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Cyber Security Policy

The UK government's approach to cyber security policy and foreign information manipulation is fragmented across multiple departments (DCMS and DSIT lead), with no single body providing overall strategic direction despite the existence of the National Cyber Security Centre within GCHQ. Treasury and parliamentary scrutiny have identified this as prioritising bureaucracy over action, and the government has published a Cyber Action Plan and growth strategy to address capability gaps and coordination.

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27 Mar 2026 | Committee report linked

It is our view that the Government has created an unnecessarily fragmented approach to countering foreign information manipulation and interference, with no one department or associated body taking overall leadership. This has created a system which seems to prioritise discussion and bureaucracy over action. A more effective model already exists. In 2016, the Government established the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), within GCHQ, bringing together government, intelligence agencies and ...

It is our view that the Government has created an unnecessarily fragmented approach to countering foreign information manipulation and interference, with no one department or associated body taking overall leadership. This has created a system which seems to prioritise discussion …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
9 May 2025 | Committee report linked

Both the cyber threat and government’s cyber security are continuing to evolve as technology develops.14 The Cabinet Office described this to us as a “technology race” that required government to adapt its approach constantly.15 We asked how government thought artificial intelligence (AI) would affect cyber security. The witnesses argued that AI was a huge opportunity, but that it needed to be introduced securely. The Cabinet Office’s assessment was that adversaries were already using AI to p...

Both the cyber threat and government’s cyber security are continuing to evolve as technology develops.14 The Cabinet Office described this to us as a “technology race” that required government to adapt its approach constantly.15 We asked how government thought artificial …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
9 May 2025 | Committee report linked

We asked the Cabinet Office how it intended to meet its target for 2030. The Cabinet Office was clear that the target would be challenging to meet. To do so, it told us that government would need to take a fundamentally different approach to cyber security. The Cabinet Office was designing this new approach, which it said would focus on what the centre of government could do to bring about change. Its plans included strengthening accountability, setting requirements for departments and measur...

We asked the Cabinet Office how it intended to meet its target for 2030. The Cabinet Office was clear that the target would be challenging to meet. To do so, it told us that government would need to take a …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
30 Aug 2023 | Committee report linked

Cross-government and external agency coordination in mitigating the risk of technological dependence on China is uneven and disjointed. The Government should create a central CNI list to improve coordination and clarify areas of priority. With the technology sector now dominated by a few key players, we are now over-reliant on Chinese technology. This is the direct result of deliberate, carefully directed and well- coordinated CCP policy to create dependence. We cannot overcome this dependenc...

Cross-government and external agency coordination in mitigating the risk of technological dependence on China is uneven and disjointed. The Government should create a central CNI list to improve coordination and clarify areas of priority. With the technology sector now dominated …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
7 Aug 2023 | Committee report linked

As the prevalence of connected technology grows, so too will the demand for the National Cyber Security Centre’s services. The Government should ensure that the National Cyber Security Centre has the capacity to meet demands for its services. It should explicitly consider and address capacity issues as part of its regular reporting Connected tech: smart or sinister? 69 on cybersecurity skills in the UK. (Paragraph 121) Technology-facilitated abuse

As the prevalence of connected technology grows, so too will the demand for the National Cyber Security Centre’s services. The Government should ensure that the National Cyber Security Centre has the capacity to meet demands for its services. It should …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
4 Feb 2021 | Committee report linked

The Government has only recently considered the consolidation of vendors in the UK’s telecommunications market as a potential risk to national security, although it is a process that has taken place over ten to twenty years. One problem appears to have been the focus on the security of the network operators and not their supply chains, including when setting the role and powers of the regulator. Although the diversification strategy now addresses vendor diversity, it still does not consider t...

The Government has only recently considered the consolidation of vendors in the UK’s telecommunications market as a potential risk to national security, although it is a process that has taken place over ten to twenty years. One problem appears to …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
8 Oct 2020 | Committee report linked

We share the Government’s objective that the UK remains at the forefront of the 5G rollout as we move into the next technological era. It is imperative that the UK is amongst the first countries to benefit from the technological advances that 5G will bring. The Government’s ambitions for the rollout of 5G are laudable and cybersecurity policy should take into account the strategic value of the UK maintaining its position as a global market leader in this technology.

We share the Government’s objective that the UK remains at the forefront of the 5G rollout as we move into the next technological era. It is imperative that the UK is amongst the first countries to benefit from the technological …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
8 Oct 2020 | Committee report linked

There is evidence that the UK, and our allies, face many malicious cyber- attacks both from rogue individuals and state-sponsored attacks from states such as Russia and China. These attacks are diverse in their nature and in their aims. Some attacks aim to steal individual data and state secrets whilst others seek to bring down the network in its entirety. (Paragraph 58) 75 The Security of 5G

There is evidence that the UK, and our allies, face many malicious cyber- attacks both from rogue individuals and state-sponsored attacks from states such as Russia and China. These attacks are diverse in their nature and in their aims. Some …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
8 Oct 2020 | Committee report linked

Advice to Government was clear, that the presence of Huawei in the UK’s networks was a manageable risk. The UK has one of the most active and effective cyber-security regimes in the world, and, from our public and private conversations with Government, we are confident that GCHQ and the NCSC are able to appropriately manage any increased risk posed by the presence of Huawei or other high-risk vendors in the UK’s 5G.

Advice to Government was clear, that the presence of Huawei in the UK’s networks was a manageable risk. The UK has one of the most active and effective cyber-security regimes in the world, and, from our public and private conversations …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK