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Water Resource Management and Supply

The Environment Agency is addressing critical failures in water resource management and supply infrastructure, particularly following the 2025 Tunbridge Wells water crisis caused by South East Water's inadequate maintenance, risk management, and operational resilience. The issue focuses on regulatory oversight, asset management, infrastructure investment, and cultural reform within water companies to prevent future supply failures.

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2026

26 events
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

South East Water did not have the right processes in place to identify and mitigate risks at Pembury Works, despite previous warnings from the DWI. That the company had “normalised” critical risks and was “flying blind” in the lead up to the crisis is a fundamental failure for a water company responsible for a critical natural resource. In a perverse sense, Mr Hinton was right in saying that the events were “unforeseeable”; but only because the company had actively chosen to not put in the es...

South East Water did not have the right processes in place to identify and mitigate risks at Pembury Works, despite previous warnings from the DWI. That the company had “normalised” critical risks and was “flying blind” in the lead up …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

Maintenance issues at Pembury contributed to the Tunbridge Wells incident in 2025, but it is South East Water’s self-identified lack of proactive and “instinctive” maintenance across its network that is most concerning. One of the most fundamental and basic responsibilities of a water company is to plan for and have the staff and resources available to maintain assets. Yet SEW did not see this a priority, even in some of its most vulnerable areas, contributing to a series of major water outag...

Maintenance issues at Pembury contributed to the Tunbridge Wells incident in 2025, but it is South East Water’s self-identified lack of proactive and “instinctive” maintenance across its network that is most concerning. One of the most fundamental and basic responsibilities …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

As regulators told South East Water repeatedly and jointly for over four years, the company needed to invest in new infrastructure to be properly resilient to potential shocks. In particular, single points of failure, supply shortfalls and regional connectivity should have been improved, but the company failed to take action on these well-known long-standing issues for many years. Spending allowances in previous price reviews may have made trade-off decisions more challenging, but ultimately,...

As regulators told South East Water repeatedly and jointly for over four years, the company needed to invest in new infrastructure to be properly resilient to potential shocks. In particular, single points of failure, supply shortfalls and regional connectivity should …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

Despite South East Water’s assertions to the contrary, periods of peak demand and extreme weather can and should be broadly predicted and prepared for. Ofwat and the Drinking Water Inspectorate have shown that the company failed to model upcoming peaks and troughs and take the necessary steps in preceding weeks and months to boost resilience and reduce the risk of a crisis. Its leadership’s approach to incident response planning is pitiful; there are signs that incident response plans either ...

Despite South East Water’s assertions to the contrary, periods of peak demand and extreme weather can and should be broadly predicted and prepared for. Ofwat and the Drinking Water Inspectorate have shown that the company failed to model upcoming peaks …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

Both the Drinking Water Inspectorate and South East Water acknowledge the weaknesses of the escalation processes around the Pembury incident. This meant that operational staff were not given sufficient support to diagnose problems early and that key stakeholders were informed too late, inhibiting preparations and in breach of regulations. We are concerned that the CEO was too involved at the Pembury Works, a potential distraction from his overall crisis command. Either this is a further probl...

Both the Drinking Water Inspectorate and South East Water acknowledge the weaknesses of the escalation processes around the Pembury incident. This meant that operational staff were not given sufficient support to diagnose problems early and that key stakeholders were informed …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

Given the huge number of supply interruptions that South East Water has failed to manage over the years, it is remarkable that the company still struggles with the supply of bottled water during outages, has failed to learn and apply lessons and relies on the goodwill of communities. Problems discussed elsewhere in this report could arguably take significant time and resources to resolve, but knowing where to set up bottled water stations and having enough bottles to go around is a fundamenta...

Given the huge number of supply interruptions that South East Water has failed to manage over the years, it is remarkable that the company still struggles with the supply of bottled water during outages, has failed to learn and apply …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

Similarly to the provision of alternative water supplies, South East Water now has years of experience in communicating during supply interruptions. It is incomprehensible that SEW still lacks a crisis communications strategy or a well-developed communications team given the company’s propensity for water outages. This put communication teams in a difficult position. Basic communications errors, like giving incorrect and inconsistent information about bottled water stations, using the wrong p...

Similarly to the provision of alternative water supplies, South East Water now has years of experience in communicating during supply interruptions. It is incomprehensible that SEW still lacks a crisis communications strategy or a well-developed communications team given the company’s …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

For a company with such regular issues with outages, South East Water’s approach to supporting vulnerable customers gives the impression of a business caught completely by surprise. We accept that it is challenging to continuously update the Priority Services Register: people will not always inform you of vulnerabilities, transient or permanent. However, the fact that there were fundamental problems with deliveries for those that were on the PSR is indicative of a problematic approach, one th...

For a company with such regular issues with outages, South East Water’s approach to supporting vulnerable customers gives the impression of a business caught completely by surprise. We accept that it is challenging to continuously update the Priority Services Register: …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

The Tunbridge Wells incident and Ofwat investigations reveal that South East Water’s leadership has repeatedly proved itself incapable of implementing the lessons learnt from previous incidents, even simple ones such as having a communication strategy for when resolution timeframes are unclear. While the company was clearly trying to learn from its previous mistakes, it caused more problems in doing so, indicative of an inability to understand and resolve core problems. This is not through la...

The Tunbridge Wells incident and Ofwat investigations reveal that South East Water’s leadership has repeatedly proved itself incapable of implementing the lessons learnt from previous incidents, even simple ones such as having a communication strategy for when resolution timeframes are …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

Since at least 2020, South East Water clearly has had, and continues to demonstrate, an inability to establish the root causes of its supply resilience problems. There are likely many facets to this, including a failure to monitor the key asset indicators, and a tendency to blame external factors, as highlighted elsewhere in this report. The company leadership seems to be divorced from the real-world situations, either due to a lack of feedback data and processes, or a willingness to ignore p...

Since at least 2020, South East Water clearly has had, and continues to demonstrate, an inability to establish the root causes of its supply resilience problems. There are likely many facets to this, including a failure to monitor the key …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

South East Water’s leadership team has demonstrated a clear preference for blaming factors outside of their control for performance issues, and in some cases, they continue to do so, despite clear evidence to the contrary. A lack of data-analysis skills might be partially to blame, but it is also clear that a culture of obfuscating responsibility has also taken hold, seriously inhibiting their ability to analyse problems and learn lessons. The company’s investigations, as well as that of the ...

South East Water’s leadership team has demonstrated a clear preference for blaming factors outside of their control for performance issues, and in some cases, they continue to do so, despite clear evidence to the contrary. A lack of data-analysis skills …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

South East Water has failed to engage with key stakeholders outside the company to help it learn from its mistakes. It is unwilling to properly listen to its customers, who have repeatedly complained of addressable failures 42 and yet continue to suffer them. The company’s leadership has taken a defensive approach with regulators to the point of trying to obstruct their reports and in so doing mislead credit agencies, demonstrating at best a lack of transparency, and at worst an attempt to ac...

South East Water has failed to engage with key stakeholders outside the company to help it learn from its mistakes. It is unwilling to properly listen to its customers, who have repeatedly complained of addressable failures 42 and yet continue …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

Continued leadership failure is grounds for leadership change. Time and again, since 2020, South East Water’s leadership has failed in its fundamental task of supplying water to its customers. That is around six years of poor performance, sometimes with multiple incidents within the same year. Most problematic from a leadership perspective are the failures identified in the company’s monitoring and managing of risks and the incident response. These are largely procedural matters, entirely wit...

Continued leadership failure is grounds for leadership change. Time and again, since 2020, South East Water’s leadership has failed in its fundamental task of supplying water to its customers. That is around six years of poor performance, sometimes with multiple …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

These failures are symptomatic of significant cultural problems that cannot be readily explained by issues with the wider regulatory framework: this includes South East Water’s failure to engage with external stakeholders, inclination for groupthink, inability to analyse problems, incapability to implement basic changes and a propensity to shirk responsibility. This culture, which permeates through all the company’s key decision- making processes, needs to change, and culture starts from the ...

These failures are symptomatic of significant cultural problems that cannot be readily explained by issues with the wider regulatory framework: this includes South East Water’s failure to engage with external stakeholders, inclination for groupthink, inability to analyse problems, incapability to …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
1 May 2026 | Committee report linked

Repeating the same actions and expecting different results is not a well- regarded tactic for resolving problems. Yet the non-executives of South East Water have time and time again chosen to back a leadership that is clearly not capable of improving outcomes for customers. Their only response to the Tunbridge Wells incident is to author an unhelpful report and appoint more people to the SEW Executive to provide the constructive challenge that they themselves should be providing. On top of th...

Repeating the same actions and expecting different results is not a well- regarded tactic for resolving problems. Yet the non-executives of South East Water have time and time again chosen to back a leadership that is clearly not capable of …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
23 Apr 2026 | Committee report linked

Although the Government has begun setting statutory limits for PFAS in drinking water, which is a welcome step, significant gaps remain in managing and limiting human exposure to PFAS through food and agricultural pathways. (Conclusion, Paragraph 76)

Although the Government has begun setting statutory limits for PFAS in drinking water, which is a welcome step, significant gaps remain in managing and limiting human exposure to PFAS through food and agricultural pathways. (Conclusion, Paragraph 76) Type: conclusion | …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
15 Apr 2026 | Policy paper Environment Agency linked

National Framework for Water Resources 2025: water for growth, nature and a resilient future

Explores England’s long term water needs, setting out the scale of action needed to ensure resilient supplies and an improved water environment.

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK · ↓ Graphical summary: National Framework for Water… (32pp)
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↓ Forewords, executive summary and structure: National Framew… ↓ 1. Introduction: National Framework for Water Resources 2025 ↓ 2. Current and future pressures on water resources, an over… ↓ 3. How much additional water we need: National Framework fo… ↓ 4. Water availability: National Framework for Water Resourc… ↓ 5. Taking action: water for the environment: National Frame… ↓ 6. Taking action on public water supplies: National Framewo… ↓ 7. Taking action on water for energy: National Framework fo… ↓ 8. Taking action on water for food: National Framework for … ↓ 9. Taking action on other significant water-using sectors a… ↓ 10. Water resources planning and abstraction licensing: Nat… ↓ 11. Expectations of Regional Water Resources Groups: Nation… ↓ 12. Further evolution of water resources planning: National… ↓ 13. Next steps: National Framework for Water Resources 2025 ↓ Appendix A: regional water resources planning expectations:… ↓ Appendix B: results of public water supply water resources … ↓ Appendix C: Environmental Destination technical report (40pp) ↓ Appendix D: Environmental Destination principles for protec… (17pp) ↓ Environmental Destination for Water Resources: planning gui… (57pp) ↓ Appendix E: Water resources data and modelling technical re… (141pp)

2025

5 events
18 Jul 2025 | Committee report linked

Defra and the EA could not tell us how many proposed new homes are not being built because of water system constraints.40 Defra told us that it has set up a minister-led taskforce for high-profile infrastructure projects, working to ensure they can be built quickly.41 We explored with witnesses how quickly schemes could be planned for and funded. The EA told us that it had to be realistic about sudden changes in housing ambition, given the timeline of the planning process for water resources....

Defra and the EA could not tell us how many proposed new homes are not being built because of water system constraints.40 Defra told us that it has set up a minister-led taskforce for high-profile infrastructure projects, working to ensure …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
18 Jul 2025 | Committee report linked

Defra has overall responsibility for setting the policy and regulatory framework for water in England.82 Defra told us there is “too piecemeal a picture” of regulation currently, with overlaps and gaps in responsibilities.83 71 Qq 34, 110 72 C&AG’s Report, para 3.32 73 Q 3 74 C&AG’s Report, para 3.6 75 Qq 100, 110 76 C&AG’s Report, paras 3.23, 3.35 77 Qq 10-11 78 Q 109 79 Q 32 80 C&AG’s Report, para 3.28 81 Q 109 82 C&AG’s Report, para 2.2 83 Q 84 17 We asked Defra and the regulators about tw...

Defra has overall responsibility for setting the policy and regulatory framework for water in England.82 Defra told us there is “too piecemeal a picture” of regulation currently, with overlaps and gaps in responsibilities.83 71 Qq 34, 110 72 C&AG’s Report, …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK
16 Jun 2025 | Committee report linked

The Independent Water Commission should consider how the link between water companies, communities and citizen scientists could be strengthened and formalised to provide a broader picture of water quality in local regions. These proposals should consider how water companies can be democratised and made as open as possible, with a legal requirement for water companies to publish performance, environmental and financial data on a sufficiently regular basis to be of use to the public. (Recommend...

The Independent Water Commission should consider how the link between water companies, communities and citizen scientists could be strengthened and formalised to provide a broader picture of water quality in local regions. These proposals should consider how water companies can …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK

2022

1 event
16 Nov 2022 | Committee report linked

The Department recognised that it had failed to manage the Weybridge site properly given its importance as a national asset. It said that it had approached the management of the site as if it was just a property asset, and had not recognised the wider importance of the science capability and the elements that are required to support that. The Department also confirmed that there had been a lack of investment during the 2000s.22 The National Audit Office highlighted that the Department had not...

The Department recognised that it had failed to manage the Weybridge site properly given its importance as a national asset. It said that it had approached the management of the site as if it was just a property asset, and …

▤ View document · ↗ GOV.UK

2020

4 events

2017

1 event

2016

1 event