To ask His Majesty's Government what progress they have made on the defence investment plan.
To ask His Majesty's Government what progress they have made on the defence investment plan.
The Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 (DIS) is the defence sector plan of the UK's Modern Industrial Strategy, published by MOD on 8 September 2025 to make defence 'an engine for growth' through procurement reform, regional Defence Growth Deals, a £182m skills package, and strengthened export support. It sits beneath the Strategic Defence Review 2025 and is operationalised through the Defence Investment Plan (replacing the Equipment Plan), the Export Control Order 2008 regime, and the Refreshed National Shipbuilding Strategy.
DIS reframes defence procurement around domestic industrial capacity, SME participation (50% spend uplift target vs FY23/24) and regional growth, while the parallel rise to 2.5% GDP defence spend by 2027 (3% next Parliament) puts unprecedented capital flow through the industrial base. The credibility test now rests on the still-unpublished Defence Investment Plan and on whether export-control liberalisation (Lancaster House 2.0, the four-nation export agreement, SI 2025/1197) actually unlocks the export pipeline DIS promises.
DIS is in active implementation. Scotland (£50m, 12 March 2026) and Northern Ireland (£50m, 22 April 2026) Defence Growth Deals have launched; the Defence Investment Plan remains unpublished as of late April 2026, prompting a Defence Committee one-off evidence session and a sharply critical PAC report. The SME Action Plan is in draft, the Offset Policy consultation has closed, and SI 2025/1197 came into force on 16 December 2025.
The defence sector plan of the UK's Modern Industrial Strategy, published 8 September 2025; commits £250m to five Defence Growth Deals, a £182m Defence Industry Skills Package, SME spend uplift, offset and export reforms.
The strategic predicate for DIS: warfighting readiness, NATO-first, whole-of-society resilience, 2.5% GDP by 2027 / 3% next Parliament. DIS is the industrial expression of SDR 2025.
10-year plan covering 8 growth-driving sectors; DIS is the defence sector plan within this umbrella.
Strategic-framework predicate for DIS, sitting alongside SDR 2025.
Amends the Export Control Order 2008, the assimilated Dual-Use Regulation and the assimilated Torture Goods Regulation; in force 16 December 2025. Implements Wassenaar/MTCR updates, lifts the UK arms embargo on Armenia and Azerbaijan, and updates dual-use lists for quantum computing, advanced semiconductor manufacturing and additive manufacturing.
Four-nation treaty making it easier for UK defence businesses to export within the partnership; acceded 9 December 2025 (HLWS1139).
Companion publication to DIS 2025 mapping the regional and national defence industrial footprint (employment, capacity, sites) including Northern Ireland.
Cross-Government shipbuilding strategy; PQ 129666 confirms an update is pending (response delayed by Prorogation, April 2026).
Fulfils SDR commitment to bring forward a Defence Diplomacy Strategy; classified in full, public summary published 24 March 2026.
Sets the conditions for long-term collaboration between MOD and industry for land equipment; PQ 128310 confirms ongoing alignment work with DIS.
Sets out how defence will increase use of additive manufacturing — a technology pillar within the DIS framework.
How MOD plans to build supply chain resilience — directly engaged by DIS's resilience pillar.
Trails the £182m Defence Industry Skills Package as the centrepiece of the DIS skills pillar.
Second of five Defence Growth Deals funded from the £250m DIS regional allocation; supports defence tech start-ups and SMEs in NI.
First of five regional Defence Growth Deals launched 12 March 2026; £50m allocation.
Consolidates defence innovation under a single operating model; a key DIS delivery vehicle.
Announces the five-deal architecture funded from £250m under DIS.
Announces export-support reforms accompanying DIS, including financial backing and cutting red tape.
Bilateral declaration deepening defence-industrial cooperation with Ukraine; channels DIS's 'battlefield-tested innovations' commitment.
Inquiry launched March 2026 examining whether the SDR's vision and the DIS-mediated procurement reforms are deliverable within the announced fiscal envelope.
Welcomes cross-Government work on industrial resilience but raises concerns about implementation; sits alongside recommendations on the National Armaments Director's role.
Recommends that the National Armaments Director, as the key post for implementing SDR and DIS policy changes, give evidence to Parliament.
PAC report sharply critical of MOD's failure to publish a current Equipment Plan and concerned about the credibility of the planned Defence Investment Plan replacement.
PAC publicly registers concern that MOD failed to provide a full Equipment Plan in 2023 and that the Defence Investment Plan succession is opaque.
Long-standing PAC scrutiny line on Equipment Plan affordability, the baseline against which the Defence Investment Plan replacement is being judged.
Underlying committee scrutiny report on the 2021 predecessor regime; the institutional memory under which DIS 2025 lands.
Predecessor SME framework; an updated annual SME Action Plan is committed under DIS but per PQ 127437 will not be published before Prorogation.
Initial Statement of Intent that scoped what became DIS 2025; published alongside HCWS273 announcing the consultation and timetable.
The 2021 DSIS published by the Coalition / Johnson government; DIS 2025 replaces this regime.
Explicitly a DIS-mandated consultation on offset measures.
The opening leg of the same DIS Offset Written Consultation.
Today I am announcing plans to develop a new Defence Industrial Strategy that will be published in late spring 2025.
Why linked: John Healey's 2 December 2024 WMS (HCWS273) committing to DIS publication.
increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027 and 3% in the next Parliament when fiscal and economic conditions allow
Why linked: Foreword to SDR 2025, the strategic predicate underwriting DIS.
The Defence Industrial Strategy committed £250 million to fund all five Defence Growth Deals across the UK, and announced an £182 million Defence Industry Skills Package.
Why linked: Repeated MOD answer to PQs 122217 and 122218.
The Ministry of Defence has set an ambitious target to increase direct and indirect spending by 50% compared to FY 23/24 baseline.
Why linked: Answer to PQ 129308 on agreed target SME spend.
To ask His Majesty's Government what progress they have made on the defence investment plan.
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they plan to utilise industrial capacity in Northern Ireland to support the defence investment plan.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when he plans to issue an update to the National Shipbuilding Strategy.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what support his Department is providing to UK companies exporting defence technologies to Ukraine to help them leverage battlefield-tested innovations for wider international markets.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what measures has his Department put in place to support UK firms supplying defence equipment to Ukraine to adopt rapid innovation cycles based on operational experience.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what is the difference between Ajax 2 and Capability Drop 4 of the Armoured Cavalry Programme.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what progress he has made on the development of Ajax 2.
Within an overarching dialogue about the role of defence in society, AUKUS offers an opportunity to demonstrate the more tangible benefits that a thriving defence industry can bring to local economies across the UK. Members of Parliament can play a …
There is an obvious alignment between the workstreams covered under Pillar 2 and the Defence Industrial Strategy’s themes of innovation, resilience and prosperity; and it offers clear opportunities for defence-related growth. However, the UK’s approach to Pillar 2 has so …
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether he has discussed the Global Combat Air Programme with his (a) Swedish, (b) Polish, (c) Canadian, (d) Australian, (e) Saudi Arabian and (f) Singaporean counterpart.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many major contracts which have been signed by his department since July 2024 were a) sustainment or refresh contracts or b) new procurement contracts.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what progress his Department has made on the Type 83 design process; and whether it will be completed by 2038.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether his Department has an agreed target spend with SMEs.
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the UK's capability to manufacture defence equipment such as ballistic protection, battlefield electronics and military aviation in the light of disruption to the acrylonitrile and high per
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the risks to UK defence capability arising from (1) limited UK production of key chemical precursors and intermediate substances such as sulphuric acid, acrylonitrile, siloxane and methacry
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what progress has been made on allocating a share of the £182 million Defence Industrial Strategy skills package to Scotland.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how much of Scotland’s Defence Growth Deal funding derives from the Defence Industrial Strategy skills package.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to his Department's press release entitled Ministry of Defence small and medium-sized enterprise engagement published on 24 March 2026, whether his Department plans to publish the (a) the SME actio
Why linked: PQ 117847 from Defence Committee Chair Tan Dhesi probing NIO engagement with SDR's national conversation pillar.
To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, with reference to page 92 of the Strategic Defence Review, how many meetings officials from their Department have attended on the national conversation on defence and security; which directorate in their
The EU’s regrettable approach to the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) negotiations does not negate the need for improved UK-EU cooperation on defence industrial matters as a matter of strategic urgency. We therefore recommend the Government continue to seek a …
Why linked: Northern Ireland Affairs Committee on UK role in European security and EU Security Action for Europe programme — engages DIS export pillar.
The UK is a key player in continued efforts to repel Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and to protect Europe’s security more broadly. Security Action for Europe, as a key EU programme aimed at improving the defence of the European continent, …
Why linked: Northern Ireland Affairs Committee finding on UK steel tariff risks — directly relevant to DIS supply-chain resilience pillar.
With the UK now outside the Customs Union, the risk of future EU tariffs on British steel remains. The Government did not identify the issue of steel tariffs as a priority in its public communications on the “reset”, and it …
Europe is over-reliant on US defence capabilities. Despite indications from successive US Presidents that Europe needs to step up, European NATO members have failed to invest in key strategic enablers. (Conclusion, Paragraph 14) Type: conclusion | Number: 2 | Response …
It is not always clear how the UK’s many minilateral and bilateral defence relationships feed into the Government’s broader strategy or if the Department and Ministers have an assessment of their relative prioritisation. (Conclusion, Paragraph 47) Type: conclusion | Number: …
The UK Government has endorsed greater EU-NATO working but should now identify specific measures through which it could best support the improvement of the relationship between the EU and NATO. This could include making it a discussion point in engagements …
Access to finance for defence industry is a significant issue as evidenced by the numerous publications and policy proposals from this year alone. We are frustrated that, given widespread recognition of the issue, no proposed solutions are likely to emerge …
Why linked: Defence Committee explanation that it is producing its Report prior to publication of the Defence Investment Plan.
We are producing this Report prior to the publication of the Defence Investment Plan and as a result without the full picture of the future force posture. We timed this inquiry on the understanding that by now there would be …
Why linked: Defence Committee observation that defence industrial base has been subject to numerous partially-implemented reviews and strategies.
The defence industrial base has been subject to numerous reviews, plans and strategies, all of which have identified recommendations. However, many of those have only been partially implemented. Whilst the Government appears to be committed to solving some of the …
Why linked: Defence Committee recognition of need to address issues facing defence industry, welcoming HMT and DBT engagement.
There is widespread recognition of the need to address the issues facing defence industry. We welcome the expansion of the defence industrial base and the engagement of HM Treasury and the Department for Business and Trade in finding solutions. However, …
Why linked: Defence Committee recommendation to measure, benchmark and publish defence industrial base capacity annually.
The Government should measure, benchmark and publish the capacity of the defence industrial base, reporting actual numbers and percentage increases to Parliament on an annual basis as part of its resilience reporting. (Recommendation, Paragraph 93) Type: recommendation | Number: 24 …
Why linked: Defence Committee conclusion questioning MOD's ability to fulfil Article 3 NATO responsibilities — sharp scrutiny chip.
We will ensure that our future examination of the thinking on capability and infrastructure requirements and the resultant force structure within the Defence Investment Plan will include scrutiny of the implications for defence of the UK and Overseas Territories. In …
Why linked: Defence Committee recommendation that Government review the Defence Industrial Plan and forthcoming Defence Investment Plan together.
We recommend that the Government review the Defence Industrial Plan and the forthcoming Defence Investment Plan, in light of our recommendations and conclusions in this chapter. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22) Defending Europe in the near term Type: recommendation | Number: 6 …
Why linked: Defence Committee finding (November 2025) welcoming cross-government work on industrial resilience strengthening the defence industrial base — substantive committee position on DIS.
We welcome cross-Government work on industrial resilience which we view as area of increasing importance. The measures proposed have the potential to strengthen the defence (and wider UK) industrial base if 60 implemented. However, we are disappointed that the Defence …
Why linked: Defence Committee finding (November 2025) that the National Armaments Director post is key to DIS implementation — substantive committee scrutiny output on DIS delivery.
The National Armaments Director is a key post for implementation of policy changes in both the SDR and the Defence Industrial Strategy. As such, we believe that the Department ought to prioritise his giving evidence to Parliament. We recommend that …
Why linked: Scottish Affairs Committee inquiry written evidence on Defence Skills and Jobs in Scotland — direct DIS skills-pillar scrutiny.
The UK Government has committed to increase defence spending to 2.6% of GDP by 2027, with plans to reach 3% in the next Parliament. Given Scotland’s significant role in the UK’s defence sector, this inquiry will explore how Scotland’s economy …
It is vital that the UK approaches the EPD not merely as a trade arrangement, but as a component of an economic and foreign policy strategy focused on ensuring Western leadership in the face of global competition, particularly from China. …
Why linked: Joint letter from Secretaries of State for BT and Defence to the Defence Committee on DIS (September 2025) — substantive government correspondence on DIS at launch.
Direction: to_committee
The final lesson is the importance of having the industrial ability and capacity to sustain equipment if supply chains are disrupted. The Department said that this means making sure that the armed forces could continue to operate equipment, even if …
The Department explained that for the third segment, it has developed a process through its support for Ukraine whereby it provides industry with a problem statement and within a month gets proposals back from industry. It requires at least three …
The Department has set the five-year target for programme length to stop the armed forces over-specifying their requirements.34 It said that the troubled Ajax programme, for example, had been tremendously over-specified.35 The Department anticipates it can achieve this target by …
The government launched the Strategic Defence Review (the SDR) in July 2024 and said it would publish it in the first half of 2025.41 The Department told us that the SDR would try to balance ambition and resource, but also …
Why linked: Defence Committee letter to Secretaries of State on the Defence Industrial Strategy (June 2025) — committee scrutiny correspondence in the run-up to DIS publication.
Direction: from_committee
Why linked: Business and Trade Committee position on coordination between industrial strategy and trade strategy — relevant to DIS-DBT coordination.
The industrial strategy must clarify how the Government plans to balance any tensions between maximising the headline rate of growth, supporting new sectors and existing jobs in industry, and achieving its net zero, economic security and regional growth objectives. (Recommendation, …
Why linked: Business and Trade Committee inquiry on Industrial Strategy for Clean Power — adjacent industrial strategy framing.
Building on the evidence received in the previous Committee’s inquiry on Securing the domestic supply chain , the Committee will hold a one-off session on Industrial Strategy for Clean Power . The inquiry will explore the areas within the sector …
Why linked: Business and Trade Committee Industrial Strategy inquiry — adjacent Modern Industrial Strategy scrutiny.
Our first industrial strategy inquiry will take a comprehensive look at the Government's proposals for a 10-year modern industrial strategy, as set out in Invest 2035. We will scrutinise the proposals in the Government’s Green Paper, and its forthcoming White …
We welcome the establishment of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), which will be one of the UK’s most significant defence programmes over the next decade and beyond. If delivered as planned, GCAP will enable the UK to retain national …
The Committee was greatly encouraged by Japan’s recognition of the importance of exports to their GCAP partners. Nonetheless, Japan’s inexperience as a defence exporter is likely to present unique challenges for GCAP which were not in evidence for Typhoon. The …
The Hawk trainer aircraft has been a UK defence export success story, but with domestic production lines closing four years ago the skills and manufacturing capacity which had built up over decades will prove challenging and costly to regenerate. We …
Retention of the existing Typhoon manufacturing workforce, made more challenging by dwindling production runs and the gap until full-scale production of Tempest is underway, must be a priority; and securing further Typhoon export orders to ensure a consistent pipeline of …
Why linked: Letter from Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry to Defence Committee Chair on the DIS Statement of Intent (December 2024) — committee correspondence on the DIS lineage.
Direction: to_committee
Why linked: Matched expansion phrase: Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy
To ask His Majesty's Government whether it remains their position that foreign and defence policy are aligned, as stated in the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, published in March 2021, and the Integrated Review Refr
Uncertainty about the MoD’s future demand for equipment hinders its work with industry to develop a resilient, responsive, and cost-effective supply chain. Key lessons from the war in Ukraine include the need for the Armed Forces to invest in weapon …
The MoD’s strategy for replacing ageing capabilities is undermined by the slow delivery of new systems, resulting in military capability gaps. Despite the MoD working with prime contractors to better understand its supply chain, increased international demand for key components …
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Ministry of Defence (the MoD) on the Equipment Plan 2023–2033 (the Plan).2 Type: conclusion | Number: 1 | Response status: not_accepted Government response: …
The MoD told us that if the government fulfils its commitment to spending 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) each year on defence, the Plan could well be affordable.18 The current defence budget is 2.1% of GDP, which increases to …
The Ministry of Defence (the MoD) is working with industry to develop a resilient, responsive, and cost-effective supply chain. For example, it told us that it has been working with the Defence Suppliers Forum, which covers about 80 companies directly …
Key lessons from the war in Ukraine include the need for the Armed Forces to invest in weapon stockpiles and ensure resilience and agility in sustaining military capabilities.43 The MoD has earmarked £5 billion over the decade to 2032–33 to …
The MoD recognises that building capacity, including the industrial skills base, will take time, and that for industry to invest in this it must have confidence that the MoD’s demand will continue.46 For example, the MoD estimates that over the …
Because of high and volatile inflation, the MoD has changed its approach to contracting with suppliers. Formerly, around 25% of contracts were ‘firm price’, whereby the supplier bore the inflation risk.51 However, the MoD said that the cost of such …
The MoD has also launched some initiatives to demonstrate a long-term commitment to industry regarding future demand, including an order with BAE Systems for 155mm artillery shells.54 The MoD told us that it wanted to develop an “always-on production line …
The MoD said that it tries to publish as much of its defence pipeline as it can to build supplier confidence.57 However, its failure to provide budgets that match ambition, such as the £5.9 billion funding shortfall in the shipbuilding …
Since the end of COVID-19 restrictions, there has been increased international demand for key components and skilled workers from other sectors, such as the car and commercial aviation industries.69 This has contributed to the slow delivery of defence equipment, including …
Recent international developments, including the war in Ukraine, have underlined the importance of strategic international partnerships for the UK.79 The UK has been working with its allies, including Ukraine, to develop interoperable equipment, pool essential munitions and encourage industry to …
The Minister for the Armed Forces acknowledged that the UK Armed Forces were deployed in excess of what the force structure was designed for, noting that “there is absolutely no pretending that we are not spending resource more keenly than …
The Chief of the Defence Staff also told us that the MOD was investing in capabilities such as “complex weapons, general munitions, and operational spares stocks to meet the needs of sustained operation”.68 The Minister for the Armed Forces argued …
Many of Dr Allport’s assessments of the capability shortages regarding the Army’s fighting vehicles align with what we discovered when we produced our 2021 Report on the challenges faced by the Army in updating its heavy armoured capability.76 When we …
When we discussed the current state of the Army with the Chief of the General Staff, he acknowledged issues existed but pointed to the work which he had done to “mobilise the Army so that it would be ready to …
Despite these actions, the Minister for the Armed Forces acknowledged that the “complete renewal of the British Army’s fighting echelon is in order to sustain our ability to put a British Division into the NATO fight under a British-led corps” …
We have been told that the Navy is undergoing a “maritime renaissance”85 and that the UK is moving towards a maritime strategy (which prioritises a naval response above land or air capabilities).86 The Chief of the Defence Staff told us …
Dr Rowan Allport of the Human Security Centre produced a detailed list of what he perceived to be Royal Navy readiness gaps and capability shortfalls which included: • Delays to the Type 26 frigate programme which have resulted in the …
These gaps are compounded by the efforts which have previously been made to improve the availability of Royal Navy vessels. Nick Childs described these as “in part, robbing Peter to pay Paul within the fleet in terms of stores, key …
In response to questions on naval readiness, the Chief of the Defence Staff told us that the Royal Navy was “on the up” with significant transformation between 2020 and 2030 as it “becomes a carrier Navy again, that alongside the …
However, both First Sea Lord and the Director Force Generation of the Royal Navy (Rear Admiral Steve Moorhouse) acknowledged that there were further steps to be taken, in terms of maintenance of vessels,103 both increasing lethality and managing stockpiles (including …
When we asked the Commander Strategic Command how he was working on alleviating shortfalls, he provided the following examples: Health • Increasing the level of medical stocks whilst working with the NHS to ensure rotation the stock from MOD shelves …
When we asked each of the single service heads what shortfalls their Forces were carrying, all mentioned stockpiles as an area of significant (current) concern.135 The high rate of consumption of munitions in the war in Ukraine has exceeded the …
Although all of the Chiefs had pointed to events in Ukraine as the catalyst for investment in stockpiles, General Lord Houghton and General Sir Nick Carter both told us that stockpiles had been reducing for a number of years before …
The Government has previously pointed to its successes in signing contracts—in June 2022 it noted that it had secured “contracts for Next Generation Light AntiTank Weapons, Starstreak High Velocity Missiles, Lightweight Multirole Missiles, Archer 6X6 Artillery 132 Q406 133 Q406–7 …
Beyond securing investment, there are further difficulties in replenishing stockpiles at pace. We heard from Professor Michael Clarke that the companies responsible for supplying precision weapons to UK Armed Forces have had small production runs for some time which there …
In our March 2023 Report ‘Special Relationships? The US, UK and NATO’ we highlighted the issue of industrial capacity in relation to supply chain capacity and a lack of skilled workers.152 We were told by Government that: Further developing strategic …
We address the DCP23’s policy intentions on the MOD’s relationship with industry and the steps it has subsequently taken to improve industrial capacity in the final chapter on strategic readiness. Recruitment and retention Type: conclusion | Number: 72 | Response …
Professor Justin Bronk told us that the IR23 and DCP23 had demonstrated “the broad challenges and ambitions that the UK is faced with” but had given no indication of priority.175 We made the same criticism (which the Government rejected) of …
General Lord Houghton told us that the UK Armed Forces have maintained high levels of readiness for standing commitments (to domestic security and overseas non- discretionary tasks) and contingent commitments (commitments to allies and alliances such as the commitment to …
Professor Michael Clarke told us that both Integrated Review documents (the original and the refresh) had demonstrated that ministerial priorities were that “Britain should have a series of multiple roles that it can perform in the world and that it …
Professor Chalmers thought it unlikely there would be an increase in defence spending anytime soon given the UK’s poor economic performance, as any increase would have to come either from cuts in other government spending or an increase of taxation.218 …
Despite the Secretary of State’s insistence that the UK Armed Forces still have sufficient capacity to deploy in response to world events, we remain to be convinced. We are concerned that the breadth of ministerial requirements is in danger of …
Describing the key components of strategic readiness, the Minister for the Armed Forces highlighted the importance of the industrial base and its ability to increase its capacity; enablers which project and sustain the force (not just in terms of equipment …
Finally, the DCP23 highlights the work carried out by Defence to “identify and mitigate a range of economic security risks” including the screening of investment in defence- relevant sectors of the UK economy. Work is ongoing to establish how Defence …
Defence industry plays an integral role in Armed Forces readiness. The First Sea Lord explained that the UK Armed Forces rely heavily on the defence industry to deliver “world-leading capability to deal with those who may wish us harm”.242 Nick …
Despite the acknowledged reliance on industry, both General Lord Houghton and General Sir Nick Carter questioned whether the relationship between the MOD and industry was effective in supporting strategic readiness. General Lord Houghton told us that despite numerous reviews on …
In 2023, we examined the organisation responsible for the majority of MOD procurement (Defence Equipment & Support).248 Pointing to the conclusion by the Public Accounts Committee that defence equipment “arrives into service many years late and significantly over-budget, with depressing …
Shortly after our Report was published, the DCP23 was produced by the Government. It announced that key lessons from Ukraine had resulted in the following conclusions: • The pace of battlefield innovation means that decades-long acquisition programmes and upgrades are …
Many of our recommendations were adopted within the DCP23. That document commits Defence to engaging at an earlier stage in strategic conversations with industry about requirements and developing relationships with key Defence Executives. This should allow Defence and industry to …
In December 2023, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Financial and Military Capability) told us that there had been recognition of the importance of trying “to make sure that our pipeline of munitions is always on, rather than boom …
As well as earlier engagement on requirements, the acquisition process is moving from one focused on specifying exact requirements to one which focuses on the ‘spiral development’ of capabilities—this will allow for the iterative development of capabilities to keep pace …
In order to ensure that Defence can replenish and increase stockpiles of munitions, spares and operational supplies, the DCP23 recognises that industry needs to have robust and resilient supply chains which have assured access to “key materials, components and 263 …
The DCP23 commits Defence to prioritising time within its acquisition system (within the parameters of time, cost and performance) as: driving pace is critical–even if it forces us to increase our risk tolerance elsewhere. Our ambition is to reduce radically …
It also states that Defence intends to set “a maximum five-year commitment for acquisition programmes, with a maximum three-year commitment for digital programmes” although it acknowledges that the MOD procures a wide range of equipment, goods and services and so …
Both Commander, Strategic Command and the Minister for the Armed Forces were at pains to emphasise that this was a real change in approach. Commander, Strategic Command told us that Defence needed to look at long-term pipelines to supply the …
The Minister was clear that current procurement processes were no longer viable as a result of the pace of innovation.277 He acknowledged that this was a complete paradigm shift and a “frankly nascent part of policy making”.278 He warned that …
We welcome the Government’s decision to assess what the country would need to do to maintain a warfighting effort. However, it is worrying that this work had not already been undertaken. The national defence plan is still a work in …
It is a matter of national pride that whenever the Armed Forces are asked to carry out a task, they will find a way. It is to the credit of the Armed Forces that they have sustained this effort for …
Despite the Secretary of State’s insistence that the UK Armed Forces still have sufficient capacity to deploy in response to world events, we remain to be convinced. We are concerned that the breadth of ministerial requirements is in danger of …
We welcome the Government’s decision to assess what the country would need to do to maintain a warfighting effort. However, it is worrying that this work had not already been undertaken. The national defence plan is still a work in …
MoD will need to work closely with industry to ensure resilience in its supply chains. The MoD outsourced its central warehousing and the procurement of some of its commodities—food, clothing, general and medical supplies—to a consortium under the “Team Leidos” …
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) about its inventory management, with witnesses from MoD centre, Defence Support, and Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S).7 Type: conclusion …
MoD’s inventory management has faced long-standing issues with its many legacy IT systems, which have limited functionality and reinforce the fragmentation of its inventory management. Each Command has its own core inventory management system, and there are other systems used …
The MoD outsourced its central warehousing and the procurement of some of its commodities—food, clothing, general and medical supplies—to a consortium under the Team Leidos banner28 through the Logistics and Commodities Services Transformation (LCST) contract in 2015. Managed through DE&S, …
The MoD is looking at incorporating the learning from the LCST contract into its Future Defence Support Services (FDSS) programme, which aims to find the best inventory management arrangements when the LCST contract comes to an end.31 Recent events such …
Future conflicts may require sudden surges in demand and industrial capacity, which industry may then need support to provide. The MoD told us that the United Kingdom and other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members have put together a NATO …
The MoD must be transparent and realistic about the eventual size of the F-35 fleet, recognising that the planned deferral of this decision to the middle of this decade will damage the ability of UK industry to maintain an ongoing …
The far-reaching cuts to aircraft numbers set out in the 2021 Defence Command Paper weakened the UK’s air power capability at a time when the armed forces were already over-stretched. The scale of this gamble became clear less than a …
The UK Government should continue to be proactive in considering how the UK’s defence and security priorities in the North Atlantic and the High North may change in the future, in response to the changing geopolitical context and the effects …
In its response to this report, the UK Government should set out what scope it considers for the defence presence in Scotland to be sufficiently scaled up to respond to a scenario where the UK has greater obligations in the …
The refreshed Integrated Review may revise judgements about operational requirements and identify new priorities which are not currently funded in the Equipment Plan. The Ukraine conflict has necessitated a refresh of the 2021 Integrated Review. The Department expected that the …
We are concerned that the Department has not yet developed a supply chain that can reliably and quickly deliver the capabilities and stockpiles it needs. The Department has started to replenish stocks gifted to Ukraine, the cost of which HM …
In response to Russia’s invasion, the Government has decided to review its 2021 Integrated Review. This work has been led by the Cabinet Office. The Government published its Integrated Review Refresh 2023 in March 2023.15 The Department now expects to …
The Department said that it would argue for new capabilities through this process, and if it received more resources, it would add these to the Equipment Plan. However, it accepted that it would need to prioritise investment decisions if new …
The Department acknowledged that inflation also makes it difficult for suppliers to deliver due to rising staff and material costs.55 As a result, the Department is changing its contractual approach to take account of the inflation risk and avoid suppliers …
The Department faces significant challenges replenishing its stocks and delivering new capabilities to meet the threats of a more volatile world. The Department has begun replacing stocks gifted to Ukraine, either on a like-for-like basis or with an equivalent where …
The Department acknowledged that UK stocks were not sufficient even before gifts to Ukraine.59 A recent Royal United Services Institute report stated that at the height of fighting in the Donbas, Russia was using more ammunition in two days than …
Direction: from_committee
The UK should explore the value of linking contracts to increase UK exports to the US and lobby the US Administration to reduce the regulatory burdens placed on UK defence companies. Type: conclusion | Number: 5 | Paragraph: 28 | …
Defence industrial capacity needs to be both resilient and scalable. In order to secure supply chains the Secretary of State acknowledged that the Government needs to address skills shortages as well as committing to significant orders alongside allies 36 Special …
It is clear that the manner in which Western Governments procure armaments is not fit for purpose. The MOD produced a strategy aimed at improving the way that it engages with industry and allies almost two years ago and yet …
Direction: to_committee
The UK Government’s approach to procuring warships has shifted in recent years, and it is no longer the default position that warships will be designed and built fully in the UK, which was of concern to some in the Scottish …
In its response to this report, the UK Government should set out what work it did, in preparing the National Shipbuilding Strategy Refresh, to estimate and measure the benefits of procuring ships domestically for the Scottish economy and the wider …
The decision to award the Fleet Solid Support (FSS) ships to the international consortium Team Resolute is an example of a shift in the UK Government’s approach to warship procurement. We note that the UK Government chose the Team Resolute …
In its response to this report, the UK Government should confirm on what date it determined that Team UK’s bid for the Fleet Solid Support ships contract was non- compliant with the terms of the competition, what work was done …
The export of the Type 26 and Type 31 design licences is a great success story for the Scottish shipbuilding industry, and we are confident that further exports will follow. At the same time, export opportunities cannot be depended upon …
The role of exports of military ships/design licences in the National Shipbuilding Strategy should be to supplement, and not to replace, domestic demand. The UK Government should be prepared to use shipbuilding contracts strategically to sustain shipbuilding capacity in Scotland …
The UK Government should carry out and lay before Parliament a formal evaluation of the contribution of the National Shipbuilding Office after two years, and again after five and ten years, to assess whether it has succeeded in driving better …
The establishment of a National Shipbuilding Office hub in Edinburgh provides a welcome link to Scottish shipbuilders. Type: conclusion | Number: 12 | Paragraph: 39 | Response status: under_consideration Government response: 12 & 13: The Department are pleased that the …
To enhance its relationships with the Scottish shipbuilding sector, the National Shipbuilding Office should, by the end of 2023, establish a permanent staff presence in its Edinburgh hub, as the MoD and NSO have indicated. (Paragraph 40) The shipbuilding pipeline …
We wish to underline the importance to Scottish shipyards of maintaining a dependable ‘drumbeat’ of orders to allow them to invest and grow. The days of ‘feast and famine’ must not return. The creation of the National Shipbuilding Strategy suggests …
The UK Government should provide greater clarity about the work that will fill the whole of the 30-year shipbuilding pipeline into the 2030s and 2040s. It is of course difficult to calculate precise military needs beyond 2050. However, the UK …
Recent developments have introduced uncertainty about some orders in the pipeline and whether it sets out a clear ‘drumbeat’ of orders needed to sustain Scottish shipyards. The Fleet Solid Support Ships and the National Flagship are two examples. There has …
In its response to this report, and in its annual shipbuilding update to the Defence Select Committee, the UK Government should provide an update on the current status of the military shipbuilding pipeline for Scottish naval yards. In particular, it …
The award of the contract to build five additional Type 26 frigates to BAE Systems is welcome news for Scottish shipbuilding, and importantly continues the shipbuilding ‘drumbeat’ into the medium-term. We note that, partly as a consequence of global challenges, …
In its response, the UK Government should set out how much capacity it expects to now be available in the Scottish warship industry in each of the years between 2025– 2032 as a result of the decision to select Team …
We heard that historically the Ministry of Defence’s understanding of shipbuilding supply chains had been a vulnerability. The Secretary of State told us this had subsequently improved. The new Defence Supply Chain Strategy’s emphasis on building resilience in supply chains …
The Ministry of Defence should publish data on the composition of shipbuilding supply chains, to assist understanding of how the UK shipbuilding industry is structured. This should include regional breakdowns so that the extent of local supply chains and industry …
The UK Government should carry out and lay before Parliament a formal evaluation of the contribution of the National Shipbuilding Office after two years, and again after five and ten years, to assess whether it has succeeded in driving better …
The establishment of a National Shipbuilding Office hub in Edinburgh provides a welcome link to Scottish shipbuilders. Type: conclusion | Number: 39 | Response status: not_addressed Government response: The Department are pleased that the committee recognises the importance of the …
A theme we heard repeatedly emphasised during our inquiry was the importance of a regular ‘drumbeat’ of orders to provide a consistent workload that could help industry plan for the future. Stakeholders from all parts of the sector stressed that …
Stakeholders also emphasised that a steady ‘drumbeat’ could underpin future investment that would make the industry more productive in the future. Mr Waddell told us: It is a very simple equation. If businesses are faced with uncertainty, they do not …
In his foreword to the National Shipbuilding Strategy Refresh, the Defence Secretary says the UK Government “will give industry a much clearer demand signal about what we are trying to achieve with our procurement programmes” and that for the first …
Some parts of this pipeline have since been confirmed, such as the confirmation that the second batch of Type 26 frigates would be built by BAE at Govan (considered in more detail later in this chapter).73 However, the pipeline is …
Other elements of the pipeline face questions, including the Type 32 frigates, which under the pipeline suggested above would be built by Babcock at Rosyth from 2028 into the late 2030s. A National Audit Office report in November noted that, …
In addition to uncertainty around the Type 32 frigate, the selection of Team Resolute as the preferred bidder for the Fleet Solid Support ships contract (as discussed in paragraphs 20–27 above) also means that the FSS vessels (considered later in …
Representatives from the shipbuilding industry told us that having sight of upcoming shipbuilding projects over the coming decades was helpful, but that it was less clear how this translated into a drumbeat of work for shipyards. Ian Waddell of the …
In its December 2021 report “We’re going to need a bigger Navy”, the Defence Select Committee recommended that the Ministry of Defence provide Parliament with an annual shipbuilding plan, including the number of ships planned to enter and leave service …
We heard differing views over how decisions about how Scotland’s constitutional future might affect the shipbuilding pipeline. Professor Keith Hartley told us that “at the moment, the industry’s future depends on the Royal Navy. Without the Royal Navy, you would …
We wish to underline the importance to Scottish shipyards of maintaining a dependable ‘drumbeat’ of orders to allow them to invest and grow. The days of ‘feast and famine’ must not return. The creation of the National Shipbuilding Strategy suggests …
The UK Government should provide greater clarity about the work that will fill the whole of the 30-year shipbuilding pipeline into the 2030s and 2040s. It is of course difficult to calculate precise military needs beyond 2050. However, the UK …
Recent developments have introduced uncertainty about some orders in the pipeline and whether it sets out a clear ‘drumbeat’ of orders needed to sustain Scottish shipyards. The Fleet Solid Support Ships and the National Flagship are two examples. There has …
In its response to this report, and in its annual shipbuilding update to the Defence Select Committee, the UK Government should provide an update on the current status of the military shipbuilding pipeline for Scottish naval yards. In particular, it …
As noted in the section above, the Defence Select Committee has recommended that the Ministry of Defence provides an annual shipbuilding update to Parliament, and annual updates on particular programmes including the Type 26 frigate. No such update has yet …
The award of the contract to build five additional Type 26 frigates to BAE Systems is welcome news for Scottish shipbuilding, and importantly continues the shipbuilding ‘drumbeat’ into the medium-term. We note that, partly as a consequence of global challenges, …
Given the ongoing global uncertainties we ask the UK Government to provide annual updates on the construction of the Type 26 vessels to both Houses of Parliament. We note that the Defence Select Committee has made a similar recommendation, but …
As discussed in Chapter 2, in November 2022 the MOD took the decision to select Team Resolute as the preferred bidder for the Fleet Solid Support ships contract. The MOD did not select a bid from Team UK, a consortium …
The decision to select Team Resolute bid as the preferred bidder for the upcoming order of Fleet Solid Support ships could create a potential gap in the workstream for the Scottish warship industry. Type: conclusion | Number: 62 | Response …
In its response, the UK Government should set out how much capacity it expects to now be available in the Scottish warship industry in each of the years between 2025– 2032 as a result of the decision to select Team …
Another tool the MOD uses to attempt to deliver benefits for local economies and communities is through using social value criteria to evaluate contracts. The MOD has a minimum 20 per cent weighting for social value. which will be applied …
We heard there was some uncertainty over how MOD assessed social value, and how delivery of social value would be measured. Industry representatives told the Defence Committee that social value was “probably the biggest factor in deciding who will win …
The Defence Secretary acknowledged that the MOD’s understanding of supply chains had been “one of our vulnerabilities” in the past, but said that since then “there has been a real drive across Government, and certainly in our department, to map …
We heard that historically the Ministry of Defence’s understanding of shipbuilding supply chains had been a vulnerability. The Secretary of State told us this had subsequently improved. The new Defence Supply Chain Strategy’s emphasis on building resilience in supply chains …
The Ministry of Defence should publish data on the composition of shipbuilding supply chains, to assist understanding of how the UK shipbuilding industry is structured. This should include regional breakdowns so that the extent of local supply chains and industry …
The creation of the UKSST was widely welcomed by contributors to our inquiry.152 John Howie of Babcock described it as “a key example of…the longer term planning that is needed to ensure that we generate the next generation of the …
In written evidence, the UK Defence Journal set out their understanding of the shipbuilding pipeline for BAE Systems and Babcock as of April 2022 (Table 1). 64 BAE Systems (DIS0030) 65 UK Defence Journal (DIS0022) 66 Q2 67 Q3 68 …
We ask Ministers to consider whether the above recommendation, on closer working between the UK and allies in the EU and US, can be effectively delivered by requesting that the UK be invited to take part in relevant parts of …
We welcome the decision to launch the ECJU Transformation Programme and the opportunity it provides to improve and reform the work of the ECJU and its relationships with stakeholders. However, given the duty of DIT to inform us of relevant …
It is difficult not to feel a sense of déjà vu as we see British military ambitions which are not entirely matched by resources. Open conflict has returned to Europe and it is disappointing to see that the Government is …
In the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper, the Government identified and understood the implications of the range of complex and cascading threats faced by the UK. However, the impact of both the Afghan withdrawal and the Russian full-scale …
Defence in a Competitive Age and the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy are ambitious papers, aimed at modernising UK defence and ensuring it has equipment suitable for the Information Age. Whilst the conclusions of Defence in a Competitive Age ought …
We welcome the uplift to the MOD’s budget in 2020 and the four-year budget commitment. However, inflationary pressures and an increase in the scale of threat means that it is no longer enough. At the same time, serious concerns persist …
As well as an annual report on the implementation of the IR, we recommend the MOD produce an annual evaluation of what has been achieved in their implementation of Defence in a Competitive Age and DSIS. This evaluation should include …
We note that the 2014 commitment to increase the number of Regular Armed Forces personnel has been superseded by changing strategic priorities. We welcome the 2021 Future Soldier programme to increase the number of battalions in Scotland and that Scotland …
The military shipbuilding sector provides an important pipeline of highly skilled jobs for Scottish industry. While current Royal Navy Type 26 and Type 31 orders are very welcome, the future of the sector is dependent on favourable UK Government policies …
The UK Government should clarify definitively its position on whether current policies potentially allow for Royal Navy warships (such as destroyers, frigates and fleet solid support ships) to be procured and/or built overseas. If this potential exists—which could have a …
The Department told us it had reviewed its approach so that it no longer fell into the trap of setting an excessive number of requirements. It said it now only approved programmes with a reasonable number of requirements, such as …
More widely, the Committee asked whether the Plan was now based on a large number of past assumptions, observing that it does not include funding for capabilities 7 Q2 8 Q8 9 Q86 10 Qq 7–8 11 Q88 12 Q64 …
In line with our general policy on shipbuilding, we call on the Home Office to ensure that any new vessels are built in British yards, to ensure national capacity is maintained (Paragraph 11) Criticism of the policy Type: recommendation | …
The National Shipbuilding Strategy refresh must finally take on board the consistent recommendations given in successive reports by a range of experts. This includes providing a steady pipeline of work for British shipyards and working collaboratively with industry. The refresh …
The Bank has been insufficiently curious when identifying where money lent through the schemes, including by Greensill, has ultimately gone. Companies have borrowed around £30 billion under CBILS and CLBILS. The schemes’ rules require these funds be used to support …
The Department’s enquiries of the Bank during Greensill’s accreditation created a damaging perception of interference, though the Bank asserts that this did not affect its judgement. The Department had eight email exchanges with the Bank between April and September 2020 …
The Department continually fails to learn from its mistakes. The Department has been delivering equipment programmes for decades and has overseen many expensive failures. There have been at least 13 formal reviews of defence procurement policy over the last 35 …
The Department spends significant sums on the developmental stages of programmes while suppliers may not be paying their fair share. The Department argued that it is standard practice to pay for work against agreed milestones across areas such as development, …
The Department’s willingness and ability to systematically record its learning from existing programmes is critical to securing improvements in the future. There have been at least 13 formal reviews of defence procurement policy over the last 35 years, which have …
In 2018, the Department established a Strategic Partnering Programme (SPP) to maximise commercial leverage with its 19 most important suppliers by improving contract performance and managing strategic risks.45 The Department told us that the 38 C&AG’s report, para 3.16 39 …
In addition to delaying the publication of the Integrated Review, it seems inevitable that the pandemic must also influence its conclusions. Coronavirus has highlighted serious deficiencies in the UK’s domestic resilience in the face of an anticipated threat. We have …
The Defence equipment programme is routinely jeopardised by factors that drive inflation in defence projects. Defence projects are often long-term, complex and involve new technologies, which makes them vulnerable to cost inflation. This Committee has highlighted that inflation in equipment …
In our report on the Equipment Plan 2019–2029, we expressed our concern that the Department had still not established an affordable long-term investment programme in military equipment and had missed opportunities to take the necessary difficult decisions to develop an …
In November 2020, the government announced that it would provide an additional £16.5 billion of funding over the next four years, which represents a 10% increase in the defence budget over this period.45 The Department said that HM Treasury has …
The Department confirmed that the Integrated Review—which had not been published at the time we took evidence—would contain substantially different capability choices from the current Equipment Plan.55 The government intends that the additional funding will be invested in capability enhancements …
Faced with an unaffordable programme, we questioned the Department’s ability to achieve value for money from its equipment expenditure. We have seen many examples of the Department not buying the quantity of kit or the number of capabilities that it …
While pointing out that this was also a problem encountered by other countries, the Department acknowledged that it did not have a good understanding of the unique factors that drive inflation on defence projects, and that there was work to …
We are concerned that the Ministry of Defence, and in particular Defence Equipment and Support may not have sufficient technically qualified staff and capacity to manage effectively the multiple armoured vehicle procurement and upgrade programmes that are currently underway. Given …
We support the Ministry of Defence’s initiative to develop a Land Industrial Strategy. The LIS should place the land sector on an equal footing with the Air and Maritime sectors, providing industry with certainty for the coming decades and ensuring …
We agree that it is important the Ministry of Defence maximises the collaborative opportunities offered by the recent investments in the UK’s armoured vehicles sector. The Department should ensure that it leverages these advantages by making a clear decision about …
We trust the creation of and adherence to the proposed Land Industrial Strategy will improve the UK’s competitiveness in this sector. The Ministry of Defence, the British Army and their Industry counterparts must work together to map out the coming …
As a result of the Ministry of Defence’s approach of encouraging inward investment, foreign involvement in the UK defence supply chain is widespread, with the UK hosting a broad range of UK-based and international suppliers. This approach has brought many …
The Ministry of Defence should assess the implications of Chinese ownership of the companies listed within this report. Type: conclusion | Number: 4 | Paragraph: 24 | Response status: under_consideration Government response: The Government notes the Committee’s recommendation and would …
The Ministry of Defence’s open and country-agnostic approach to foreign involvement means that the defence supply chain has been open to potentially hostile foreign involvement, with reports of companies being owned and influenced by foreign Governments whose values and behaviours …
The relative indifference of the Ministry of Defence to the possible relocation of General Electric’s Rugby facility was concerning. We are pleased that this important industrial capacity ultimately remained in the UK. The Ministry of Defence should prioritise the maintenance …
Venture capitalism helps to drive innovation in defence and associated industries. However, we heard concerns that venture capitalist funding could represent an avenue for hostile foreign investors to gain entry into the UK defence supply chain. The Minister for Business …
The defence industry in the UK has remained broadly resilient in the face of financial pressures resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for all businesses within the defence supply chain, particularly those that also operate …
The Ministry of Defence and wider Government have provided substantial support to businesses in the defence supply chain. Unfortunately, we heard that this support has not always reached its intended beneficiaries or had the intended consequences. The Ministry of Defence …
The commercial aerospace industry remains financially fragile. The Ministry of Defence should already be aware of the close links between this industry and the defence supply chain and should consider what more it can do to support businesses which operate …
The COVID-19 pandemic impacted the supply chains of defence businesses as well as their finances. Global supply chains for defence represent a vulnerability, especially when these supply chains include materials from countries not closely aligned with the UK. The Ministry …
In producing a national strategy for critical and emerging technologies, the Government should assess the UK’s domestic research and development capability for each technology area as well as the capability of its allies. As the Government looks 5G market diversification …
There remains considerable uncertainty over the Department’s future ambitions for Carrier Strike. The government is re-assessing its defence priorities in the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (the Review), which it is due to publish in November …
It remains to be seen whether the foreign policy aspect of the Review will produce a distinct Foreign Policy Strategy or whether this will be combined with a National Security Strategy. Whether the Review produces one, two, or three documents, …
Given that systemic challenges have not been resolved in the previous thirteen reviews of defence procurement, we doubt that the Integrated Review will come up with even a short-term fix. We believe that the Review ought to address the strategic …
We have heard that external engagement in the Review process provides a challenge function to the Government’s understanding, can act as an early signpost to stakeholders who can contribute to achieving the UK’s security and defence priorities and contributes to …
Loading new-since list…
Loading External Lens…
The Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 (DIS) — published 8 September 2025 1 by the Ministry of Defence as the defence sector plan within the UK's Modern Industrial Strategy — restructures UK defence industrial policy around procurement reform, regional Defence Growth Deals, a £182m skills package and stronger export support, all sitting beneath the Strategic Defence Review 2025 2 and its 2.5%-by-2027 fiscal trajectory. Operational delivery is now under way: the Scotland (March 2026) 3 and Northern Ireland (April 2026) 4 £50m Defence Growth Deals have launched; export-control liberalisation has shipped through SI 2025/1197 5 and the four-nation Agreement on Defence Export Controls 6; and UK Defence Innovation has consolidated DASA, DIU and DE&S FCI 7. The live credibility risk is the still-unpublished Defence Investment Plan, on which the Defence Committee held a one-off evidence session 8 and the Public Accounts Committee has registered sharp criticism.
DIS sits at the centre of an unusually busy regime architecture. The strategic predicate — Strategic Defence Review 2025 1 and National Security Strategy 2025 2 — was settled by summer 2025, with the Modern Industrial Strategy framing defence as one of eight growth-driving sectors. DIS itself 3 was published 8 September 2025, followed within weeks by the UK Defence Footprint companion mapping the regional industrial base 4 and the major skills boost pre-launch 5. Delivery vehicles have been consolidated: the Defence Reform programme of April 2025 6 restructured MOD into four areas including a National Armaments Director group 7; UKDI consolidated three innovation bodies in July 2025 8; and the April 2026 ALB Reforms WMS confirmed DECA's merger into DE&S 9. On the export side, SI 2025/1197 10 came into force on 16 December 2025 — implementing Wassenaar/MTCR updates, lifting the UK arms embargo on Armenia and Azerbaijan, and updating dual-use lists for quantum computing, advanced semiconductor manufacturing and additive manufacturing — and the UK acceded to the four-nation Agreement on Defence Export Controls on 9 December 2025 11. Two of the five Defence Growth Deals have launched: Scotland (£50m, 12 March 2026) 12 and Northern Ireland (£50m, 22 April 2026) 13. The MOD has set a 50% SME spend uplift target vs FY23/24 (≈£2.5bn) 14, but the Defence Investment Plan replacing the Equipment Plan remains unpublished.
The defining feature of the last 90 days is parliamentary frustration at the Defence Investment Plan's non-publication. The Defence Committee held a one-off oral evidence session on 24 March 2026 specifically on the impact of the delay to the Defence Investment Plan on industry 1, and PAC's prior 32nd Report — The Future of the Equipment Plan — together with its 'extremely disappointed' press notice frames MOD as accountable for the gap. Two Lords PQs (HL16616, HL16617) tabled on 21 April 2026 went unanswered before Prorogation, and Chief Secretary James Murray took a 28 April 2026 Commons oral question on DIS effectiveness from John Milne LD 2. Delivery has progressed in parallel: the Northern Ireland £50m Defence Growth Deal launched on 22 April 2026 3; the MOD ALB Reforms WMS 4 of 23 April restructured delivery bodies; and PQs 122217-8 confirmed both the £250m Defence Growth Deals envelope and the £182m Defence Industry Skills Package as DIS commitments 5. The UK-Ukraine Enhanced Security and Defence Industrial Collaboration Declaration of 17 March 2026 channelled the 'battlefield-tested innovations' element of DIS into a bilateral framework.
The single most important near-term milestone is publication of the Defence Investment Plan 1. PAC's June 2025 32nd Report argued the predecessor Equipment Plan was unaffordable; without a published successor, the DIS's industrial commitments — £250m for five Growth Deals 2, £182m for skills 3, 50% SME spend uplift ≈£2.5bn 4, six new munitions factories backing the £1.5bn 'always-on munitions pipeline' 5 — float untested. Three remaining English-region Defence Growth Deals are pending within the £250m envelope; Lord Forbes's March 2026 Lords oral question 6 flagged English regional impact as a live scrutiny line. The annual SME Action Plan with a direct spend target is expected post-Prorogation per PQ 127437 7. The National Shipbuilding Strategy update is pending per PQ 129666 8. The Defence Committee has demanded the National Armaments Director give public evidence 9 — watch for whether MOD complies. Externally, the 2.5% GDP defence spending threshold is due to be reached in 2027 10; the first NAO post-DIS audit and the first OBR Spending Review treatment of the DIS envelope will set the external credibility baseline that PAC will weaponise. Watch also for further Export Control Order amendments tracking Wassenaar / MTCR plenary outcomes, given SI 2025/1197 was the second amendment in 2025 11.
The headline risk is fiscal-credibility lag: SDR 2025's 2.5%-by-2027 / 3%-next-Parliament trajectory 1 and DIS's £250m+£182m named envelopes have no externally validated costing absent the Defence Investment Plan, and NAO's December 2023 finding that the Equipment Plan was unaffordable 2 remains the live baseline. PAC has explicitly recorded its disappointment at the absence of a public spending plan. A second risk is implementation opacity around the National Armaments Director post and UKDI's role — both are central to delivery but neither has appeared publicly to explain how DIS commitments translate into procurement decisions. Inferred from corpus gap: the £50m Scotland and £50m Northern Ireland Defence Growth Deals together account for £100m of the £250m envelope, leaving three English deals at an average ≈£50m each undisclosed. Inferred from corpus gap: no published NAO successor audit to the December 2023 Equipment Plan study exists in the corpus, meaning the regime's most important external scrutiny input is currently absent.
This briefing treats DIS 2025 (the defence sector plan within the Modern Industrial Strategy, published 8 September 2025 1) as the live regime, with the 2021 Defence and Security Industrial Strategy as predecessor. The 2018 Combat Air Strategy 2, the 2023 DE&S Strategy 3, the 2023 Defence Aviation Net Zero Strategy 4 and the Defence Diplomacy Strategy 2026 5 are noted as adjacent sub-strategies rather than core DIS instruments. Defence personnel policy and recruitment, the operational deployment of UK forces, and detailed defence R&D funding decisions sit outside scope per the thread definition; defence nuclear enterprise updates are included only where they intersect with industrial capacity (e.g. Sheffield Fo
Bills and Acts this regime substantively depends on. Links go to the bill's own thread on this site (where available) and to bills.parliament.uk.
Primary statutory power under which SI 2025/1197 amends the Export Control Order 2008 — the legally binding layer through which DIS's export-control commitments operate.
Provides the Single Source Contract Regulations framework; DIS's procurement-reform pillar includes proposed SSCR reform consulted on in 2023, making DRA 2014 a continuing statutory anchor for non-competitive defence procurement.
Cross-cutting procurement statute under which MOD's 1,398 major contracts since July 2024 [37454] are now awarded; DIS's procurement reforms operate within the Procurement Act regime including its national security exemptions.
The Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 is not a statute; it is a strategy paper sitting at the apex of a four-layer doctrinal stack and binding only through the procurement, licensing and fiscal instruments beneath it. The TOP layer is strategic framing — the Strategic Defence Review 2025 1, the National Security Strategy 2025 2 and the Modern Industrial Strategy [candpk=8358] together set the threat picture, the 2.5%/3% fiscal trajectory and the eight-sector growth framing within which defence is named a 'sector plan'.
The SECOND layer is the strategy itself — DIS 2025 3 published 8 September 2025 — together with its operationalising companions: the UK Defence Footprint 4, the £182m Defence Industry Skills Package 5, £250m for five Defence Growth Deals 6, the Defence Diplomacy Strategy 7 and predecessor regimes (DSIS 2021 [candpk=424326]; SME Action Plan 2022 8; Land Industrial Strategy 9; Refreshed National Shipbuilding Strategy 2022 10; Defence Supply Chain Strategy 2022 11).
The THIRD layer is the delivery apparatus reorganised through Defence Reform — Defence Equipment & Support, the new UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) consolidating DASA / DIU / DE&S FCI 12, the National Armaments Director group 13, and the ongoing ALB consolidation including DECA's merger into DE&S 14. This layer DELIVERS DIS through individual procurement decisions and Defence Growth Deal designations; it does not change DIS's strategy text.
The FOURTH layer is the binding legal layer — the Export Control Act 2002 / Export Control Order 2008 regime (amended by SI 2025/1197 15), the assimilated Dual-Use Regulation and Torture Goods Regulation, and bilateral treaty instruments like the Agreement on Defence Export Controls 16 and Lancaster House 2.0 17. THIS is where DIS's export pillar becomes legally operative: liberalised licensing under the four-nation agreement, updated dual-use list entries for quantum computing and advanced semiconductors, and the lifting of the UK arms embargo on Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The doctrinal point is that DIS commitments — '50% SME spend uplift', '£182m skills', 'five Growth Deals' — are politically binding but legally unenforceable in themselves; they bind only through Defence Investment Plan budget allocations (the document Parliament has been waiting for since autumn 2025), procurement contract structures, and the export-licensing regime. PAC has flagged the credibility gap [candpk=30477] and the Defence Committee has demanded the National Armaments Director appear to explain delivery 13.
Geographically-targeted £50m investment package from the £250m DIS regional envelope; first awarded to Scotland (12 March 2026) and Northern Ireland (22 April 2026).
The successor to the annual Equipment Plan announced in SDR 2025; will set out how SDR's vision will be delivered through procurement and capability planning.
Concept from SDR's £1.5bn additional investment for energetics and munitions, encompassing six new munitions factories.
Defence is one of eight growth-driving sectors under the UK's Modern Industrial Strategy; DIS is its sector plan.
Publication of the Defence Investment Plan — the single most-watched DIS milestone; PAC and Defence Committee already on record demanding it. Multiple PQs (117847, HL16616, 128310) tabled in March-April 2026.
Publication of the annual SME Action Plan with direct spending target — confirmed pending by PQ 127437.
Government response to the DIS Offset Written Consultation (closed 23 December 2025).
Three further Defence Growth Deal launches (English regional allocations) within the £250m envelope; Scotland and NI accounted for £100m.
Update to the National Shipbuilding Strategy — PQ 129666 confirms an update is pending.
First credibility test of the SDR/DIS fiscal trajectory — UK defence spending due to reach 2.5% of GDP by 2027.
Defence Committee scrutiny of the National Armaments Director — committee has recommended public evidence.
Further Export Control Order amendments tracking Wassenaar / MTCR plenary outcomes — SI 2025/1197 was the second of two amendments in 2025.
Treats DIS 2025 as the operational architecture for delivering SDR 2025's industrial pillar — explicitly positioning defence as 'an engine for growth' through Defence Growth Deals, the £182m skills package and a 50% SME-spend uplift target. Frames the Defence Investment Plan as the costed delivery instrument that will follow and treats the export-control liberalisation (SI 2025/1197, Agreement on Defence Export Controls) as a complementary growth lever.Sep 2025Nov 2025Jul 2025Apr 2026Dec 2025
Tension with Public Accounts Committee, Defence Committee
Stated political owner of DIS — used the November 2025 'Factories of the future' WMS to anchor the £1.5bn munitions/energetics package, the July 2025 Defence Reform WMS to establish UKDI as the delivery vehicle, and the original December 2024 commitment to publish DIS in late spring 2025 (slipped to September 2025).Nov 2025Jul 2025Dec 2024
Delivers DIS through Parliament — gave the 8 September 2025 Commons launch statement and the April 2026 ALB Reforms WMS consolidating defence delivery bodies. Treats DIS as the answer to the persistent Defence Investment Plan publication question.Sep 2025Apr 2026
Lords mirror on every DIS WMS — Defence Export Controls Agreement, Factories of the Future, ALB Reforms, Defence Diplomacy Strategy. Provides cross-house continuity and answers Lords PQs on industrial-base resilience [37809, 37808].Dec 2025Nov 2025Apr 2026Mar 2026
On the Modern Industrial Strategy umbrella: positions defence as one of eight growth-driving sectors and frames DIS as DBT-MOD joint policy. Owns the Export Control Joint Unit and the SI 2025/1197 export-control update, including the Armenia/Azerbaijan embargo lift.Sep 2025Nov 2025
Welcomes the expansion of the industrial base and engagement of HM Treasury and DBT but is sharply critical of implementation pace — explicitly recommends measuring and benchmarking the defence industrial base annually, demands the National Armaments Director give evidence, and held a one-off oral evidence session on the impact of the Defence Investment Plan delay on industry. Position: supportive of regime architecture, hostile to implementation opacity.Mar 2026Nov 2025Nov 2025
Tension with Ministry of Defence
On the Scotland Defence Growth Deal and shipbuilding: pushes for stronger Scottish defence industrial footprint, has inquired into 'Securing Scotland's Future: Defence Skills and Jobs' (Oct 2025) and previously the Defence in Scotland: military shipbuilding inquiry (2023). Welcomes the March 2026 £50m Scotland Defence Growth Deal as partial response.Apr 2023Apr 2026
On defence spending in Northern Ireland: launched inquiry in Feb 2024 noting MOD spending in NI is significantly below NI's industrial potential; the £50m NI Defence Growth Deal of April 2026 responds to this scrutiny line.Apr 2026
Independent baseline: the December 2023 Equipment Plan report found the Plan unaffordable with the largest deficit since 2012. NAO has not yet published a successor audit; its 2023 finding remains the external credibility benchmark against which DIS and the Defence Investment Plan are measured.Dec 2023
On DIS effectiveness: tabled the 28 April 2026 Commons oral question to the Chief Secretary on what discussions HMT has had with the Defence Secretary on DIS effectiveness — an LD scrutiny chip targeting fiscal credibility.Apr 2026
On DIS regional growth and jobs: tabled the March 2026 Lords oral question on potential impact of DIS 2025 on economic growth and job creation in English regions — focusing scrutiny on whether the £250m Growth Deal envelope reaches English regions outside the announced Scotland and NI deals.Mar 2026
On regional DIS impact (Northern Ireland): tabled the February 2026 Commons oral question on potential impact of DIS 2025 on Northern Ireland — a precursor to the April 2026 NI Defence Growth Deal launch.Feb 2026
On regional DIS impact: persistent backbench scrutiny voice on Northern Ireland impact of DIS through October 2025 and February 2026 oral questions; supportive of regional-deal architecture.Oct 2025Feb 2026
On DIS SME pillar: tabled the January 2025 Commons oral question to Maria Eagle on DIS support for defence-sector SMEs — opened the parliamentary scrutiny track that eventually produced the 50% SME spend uplift target and the pending SME Action Plan.Jan 2025
On DIS strategic coherence: former Defence Committee Chair, intervened in both the 2021 DSIS debate and the September 2025 DIS Commons launch; provides continuity Conservative scrutiny questioning whether the regime delivers warfighting capability quickly enough.Sep 2025
On the need for a defence industrial strategy: asked the original July 2020 oral question to Ben Wallace about developing a defence industrial strategy that opened this entire thread, and re-engaged in the March 2021 DSIS debate; institutional memory voice favouring a strong industrial pillar.Jul 2020
On DIS scrutiny in the Lords: spoke in both the September 2025 DIS Lords statement and the March 2021 DSIS debate; provides continuity backbench Labour scrutiny on procurement and industrial-base questions.Sep 2025
On DIS as former MOD Lords minister: spoke in the September 2025 DIS Lords statement and the March 2021 DSIS debate; provides Conservative continuity voice on procurement reform.Sep 2025
On DIS industrial-base / exports angle: crossbench peer with business background; spoke in both the September 2025 DIS Lords statement and the 2021 DSIS debate.Sep 2025
On the 2021 DSIS predecessor regime: as Minister for Defence Procurement delivered the 23 March 2021 Commons statement launching DSIS — the regime DIS 2025 replaces.Mar 2021
On the original DSIS review: as Secretary of State for Defence issued the March 2020 review-of-DSIS statement and the 2022 NSS Refresh — the institutional history underpinning the current regime.Mar 2020