlining their continued commitment to the programme, sending a clear public message both domestically and to adversaries. (Conclusion, Paragraph 32)

7.
The appointment of a Prime Minister’s Special Representative on AUKUS, initially for a year, has been a positive step welcomed by stakeholders in industry and across the trilateral. We recommend that the role be made permanent, providing consistency for stakeholders and sending an important signal across Whitehall and to our international partners about the UK’s commitment to AUKUS. (Recommendation, Paragraph 38)

8.
The Government should advocate for the US and Australia to follow the UK in appointing their own Special Representative (or an equivalent role). Consideration should also be given to establishing a joint secretariat to support them. (Recommendation, Paragraph 39)

9.
The remit of the Prime Minister’s Special Representative is broad, with both domestic and international focus across a wide range of capabilities. If its functions are to be exercised effectively, it must be adequately supported by the Civil Service. Alongside the extension of the role, the staffing of the office should be reviewed with a view to bolstering the resource available. (Recommendation, Paragraph 40)

Engagement

10.
The need to engage more openly with the public in a national conversation on defence and security issues has been a recurring feature of the political discourse in recent years and one on which we have previously pressed the Government for action. A programme of AUKUS’ length and cost will rely on public support if it is to succeed. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)

11.
Within an overarching dialogue about the role of defence in society, AUKUS offers an opportunity to demonstrate the more tangible benefits that a thriving defence industry can bring to local economies across the UK. Members of Parliament can play a key role in this messaging at constituency level, but our attempts to engage with the MOD to achieve this have so far been frustrated. In its response to this report, the MOD should set out how it will take a more proactive and open approach to working with Members, and to engaging with the media to achieve this shared goal. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46)

Workforce and skills

12.
Whilst the groundwork has been laid for growing the nuclear workforce, the scale of the recruitment needed to deliver AUKUS calls for more creative solutions. These should harness existing strengths, such as the world-leading skills academies run by UK defence primes, and use the unique recruitment opportunity presented by the trilateral partnership to tap into new sources of talent. The Government should encourage and incentivise recruitment from geographic locations and demographics without strong existing links to defence, using AUKUS as a vehicle to extend skilled employment and prosperity across the UK. (Recommendation, Paragraph 54)

13.
We are deeply concerned by the Government’s failure to recognise the impact of barriers to workforce movement across the trilateral. The ensuing inconvenience and cost may currently be manageable—although they are having a stifling effect on collaboration—but it is clear to us that existing arrangements will not be sustainable as work on AUKUS intensifies. With the programme already working to ambitious timelines, this problem must be addressed now to avoid future backlogs and delays, which could threaten the delivery of SSN-AUKUS in both the UK and Australia. (Conclusion, Paragraph 61)

14.
The Government must urgently remove barriers to workforce mobility across the AUKUS partners, beginning with security clearances. We recommend that the MOD, working with trilateral partners and in consultation with industry, set out within six months a clear plan to enable mutual recognition or continuity of security clearances for AUKUS-related work, and report to Parliament on progress. The introduction of an AUKUS visa should be considered as part of this work. Failure to address this now will constrain collaboration, slow delivery, and impose escalating costs as the programme intensifies. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62)

15.
The development of new SSN facilities in Adelaide and Perth could pose a risk to workforce retention at the UK’s equivalent facilities in Barrow-in-Furness and Plymouth. The MOD must closely monitor workforce flow as the design and build of SSN-AUKUS progresses, and should ensure that efforts to streamline workforce movements do not inadvertently create a detriment to the UK’s submarine industrial base. Efforts to regenerate Barrow and Plymouth will be key to mitigating this risk, as we address in more detail later in this report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 65)

Pillar 1—The Optimal Pathway

16.
For the UK, delivering SSN-AUKUS will be a lengthy and complex undertaking requiring a sustained financial commitment from Government across several electoral cycles. It is deeply concerning that there are signs that the investment pipeline that underpins that commitment has already faltered. This cannot be allowed to happen again: the need for timely and appropriate levels of investment must be prioritised within Whitehall. Shortfalls or delays in funding risk a failure to deliver SSN-AUKUS on time, with potentially severe consequences for UK and wider Euro-Atlantic security, and our standing with our trilateral partners. (Conclusion, Paragraph 76)

17.
The Government must demonstrate that the industrial uplift required to deliver SSN AUKUS is being funded and delivered at pace. We recommend that an annual assessment of planned versus delivered investment in submarine industrial capacity be conducted by the Prime Minister’s Special Representative, to be submitted to the Prime Minister and published in a form suitable for Parliamentary scrutiny. Any slippage should be explicitly justified. Given the long timelines involved, early delays will compound and materially threaten delivery. (Recommendation, Paragraph 77)

Pillar 1—Build

18.
As Australia works against tight timescales to develop the infrastructure and workforce required to build its sovereign nuclear-powered submarine capability, it will need to take decisions which could have implications for the UK’s own build schedule at Barrow. The UK Government must co-ordinate closely with the Australian Government as it finalises its plans, ensuring that the UK has developed contingencies for all possible options. (Recommendation, Paragraph 80)

19.
There was a clear consensus in our evidence that the regeneration of the town of Barrow-in-Furness is essential to the delivery of AUKUS. The formation of Team Barrow and the investment committed to date to address this is welcome, but it does not go far enough. The scale of the challenge was laid bare in the evidence before us and was made apparent during our visit to the town. (Conclusion, Paragraph 91)

20.
With the successful delivery of SSN-AUKUS dependent on attracting and retaining a skilled workforce at BAE Systems’ site in Barrow, the Government must do more to ensure that the ambition laid out by Team Barrow is met. This will require additional funding from central Government to provide the investment in housing, healthcare, transport and education which the town urgently needs. Barrow’s unique role as the home of the UK’s submarine building capability means that failure to do so will jeopardise not only AUKUS, but also the nation’s defence and security. Put simply, the regeneration of Barrow is too big to fail. (Recommendation, Paragraph 92)

21.
Although the planned regeneration is in its early stages, Team Barrow must ensure that visible change is seen on the ground as soon as possible to reassure the local community that their role in the national endeavour has been recognised, and that meaningful change is underway. (Recommendation, Paragraph 93)

Pillar 1­—Sustainment

22.
Delivering on the UK’s commitment to increase port visits and later rotate an Astute-class submarine out of Australia will be essential to maintaining credibility within AUKUS. We were glad to receive the Minister’s assurance that the UK remained on track to meet this obligation, and we welcomed the subsequent arrival of HMS Anson in Western Australia. However, it is clear that fulfilling this commitment has stretched the Astute fleet to—or even beyond—its limits. (Conclusion, Paragraph 102)

23.
With submarine availability critically low, and against a backdrop of deepening concern about the readiness of the Royal Navy, the Government must deliver infrastructure improvements at HMNB Devonport and HMNB Clyde at pace to relieve pressure on the fleet. Failure to do so will risk the UK’s ability to meet its obligations under AUKUS whilst continuing to maintain security in the Euro-Atlantic. (Recommendation, Paragraph 108)

24.
Workforce growth at HMNB Devonport will be key to delivering the infrastructure required to improve submarine availability and prepare for SSN-AUKUS. Team Plymouth will play a central role in creating the local conditions to attract and maintain this larger workforce and will also be key to delivering the local defence dividend promised by the city’s Defence Growth Deal. The Government must provide timely and adequate funding for Team Plymouth to enable it to meet the workforce challenge and maximise defence-related growth. (Recommendation, Paragraph 109)

25.
The UK must throw its full support behind Australia’s development of new infrastructure in Perth, particularly the new Defence Precinct at Henderson. Close working between the UK and Australia at government and industry level will enable the UK to share its experience in constructing and operating its own nuclear sustainment infrastructure, assisting Australia in expediting progress and allowing both countries to maximise the benefits to be gained by operating a common fleet. (Recommendation, Paragraph 112)

Export controls

26.
The lifting of export control restrictions under AUKUS is a significant achievement for the partnership. It has the potential to bring immense benefits across UK defence. However, that potential will only be realised if Government removes barriers to participation and raises awareness across industry, encouraging businesses—including those which may not consider themselves to be traditional defence suppliers—to make the most of the opportunity presented. (Conclusion, Paragraph 120)

27.
The Government should seek to identify those organisations which could benefit from membership of the Authorised User Community—especially SMEs—and proactively promote it to them, offering guidance and support where required. The new Defence Office for Small Business Growth should play a key role in this effort. The MOD must also work closely with the Department for Business and Trade to monitor applications and ensure that early delays to the granting of approvals are not repeated. (Recommendation, Paragraph 121)

Pillar 2 delivery

28.
With its aim of harnessing trilateral collaboration on advanced technologies, Pillar 2 has the potential to be transformative, but progress to date has been disappointing and inadequate. It now faces an uphill battle to restore credibility. In the short term, the Government must press for swift agreement within the trilateral on priority projects which provide tangible benefit to the warfighter and their subsequent delivery at pace. The Government must also provide clarity around funding mechanisms so that industry is provided with the investment confidence needed to produce those capabilities at scale. (Recommendation, Paragraph 132)

29.
There is an obvious alignment between the workstreams covered under Pillar 2 and the Defence Industrial Strategy’s themes of innovation, resilience and prosperity; and it offers clear opportunities for defence-related growth. However, the UK’s approach to Pillar 2 has so far been disjointed and has failed to fully exploit those opportunities. (Conclusion, Paragraph 140)

30.
The MOD must work closely with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, and the Department for Education, to drive a truly joined-up, whole-of-government approach to Pillar 2. The Government must also do more to involve SMEs directly in Pillar 2 activities, harnessing their agility and innovation to enhance capability development. (Recommendation, Paragraph 141)

Expanding Pillar 2

31.
Expanding Pillar 2 to include additional partners offers potential opportunities, but it will add a further layer of complexity and negotiation to what is already proving to be a difficult task. Whilst remaining positive about a future expansion of Pillar 2, we reluctantly conclude that the focus for now must be on achieving tangible results within the existing trilateral: AUKUS must first deepen collaboration before widening it. (Conclusion, Paragraph 146)

Conclusion

32.
A programme of AUKUS’ scale and scope will not succeed if it is perceived within Whitehall as one of many defence programmes competing for scarce resources. Only strong and visible political leadership from the very top of Government can counter a drift into bureaucratic obscurity and ensure that AUKUS receives the funding and priority that the nation’s defence and security demands. (Conclusion, Paragraph 147)

33.
As we approach five years since the partnership came into being, with changes of Government in each partner nation and domestic reviews completed, now is the time to seize the opportunity AUKUS presents and demonstrate the UK’s firm commitment to making it a success. The recommendations in this report identify the steps that must be taken to address the challenges that have already emerged, and to inject a new impetus into the delivery of AUKUS. We call on the Government to adopt them without delay. (Conclusion, Paragraph 148)

Formal minutes

Tuesday 21 April 2026

Members present

Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi, in the Chair

Mr Calvin Bailey

Alex Baker

Lincoln Jopp

Jesse Norman

Ian Roome

Michelle Scrogham

AUKUS

Draft Report (
AUKUS
), proposed by Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi, brought up and read.

Ordered
, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 148 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved
, That the Report be the Eighth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered
, That Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi make the Report to the House.

Ordered
, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134)

Adjournment

Adjourned till Tuesday 28 April 2026 at 10.00am.

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the
inquiry publications page
of the Committee’s website.

Tuesday 9 September 2025

Sophia Gaston
, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Statecraft and National Security, King’s College London;
Dr Sidharth Kaushal
, Senior Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
Q1–41

Tuesday 21 October 2025

Steve Timms
, Managing Director, BAE Systems Submarines;
Steve Carlier
, President, Rolls Royce Submarines Limited;
Harry Holt
, Chief Executive Nuclear, Babcock International Group
Q42–85

Samira Braund
, Defence Director, ADS Group;
Andrew Kinniburgh
, Director-General, Make UK Defence;
Matthew Evans
, Chief Operating Officer and Director of Markets, techUK
Q86–114

Wednesday 19 November 2025

Sir Stephen Lovegrove
,

Prime Minister’s Special Representative on AUKUS
Q115–172

Wednesday 26 November 2025

The Rt Hon The Lord Case
, Chair, Team Barrow;
Peter Anstiss
, CEO, Team Barrow;
Nona Buckley-Irvine
, Head of Team Barrow, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government;
Angela Jones
, Director of Thriving Places, Westmorland and Furness Council
Q173–210

Tuesday 2 December 2025

Luke Pollard MP
, Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, Ministry of Defence;
Air Marshal Tim Jones
, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Force Development), Ministry of Defence;
Vice Admiral Sir Chris Gardner KBE
, Chief Executive Officer, Submarine Delivery Agency
Q211–304

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the
inquiry publications page
of the Committee’s website.

AUKUS numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1
ADS Group 
AUKUS0013

2
Ahmed, Mrs Angie Hesham Abdo (PhD Candidate / Associate Fellow, University of Hull,
Department of Politics) 
AUKUS0004

3
Amentum 
AUKUS0022

4
Australian Conservation Foundation 
AUKUS0012

5
Australian Government 
AUKUS0034

6
Australian Peace and Security Forum 
AUKUS0016

7
BAE Systems 
AUKUS0020

8
Babcock International Group 
AUKUS0026

9
BritishAmerican Business 
AUKUS0003

10
Centre for Statecraft and National Security, King’s College London and Security & Defence Plus Alliance 
AUKUS0023

11
Council on Geostrategy 
AUKUS0010

12
Defence On The Brink 
AUKUS0027

13
Gaston, Sophia (Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Statecraft and National Security, King’s College London) 
AUKUS0024

14
Government of South Australia 
AUKUS0038

15
Hall, Dr Gavin (Teaching Fellow, University of Strathclyde); Professor Scott Cunningham (Chair of Science and technology Policy, University of Strathclyde); and Dr Richard Johnson (Senior Lecturer, University of Strathclyde) 
AUKUS0025

16
KBR and Frazer-Nash 
AUKUS0021

17
Make UK Defence 
AUKUS0030

18
Ministry of Defence 
AUKUS0039

19
Ministry of Defence 
AUKUS0031

20
Mott MacDonald 
AUKUS0037

21
Northrop Grumman UK 
AUKUS0018

22
Patrick, Professor Carl Stephen (Director ,Centre for Underwater Acoustic Analysis (CUAA)) 
AUKUS0008

23
PentenAmio 
AUKUS0015

24
RAND Europe 
AUKUS0032

25
Rolls Royce (Submarines) 
AUKUS0029

26
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 
AUKUS0033

27
Society of Maritime Industries (SMI) 
AUKUS0035

28
Space Forge 
AUKUS0009

29
Subsea Craft Ltd 
AUKUS0036

30
Taylor, Mr Geoff 
AUKUS0002

31
Team Barrow 
AUKUS0040

32
techUK 
AUKUS0017

33
The Keep Our Future Afloat Committee 
AUKUS0028

34
Tossini, Mr Joao Vitor 
AUKUS0006

35
Walker-Munro, Dr Brendan (Senior Lecturer (Law), Southern Cross University) 
AUKUS0005

36
Western Australian Government 
AUKUS0011

37
Westley Group Ltd 
AUKUS0007

38
Wright, Dr Katharine A. M. (Senior Lecturer in International Politics and Co-Convener Military War and Security Research Group, Newcastle University); Professor Matthew Grenby (Pro-Vice Chancellor for Research and Innovation, Newcastle University); Professor Nigel Harkness (Deputy Vice Chancellor, Newcastle University); Mr Matt Linsley (Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) Manager, Newcastle University); Professor Jeff Neasham (Chair in Acoustic Signal Processing and Head of Intelligent Sensing and Communication (ISC) Research Group, Newcastle University); and Professor Savvas Papagiannidis (Professor of Information Systems, Digital Innovation and Transformation / Head of Information Systems and Operations, Newcastle University) 
AUKUS0014

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the
publications page
of the Committee’s website.

Session 2024–26

Number

Title

Reference

7th

Pre-Appointment HearingArmed Forces Commissioner

HC 1428

6th

The UK contribution to European Security

HC 520

5th

Defence in the Grey Zone

HC 405

4th

The Armed Forces Covenant

HC 572

3rd

The Global Combat Air Programme

HC 598

2nd

Developing AI capacity and expertise in UK defence

HC 590

1st

Service Accommodation

HC 406

6th
Special

The UK contribution to European SecurityGovernment Response

HC 1658

5th
Special

Defence in the Grey ZoneGovernment Response

HC 1326

4th
Special

Government response to The Armed Forces Covenant report

HC 1034

3rd
Special

Government response to Developing AI capacity and expertise in UK Defence

HC 812

2nd
Special

The Global Combat Air ProgrammeGovernment Response

HC 799

1st
Special

Service AccommodationGovernment Response

HC 751

Footnotes

1
US Department of State,
AUKUS: A Generational Opportunity
, testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 6 September 2023

2
For more information on Pillar 2 technologies see House of Commons Library,
AUKUS Pillar 2: Advanced military capabilities
, Research Briefing 9842, 2 September 2024

3
POLITICO,
“Stab in the back”: France slams Australia, US over move to ditch €50B submarine deal
, 16 September 2021

4
See, for example, Australian Peace and Security Forum (
AUKUS0016
); Australian Conservation Foundation (
AUKUS0012
). AUKUS has also received criticism from high-profile Australian political figures including former Prime Ministers Malcolm Turnbull and Paul Keating; see
Sky News Australia, Malcolm Turnbull says AUKUS has more risk than rewards
, 16 March 2023.

5
The White House,
Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom Announcing the Creation of AUKUS
, 15 September 2021

6
Council on Geostrategy (
AUKUS0010
)

7
BBC News,
AUKUS: China denounces US-UK-Australia pact as irresponsible
, 17 September 2021

8
Council on Geostrategy (
AUKUS0010
)

9
See Abraham M. Denmark and Charles Edel,
The AUKUS inflection: seizing the opportunity to deliver deterrence
, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 25 August 2025, for a detailed analysis of the rationale for AUKUS.

10
Ministry of Defence,
Strategic Defence Review, Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad
, 2 June 2025, p37–39

11
Angie Hesham Abdo Ahmed, University of Hull, (
AUKUS0004
); Australian Peace and Security Forum (
AUKUS0016
)

12
RAND Europe (
AUKUS0032
)

13

Qq234–235

14

Q116

15
Ministry of Defence press release,
New government adviser to maximise benefits of AUKUS partnership
, 22 August 2024

16
Ministry of Defence,
Appointment of AUKUS adviser and report: Terms of Reference
, 29 August 2024

17
Ministry of Defence news story,
AUKUS partnership strengthened with Prime Minister appointing new Special Representative
, 7 April 2025

18
BritishAmerican Business (
AUKUS0003
); techUK (
AUKUS0017
); PentenAmio (
AUKUS0015
)

19

Q117

20

Q252

21
Ministry of Defence (
AUKUS0039
)

22
Sophia Gaston (
AUKUS0024
)

23

Q8

24

Q116

25
Ministry of Defence (
AUKUS0031
)

26

Q121

27

Q20

28

Q8

29

Q116

30

Q122

31
BBC News,
AUKUS: Could Trump sink Australia’s submarine plans?
, 13 June 2025

32
See, for example, Council on Geostrategy (
AUKUS0010
); Amentum (
AUKUS0022
)

33
ABC News,
Trump ends AUKUS uncertainty with firm backing for Albanese
, 21 October 2025

34
Make UK Defence (
AUKUS0030
)

35
MOD news story,
AUKUS partnership strengthened with Prime Minister appointing new Special Representative
, 7 April 2025

36
Make UK Defence (
AUKUS0030
); Babcock International Group (
AUKUS0026
)

37

Q120

38

Qq130–132

39
Defence on the Brink (
AUKUS0027
)

40

Q120

41

Q250

42

Qq126–128

43
Sophia Gaston (
AUKUS0024
)

44

Q115

45
Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2024–26,
The UK contribution to European Security
, HC 520, paras 16–18

46

Qq262–263

47
Ministry of Defence (
AUKUS0031
)

48
Ministry of Defence press release,
New Taskforce to build UK nuclear skills
, 1 August 2023

49

National Nuclear Strategic Plan for Skills
[pdf]

50

Q75

51

Q94

52
ADS Group (
AUKUS0013
)

53
Northrop Grumman UK (
AUKUS0018
); Make UK Defence (
AUKUS0030
)

54

Q95
,
Q106

55

Q92

56

Q91

57

Q145

58
Mott MacDonald (
AUKUS0037
)

59

Q14

60
Sophia Gaston (
AUKUS0024
)

61

Q145
,
Q49
,
Q53

62

Q257

63
Australian Submarine Agency,
Submarine industry and workforce
, accessed 1 April 2026

64
Amentum (
AUKUS0022
)

65

Q206
,
Q147

66
Prime Minister’s Office,
Fact sheet: Trilateral Australia-UK-US Partnership on Nuclear-Powered Submarines
, 13 March 2023

67
Ministry of Defence,
Strategic Defence Review, Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad
, 2 June 2025, p6

68
RAND Europe (
AUKUS0032
)

69
Ministry of Defence (
AUKUS0031
)

70
RAND Europe (
AUKUS0032
)

71

Q149
,
Q116

72

Q149

73

Q150

74

Qq43–45

75

Q24

76

Q285

77
Congressional Research Service,
Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress
, 26 January 2026

78
Council on Geostrategy (
AUKUS0010
); RAND Europe (
AUKUS0032
)

79
Ministry of Defence press release,
UK firm appointed to build Australian AUKUS submarines
, 21 March 2024

80
Ministry of Defence (
AUKUS0031
); Australian Government (
AUKUS0034
)

81

Qq42–43

82

Q174

83
Team Barrow (
AUKUS0040
)

84

Q268

85

Q79

86

Q186
,
Qq 201–202

87

Q205
,
Q203

88
Prime Minister’s Office press release,
PM announces national endeavour to strengthen the UK’s nuclear deterrent
, 24 March 2024

89

Q182

90

Q287

91

Q64

92
Babcock International Group (
AUKUS0026
)

93
Defence on the Brink (
AUKUS0027
)

94
Forces News,
Can the Royal Navy keep its overstretched Submarine Service cycle going?
, 24 March 2025

95
Australian Government (
AUKUS0034
)

96

Q19

97
Defence On The Brink (
AUKUS0027
)

98

Qq266–267

99

Q265

100
Navy Lookout,
Royal Navy sends HMS Anson to Australia despite submarine shortage
, 19 January 2026; Financial Times,
Iran crisis shines spotlight on “threadbare” Royal Navy
, 5 March 2026

101

The Diplomat, The Iran War Is Now Impacting AUKUS
, 12 March 2026
; The Guardian,
The weakest link: Australia’s submarine hopes depend on the UK - but Britannia no longer rules the waves
, 20 March 2026

102
Ministry of Defence press release,
Scottish defence dividend £250m investment launched
, 16 July 2025

103
BBC News,
Defence investment a “confidence vote” in South West
, 3 June 2025; Babcock International press release,
Babcock signs £750 million contract to deliver future submarine capability at Devonport
, 10 November 2023

104
Plymouth City Council press release,
Launching Team Plymouth
, 19 September 2025

105

Defence-driven Growth for Plymouth
, accessed via
Invest Plymouth

106
Ministry of Defence press release,
New Defence Growth Deals Created to Boost Local Economies Under Major Sector Plan
, 7 September 2025

107

Q82

108

Qq207–210

109
Western Australian Government (
AUKUS0011
); Australian Government press release,
Additional Defence funding to deliver the Henderson Defence Precinct
, 14 September 2025

110

Cooperation agreement between the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of Western Australia to deliver and sustain Australia’s future Defence capabilities
, 16 October 2024

111

Q64

112
Rajiv Shah,
US export rules need major reform if AUKUS is to succeed
, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 16 February 2023; John Christanson, Sean Monaghan and Di Cooke,
AUKUS Pillar Two: Advancing the Capabilities of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia
, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 July 2023

113
Ministry of Defence press release,
Historic Breakthrough in defence trade between AUKUS partners
, 15 August 2024

114

Q86
; techUK (
AUKUS0017
); Make UK Defence (
AUKUS0030
)

115

Q86

116
Make UK Defence (
AUKUS0030
)

117
Trevor Taylor (
AUKUS0033
)

118

Q89

119
Ministry of Defence (
AUKUS0031
)

120
Prime Minister’s Office news story,
UK, US and Australia launch new security partnership
, 15 September 2021

121
Prime Minister’s Office,
Fact sheet: implementation of the Australia-UK-US partnership (AUKUS)
, 5 April 2022

122
Australian Government,
AUKUS Defence Ministers Meeting Joint Statement
, 2 December 2023

123
John Christianson, Sean Monaghan and Di Cooke,
AUKUS Pillar Two: Advancing the Capabilities of the United States, United Kingdom and Australia
, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 July 2023

124

Q35

125

Q289
; ADS Group (
AUKUS0013
)

126
Naval Technology,
Helsing acquire Blue Ocean to speed up AUV production
, 8 October 2025; Helsing press release,
Helsing opens its first UK Resilience Factory in Plymouth to build AI-enabled submarine-hunters
, 19 November 2025

127
Dr Gavin Hall, Professor Scott Cunningham, Dr Richard Johnson (University of Strathclyde) (
AUKUS0025
)

128
techUK (
AUKUS0017
)

129

Q116

130

Q116
;
Q290

131

Q289

132

Qq99–100

133
RAND Europe (
AUKUS0032
)

134
ADS Group (
AUKUS0013
),
Q97
,
Q99

135

Q113

136

Q35
,
Q9

137

AUKUS0014

138
Ministry of Defence,
Defence Industrial Strategy 2025: Making Defence an Engine for Growth
, 8 September 2025

139
Ministry of Defence (
AUKUS0031
)

140
Make UK Defence (
AUKUS0030
);
Q107

141
ADS Group (
AUKUS0013
)

142
Subsea Craft Ltd (
AUKUS0036
)

143

Qq108–109

144
Prime Minister’s Office press release,
Joint Leaders statement to mark the third anniversary of AUKUS
, 17 September 2024

145
ADS Group (
AUKUS0013
)

146
Ministry of Defence (
AUKUS0031
)

147
KBR and Frazer-Nash (
AUKUS0021
); Space Forge (
AUKUS0009
), ADS Group (
AUKUS0013
), techUK (
AUKUS0017
)

148

Qq303–304